Re: info & physics

John Collier wrote:

> At 05:26 PM 13/05/02, norbert wrote:
> >Dear Gyorgy and fis-ers
> >i am very happy to read what gyorgy just wrote.. i was always concerned
> >about the fact that we might put the information concept into a very narrow
> >frame and reduce it to biological and social systems.
> >there was a long history of evolution of irreversible processes, bevor
> >biological evolution started on earth. It is very easy to find self
> >organisation and evolution of structural information in inorganic evolution
> >of the universe.
> >norbert
>
> Because of the great divide concerning whether information exists
> "out there" independently of an interpreter or whether it is something
> that is created only through interpretation or intentionality, I have become
> increasingly reluctant to talk of information. Partly this is because I
> do not know what is at stake. It seems to me reasonable that two
> people could interpret the same information differently. Given this,
> it seems to me reasonable that information does not depend on
> the specific interpretation. If the interpretation view is correct,
> then it must require that there is some interpretation, but not a
> specific interpretation, or else there could be no disagreement
> about the interpretation of the same information. However, it seems
> that at least some who take the intentional view also want information
> to be something surprising to the one who is informed, making information
> a very subject relative thing. This seems to make it very difficult
> for two people to share information, especially to transmit it, since
> presumably what is new to the recipient is not new to the transmitter.
> Other misalignments of novelty are also quite possible.
>
> Now certainly there is a sense in which information is a measure
> of the reduction of unexpectedness. How seriously are we to take
> this intentional locution? Apparently, pretty much as seriously as we
> want to. The flexibility is there, as the diverse views in this group
> show over and over again. So a lot hangs on the wants. And that
> is where I am not quite clear about what is at stake.
>
> In the case of nonintentional contexts, I have become increasingly
> careful to talk of information capacity rather than information. This
> is actually what Shannon was talking about, and it is all that is
> required for both physics and mathematical communications
> theory. These two notions place some constraints on information
> proper, since physics limits what it is possible to embody, and
> communications theory limits what it is possible to convey.
> A theory of embodied conveying would be a very useful thing,
> and I do not want it to get hung up on the issue of whether or not it
> is really about information. Especially, I am have become quite
> intolerant of arguments to the effect that since information depends
> on the receiver information capacity depends on the receiver's
> desires, prejudices, beliefs, whims, intelligence or stupidity. There
> may be information there to be found but the receiver is just to
> dense to notice it. We need a way to talk about that sort of
> circumstance that is both systematic and integrated into a
> general theory of information.
>
> I think that there is a lot to be said for integrating the notion of
> information capacity with information, as Gyuri and Norbert
> seem to be suggesting. There is a great deal of unifying power.
> On the other hand, this unification would tend to obscure the
> intentional aspect of information -- if one assumes that information
> capacity is all there is to information.
>
> Personally, I find notions of meaning, intention, surprise,
> expectation, and uncertainty rather obscure (except in some rigorous
> mathematical and physical applications of surprise, expectation
> and uncertainty -- but these are surely not the normal uses).
> I wonder if we really want to found information theory on
> such mysterious concepts. There are some philosophers,
> e.g., the Churchlands, who think that there aren't really
> such intentional things in the world at all. Would this mean
> that there is no information?
>
> If we define information in intentional terms, does that mean
> that information theory is hopelessly circular as an approach
> to understanding intentionality and meaning?
>
> On the other hand, if we allow an physical system that
> shows structure ("it from bit") to contain information, are we
> buying, implicitly into some sort of panpsychism?
>
> I think that the answer to both of these questions is
> "no", and a satisfactory information theory will need to
> make clear why the answer is negative in both cases.
>
> I must be away for a few days. I wanted to leave these
> ruminations before I go.
>
> John
>
> ----------
> Dr John Collier john.collier@kla.univie.ac.at
> Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research
> Adolf Lorenz Gasse 2 +432-242-32390-19
> A-3422 Altenberg Austria Fax: 242-32390-4
> http://www.kli.ac.at/research.html?personal/collier

The correct observation of John Collier (cf. letter above) that unification of
the notion of
information capacity with information would tend to obscure the
intentional aspect of information is very important because
information, like energy, is some essence, while information capacity is a
measure of information
(M. Burgin THE ESSENCE OF INFORMATION: A MULTIFACETED IMAGE OF INFORMATION).

Shannon was talking only about information capacity (cf. letter above) only
because he did not know, as many others now,
what information is.
Received on Fri May 17 22:07:24 2002