Re: Biology, technology and information

From: Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]>
Date: Wed 11 Mar 1998 - 04:27:20 CET

Dear Rafael:
Dear All:

Your recent post gets to the heart of the matter. After, some ten years
of trans-disciplinary discussions, I am totally persuaded that
individuals from different disciplines must work extraordinary hard to
grasp the professional or domain meanings intended by other
professionals from other disciplines. This separation has emerged in
historical terms as Ray as so nicely pointed out. It is a modern
phenomenon, identified earlier by C P Snow in the '50s as simply two
cultures. Now, we have "N" cultures and no sign of convergence!

Rafael Capurro, Professor wrote:
>
> Thank you Ray for your clarification concerning the history of ideas
> with regard to the mutual influences between the biosciences and
> engineering/technology. This is, I think, a key question in an
> interdisciplinary dialogue, where everyone is having particular
> phenomena in mind while at the sime time using the same words which
> are sometimes analogue, somtimes equivoc and sometimes synonym!

Exactly! The heart of the problem of communication across boundaries or
degrees of organization.
  Consider the term "energy" in physics, biology, social behavior and
music! How are these meanings related to each other? Are the meanings
related to one-to-one correspondences or in terms of coherence?

> (Peter's "Capurro's trilemma"). If a biologist uses the word
> information in order to grasp a transformation that takes place as a
> living organism interacts with the 'Umwelt' then he is, I think, in a
> similar (!) situation as a linguist who says, that information is not
> just meaning, but that it is a given transformation of a cognitive
> structure (or, hermeneutical speaking, of a pre-understanding).

An good example which finds coherence at higher degrees of organization.
However, a chemical transformation is precisely defined in terms of the
atoms and the organizational structures of the molecules. The equations
for a chemical transformation, say an oxidation reaction, are written so
that they generate one-to-one correspondences between the subatomic
particles (electrons tranferred), atoms and molecules.
Thus, the chemical transformation assumes a very exact one - to- one
correspondence truth function. At higher degrees of organization
involving two or more organisms, such as 'Umwelt' interactions or verbal
exchanges, it is seldom that one-to-one truth functions exist. (Not
impossible, but seldom.) The philosophical notion of coherent truth or
consistency over the system may be more appropriate.

> Information is, in the first case, a difference that makes a
> difference (Bateson)

For example: A - B = C? (Where A,B,C are simple natural numbers?)
I would call this structural distinctions. This is how we distinguish a
molecule with one name from a molecule with another name. Of course,
these distinctions refer to both the number of atoms in the molecule and
the organization of the atoms in the molecules - the so-called "graphs"
of the molecules.

> and in the second case is a difference that
> finds a difference (Luhmann).

For example:

A multiplied by B equals D
and
A multiplied by C equals E?

 I would call this a functional distinction,( but this is a weaker
example than the first.) The process of finding the difference between
B and C requires a third object, A.

In both cases information is (following
> Weizsaecker and others) not a quality of something but a quality of
> something with regard to a (cognitive) structure. This is a triadic
> situation as underlined by Soeren (and semiotics).

Could you explain why you feel that this requires a semiotic treatment?
Is it really a representational issue?

This is also what
> Kant says when he talks about qualities belonging to things and
> qualities that refer to a knower who adscribes them to (the
> qualities) of things. Information is, thus, an (our, or, more
> generally, a structure's) adscription of something (having its given
> qualities). It is, as E. Oeser puts it, a second order quality.
> This is the reason, I think, why we can talk about information (in
> general) while at the same time having different phenomena in mind
> (and in our hands!).

Is this a modern phenomenon with respect to the evolution of the
definition of information? Who knows the earlier linguistic history of
this term?

One of the curious things about Shannon's definition of information is
that it uses three separate mathematical operations: addition,
multiplication and exponentiation (or log).
Mathematically,
 multiplication is defined as iteration of addition; and
exponentiation is defined as iteration of multiplication.

In other words, various iterations of various iterations will describe
lots of things - both within the sciences and within the humanities.

Finally, from a organizational hierarchy viewpoint, no units are
assigned the objects.
Thus, Shannon's definition can be applied to any stationary distribution
(your "general information"). Furthermore, since the units are not
integral to the definition, any phenomenon which can be expressed as a
stationary distribution can be approximated as "information".

Is it unusual that one can give a precise mathematical definition for a
calculation, and, at the same time, be vague about the meaning of the
equation? Shannon's formula achieves this!!

Regards to All
Jerry
Received on Wed Mar 11 04:26:21 1998

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