Re: SV: SV: Information and Natural Languages

Dear Soeren,
your write:
>It is very interesting to consider if there are qualitative basic
different kinds of existing in the world.
Like Aristotle I think that there are levels of subjectivity but cannot
anymore see any reasonability of the mechanistic idea of physical being.
Classical physics misuses the Greek term of physis.
Once - especially the empiricists - thought that you could observe
passively. Nobody can hold that view any more after the quantum physics
observer discussion. So I will hold that an observer is also a doer.<

the problem is, what does "basic" mean! I am sure you can see
differences (or make or find them!) between, say, a house, a cat, the
Pacific ocean, the Danish crown, the Second World War, Shakespeare's
"Much ado about nothing", etc. etc. This is, indeed, an ontological
question. Maybe the misuse of classical physics of the Greek term
_physis_ is similar to the problem of time Koichiro is rising.
Objective time presupposes a kind of objective ontology and of
objective time (linearity, reversibility). If we are 'part' of
reality, 'inside' it, this 'being inside' (and outside) is obviously
different from the way other beings are. Remember for instance the
difference between Greek _chronos_ (time) and _kairos_ (the right
moment).
Kind regards,
Rafael

Venlig hilsen/Best wishes

Assoc. Prof. Ph. D. S�ren Brier
Royal School of Library and Information Science, Aalborg Branch
Langagervej 4, DK-9220 Aalborg �st
Telephone: +45 98 157922 , Fax: +45 98 151042
Homepage: http://www.db.dk/dbaa/sbr/home_uk.htm
Ed. & Publisher of Cybernetics & Human Knowing
homepage: http://www.db.dk/dbaa/sbr/cyber.htm

> ----------
> Fra: Rafael Capurro, Professor[SMTP:CAPURRO@hbi-stuttgart.de]
> Sendt: 11. december 1997 16:01
> Til: Multiple recipients of list
> Emne: Re: SV: Information and Natural Languages
>
> Dear Soeren,
>
> I am not so sure if this is very helpful: to say everythink is a
> potential observer seems to me like Teilhard de Chardin's idea that
> everything (including particles) have some kind of consciousness, or
> the (metaphysical) idea that everything is spirit or matter or
> whatever. If you want to distinguish between different ways of being
> an observer, then you must make qualitative differences.
> If an observer is always 'an-observer-in-the-world' i.e. if there is
> no place outside the world (or an absolute observer), there we can
> say that observers are precisely characterized by their
> 'in-the-world-being'. This presupposes that other things which are
> not observers but are also 'in-the-world' are not in the world in the
> way observers are. By the way, we should reflect also that observers
> are suppose to 'observe' i.e. not to actively intervene in the
> processes they observe (although their observation is a kind of
> doing). This is, I think, one week point of Luhmann's conception, as
> it disregards the praxis. But the question again is, what does it
> mean to be a 'doer'. Everything is doing something as far as it is
> moving (this was the Aristotelian standpoint in his Physics, but
> Aristotle differentiates very clearly between 'praxis' and 'poiesis'
> and 'kinesis').
> Cheers
> Rafael
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 12:54:12 +0100 (MET)
> Reply-to: fis@listas.unizar.es
> From: Brier S�ren <SBR@db.dk>
> To: Multiple recipients of list <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Subject: SV: Information and Natural Languages
>
> Dear Koichiro
>
> You write: "My observers are exclusively internal, even including
> myself.
> There is no such a non-observer out there."
>
> I guess that all observers are internal to the universe? Aren't they.
> Laplaces demon is dead.
>
> Now everybody agree that an important part of the universe consists of
> observers: the living systemseven in the standard scientific
> (physicalistic) world view.
>
> One of the questions is if we will ever be able to form a consisten
> theory of the development of life and consciousness and thereby
> consistent with our own epistemology in this ontology. I seriously
> doubt
> it.
>
> Are we not forced to consider all systems we observe as observing
> systems? That means that a stone or an elementary particle is an
> observer, but on a much lower level that languaging self-conscious
> social humans. We recognize animals as observers on a lower scale than
> humans. But so far the scientific world view has stopped there, mainly
> because of physicalism.
>
> Venlig hilsen/Best wishes
>
> Assoc. Prof. Ph. D. S�ren Brier
> Royal School of Library and Information Science, Aalborg Branch
> Langagervej 4, DK-9220 Aalborg �st
> Telephone: +45 98 157922 , Fax: +45 98 151042
> Homepage: http://www.db.dk/dbaa/sbr/home_uk.htm
> Ed. & Publisher of Cybernetics & Human Knowing
> homepage: http://www.db.dk/dbaa/sbr/cyber.htm
>
> > ----------
> > Fra: koichiro matsuno/7129[SMTP:kmatsuno@vos.nagaokaut.ac.jp]
> > Sendt: 11. december 1997 10:54
> > Til: Multiple recipients of list
> > Emne: Re: Information and Natural Languages
> >
> > Rafael, I was too blunt previously.
> >
> > >the question is what does it mean to be an observer? or, in other
> > >words, what is the ontological status of a non-observer.
> >
> > My observers are exclusively internal, even including myself.
> > There is no such a non-observer out there. This view however causes
> > a lot of headache to us, especially with regard to their ontological
>
> > status. Heidegger seems to have considered this problem seriously.
> > Some Heideggerian in the States told me that Heidegger in his
> intended
> >
> > mysterious third division of "Sein und Zeit" tried to establish a
> new
> > ontology based upon the present progressive tense. In other words,
> if
> >
> > everything is an actor or an observer in one way or another, the
> most
> > direct means of its description is in the present progressive tense
> > instead of in the present tense. I am quite sympathetic to the view.
>
> > Incidently, that Heideggerian found such statements in the
> > hand-written
> > manuscript (roughly 200 pages) by Heidegger himself, kept in the
> > library
> > of the University of Marburg.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Koichiro
> >
> > Koichiro Matsuno
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
Received on Mon Dec 15 20:28:08 1997