Re: info & physics

At 05:26 PM 13/05/02, norbert wrote:
>Dear Gyorgy and fis-ers
>i am very happy to read what gyorgy just wrote.. i was always concerned
>about the fact that we might put the information concept into a very narrow
>frame and reduce it to biological and social systems.
>there was a long history of evolution of irreversible processes, bevor
>biological evolution started on earth. It is very easy to find self
>organisation and evolution of structural information in inorganic evolution
>of the universe.
>norbert

Because of the great divide concerning whether information exists
"out there" independently of an interpreter or whether it is something
that is created only through interpretation or intentionality, I have become
increasingly reluctant to talk of information. Partly this is because I
do not know what is at stake. It seems to me reasonable that two
people could interpret the same information differently. Given this,
it seems to me reasonable that information does not depend on
the specific interpretation. If the interpretation view is correct,
then it must require that there is some interpretation, but not a
specific interpretation, or else there could be no disagreement
about the interpretation of the same information. However, it seems
that at least some who take the intentional view also want information
to be something surprising to the one who is informed, making information
a very subject relative thing. This seems to make it very difficult
for two people to share information, especially to transmit it, since
presumably what is new to the recipient is not new to the transmitter.
Other misalignments of novelty are also quite possible.

Now certainly there is a sense in which information is a measure
of the reduction of unexpectedness. How seriously are we to take
this intentional locution? Apparently, pretty much as seriously as we
want to. The flexibility is there, as the diverse views in this group
show over and over again. So a lot hangs on the wants. And that
is where I am not quite clear about what is at stake.

In the case of nonintentional contexts, I have become increasingly
careful to talk of information capacity rather than information. This
is actually what Shannon was talking about, and it is all that is
required for both physics and mathematical communications
theory. These two notions place some constraints on information
proper, since physics limits what it is possible to embody, and
communications theory limits what it is possible to convey.
A theory of embodied conveying would be a very useful thing,
and I do not want it to get hung up on the issue of whether or not it
is really about information. Especially, I am have become quite
intolerant of arguments to the effect that since information depends
on the receiver information capacity depends on the receiver's
desires, prejudices, beliefs, whims, intelligence or stupidity. There
may be information there to be found but the receiver is just to
dense to notice it. We need a way to talk about that sort of
circumstance that is both systematic and integrated into a
general theory of information.

I think that there is a lot to be said for integrating the notion of
information capacity with information, as Gyuri and Norbert
seem to be suggesting. There is a great deal of unifying power.
On the other hand, this unification would tend to obscure the
intentional aspect of information -- if one assumes that information
capacity is all there is to information.

Personally, I find notions of meaning, intention, surprise,
expectation, and uncertainty rather obscure (except in some rigorous
mathematical and physical applications of surprise, expectation
and uncertainty -- but these are surely not the normal uses).
I wonder if we really want to found information theory on
such mysterious concepts. There are some philosophers,
e.g., the Churchlands, who think that there aren't really
such intentional things in the world at all. Would this mean
that there is no information?

If we define information in intentional terms, does that mean
that information theory is hopelessly circular as an approach
to understanding intentionality and meaning?

On the other hand, if we allow an physical system that
shows structure ("it from bit") to contain information, are we
buying, implicitly into some sort of panpsychism?

I think that the answer to both of these questions is
"no", and a satisfactory information theory will need to
make clear why the answer is negative in both cases.

I must be away for a few days. I wanted to leave these
ruminations before I go.

John

----------
Dr John Collier john.collier@kla.univie.ac.at
Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research
Adolf Lorenz Gasse 2 +432-242-32390-19
A-3422 Altenberg Austria Fax: 242-32390-4
http://www.kli.ac.at/research.html?personal/collier
Received on Mon May 13 19:10:38 2002