Re: SV: Information and Natural Languages

> Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 12:31:58 +0100 (MET)
> Reply-to: fis@listas.unizar.es
> From: Brier S�ren <SBR@db.dk>
> To: Multiple recipients of list <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Subject: SV: Information and Natural Languages
Dear Soeren,

thanks for the long mail. I did not read your interesting papers. As
I did not get any Christmas present from you until now, I would very
much appreciate one like this!
>
> You pose such difficult questions!

well, I hope so! it is better if we try to pose 'difficult questions'
instead of taking things for granted...
>
 you write:
 
> Autopoiesis was originally defined as the state of living systems by
> Maturana and Varela.
> > Luhmann has suggested a general theory of Autopoiesis . He writes:
> "If we abstract from life and define autopoiesis as a general form of a
> system building using self-referential closure, we would have to that
> there are non-living autopoietic systems" p. 2 in "Essays on
> self-reference".
>
so we have a(n old) discussion between living and non-living systems.
Instead of 'life' we use now the term 'autopoietic' that allows us to
speak about (former) non-living systems as 'outopoietic' and ideed
the whole universe as an autopoietic system. But does it make any
sense to say (as you do at the end of this posting) that the
universe observes itself etc.? Does it make any sense to postulate
this kind of pseudo-subjectivity? (the same with regard to 'the
evolution')

You write:
> As far as I know Heidegger it is very close to his theory, because an
> autopoietic system is always already "in the world". It emerges from a
> world. But this world only emerges a 'the world' as the system becomes
> aware of itself and therefore observes the difference between itself and
> the world.
>
Heidegger's 'in-der-Welt-sein'-theory is a (in Popperian sense)
falsification of classical metaphysics. For metaphysics all entities
are in the same way in space and in time. Now Heidegger was looking
for one example where this is not the case. And this case is the kind
of being-in-the-world that our kind of being is. 'World' is not the
earth (not: being-on-the-earth), but 'world' means a network (!) of
meaningful relationships (Luhmann's 'Sinn'), in which we are embedded
'from the very beginning' (a priori). Being-in-the-world means also,
that we are not an encapsulated subjectivity trying to reach an
'outside world', but precisely that we are always embedded in a
process of dis-covering what things are. Heidegger's falsification of
metaphysics means that ontology cannot be based uncritically on a
special kind of being (non-living, being, human being, mathematical
beings, technical beings, divine beings etc.), but that the 'meaning
of being' is (for us) an open task. We are continously creating or
'casting' being (casting agents of being) as far as we cast 'a world'
i.e.a 'world view'.

> Venlig hilsen/Best wishes

muchos saludos y Feliz Navidad!
Rafael
Received on Thu Dec 11 16:54:09 1997