Re: metaphors

Dear Jerry,

thanks for the comments. Very briefly:
1) I think there is a misunderstanding when I said _science starts with the
present tense_. Of course science, being a human activity, is grounded in
the _present progressive tense_. But the way(s) it looks a things and the
way(s) it makes _predictions_ are based (at least since modernity) on the
separation between _subject_ and _object_. This allows _predictability_, as
far as we can _take distance_ (the more the better) from the objects of
study. History (and humanities) are _less objective_ as far as the
_distance_ is more difficult to take (because their _object_ is of the kind
of the present progressive tense). The _predictability_ in the case of
historical science turns out to be, as Popper said, _historicisistic_. This
may be partly (?) superseded by quantum mechanics and in philosophy by
thinkers like Wittgenstein and Heidegger (and Nietzsche, and...)
2) time and space are _equipromordial_ (in German: gleichurspruenglich)
(either, like in Kant, as apriori of subjectivity, or, as in the case of
Heidegger, as _existentials_). For science (at least in the ideal case of
modern _objective_ sciences) time needs to be treated indeed as a
_continuous variable_. But this presupposes that at least for us (i.e. the
way(s) we live our life(s)) time is not just a continuous variable.
Otherwise we could never be able to look at it _as_ a continuous variable.
3) what is _matter_? Matter is a concept we have inherited from Greek
metaphysics. This is, as you know, a long story. Can you please give me some
more help on your thermodynamic perspective? It seems to me that you start
with _matter in motion_, but it is _you_ who starts with it, i.e. when you
start investigating _matter in motion_ (not just matter!), you have some
_ideas_ on motion, matter etc. You start by nivellating everything to
_matter in motion_ Do you?
4) Science, values and predictions: Greek philosophers developed different
kinds of ethical thinking based on the premises either of the permanence of
immutable nature (no predictions are necessary) or on the premisses of
_tyche_ (fortuna, chance). Indeed human being was seen in Greek tragedy
founded in an _ethos_ highly determined by the unpredictable will of gods
and of _tyche_ (just think about the experience of _governing_ a ship
(_cybernetes_) having little influence (and knowledge) about the winds, the
sea etc.
I promised short comments! sorry! thanks again, hope not to bore you
rafael

-----Urspr�ngliche Nachricht-----
Von: Jerry LR Chandler <jlrchand@erols.com>
An: Multiple recipients of list <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Datum: Freitag, 4. Dezember 1998 18:03
Betreff: Re: metaphors

>Dear Rafael, Koichiro and All:
>
>The following comments and questions may be a bit radical for this
>group; nevertheless, it is possible that they are of some interest to
>some.
>
>Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro wrote:
>> I we start (as we do,
>> when we do science) from the present tense, then, I guess, we have no
>> possibility (or only the _leap_) to bypass to the other one. But this
start
>> is not the original point of view. Evolution starts with the present
>> progressive tense and science comes (logically and temporally _after_ and
>> therefore always too late). So the _leap_ (or _jumping back_) is possible
>> because we are primarily as living beings in the present progressive
tense.
>> kind regards
>> rafael
>
>I question how any thought, including scientific thought, could be
>initiated outside the present progressive mode. By what criteria can
>one differentiate active thinking into scientific thought and, for
>example, ethical thought?
>
>A basic metaphysical question needs to addressed before these
>suggestions become persuasive to me. Given the limitations of semantic
>expressions, (that is, linear sequences of words composed into
>sentences) which should be given priority in scientific discourse:
>matter? time? space?
>
>These three terms are tightly intertwined and interlinked in empirical
>observations. What personal values are authors co-communicating when
>one of these three, for example, time, is selectively given semantic
>priority? (Prigoginian thermodynamics is very forthright in proposing
>that time should be given priority! And, by separating entropy flow in
>time into endo and exo components, one could argue that space is
>elevated into a secondary position. This is all rather ironical; if one
>starts with the third law of thermodynamics, then entropy exists only as
>a consequence of matter in motion! (Recall that the third law of
>thermodynamics states that all motion ceases at absolute zero
>temperature. Empirically, experiments by Morowitz in the 1960s showed
>that living organisms could be cooled to very, very near absolute zero
>without significant loss of viability upon warming to normal
>temperatures. These empirical experiments imply that biological
>information is independent of heat entropy.))
>
>If time is given metaphysical precedence over matter and space, then can
>it be treated as anything other than a continuous variable? If one
>starts with time as a continuous variable, then one is adopting some
>version of the coherence theory of truth. The flows of time in natural
>systems (as exemplified by expereinces such as watching a river flow, a
>bird soar, a deer flee or a garden grow,) are not readily objectified.
>In order to objectify, one must imagine objects, objects with at least
>some aspect of stability in time. Such objects are then subject to
>another theory of truth, ie, the correspondence theory and the
>accompanying rules of counting or enumerating. (Frege and Dummett have
>both explored the implications of these two theories of truth.)
>
>The notion that:
>>science comes (logically and temporally _after_ and
>> therefore always too late).
>
>needs to be critically examined.
>
>Consider, for example, antibiotic therapy for infectious disease, the
>construction of weapons, travel by jet planes, and internet
>communications, which are based on a sense of trust, intiguity and value
>about the course of future events. From my perspective, the essential
>nature of science is predictability. In the absence of some sense of
>predictibility, either in the coherent, correspondent or pragmatic sense
>of truth, one is hard pressed to call it "science" in the normal usage
>of the scientific community. Thus, to me, the profound implication of
>science for values, ethics and morals is the nature of predictions
>emerging from it and the subsequent impact on our humaness and our human
>habits.
>
>Rafael's suggestions generate the following questions:
>
>1. What criteria can be formed to assign prioty to matter? time? or
>space?
>2. What mechanisms can be formed within any natural science which allows
>for a "leap in time"?
>3. Is it a scientific or a metaphysical question to speak of the "start
>of evolution?"
>4. Should scientific values be excluded from the set of human values?
>5. How are scientific values differentiable from other human values such
>as those expressed in law, medicine or accounting, or even mathematics?
>6. If one views biological information from the perspective of third law
>and its empirical existence at absolute zero temperature rather than
>the second law and Shannon information, will a fundamentally different
>perspective of the relationships between science and values, ethics and
>morals emerge?
>
>My own thinking and writings are often grounded on a positive answer to
>the sixth question.
>
>
>Cheers
>
>Jerry LR Chandler
Received on Wed Dec 09 09:56:40 1998