Vedr.: semiotics

From: S�ren Brier <[email protected]>
Date: Tue 21 May 2002 - 18:34:38 CEST

>From S�ren Brier

Dear Edwina

My problem is that if we cannot have Second and Thirdness in nature without they being signs then all there is in the world is signs and there are no objects to refer to.

 Laws of nature in them selves just are. They are not sign for us, But their description is. Quarks just are too. You can chose to see them as sign for the universe or Cosmos. Then you have to work with very different qualities of signs. Jesper Hoffmeyer seem to want to go this way.

You may be right that Secondness cannot exist in itself, as it need some kind of regularity (thirdness) to uphold existence over time. I have confronted some learned semioticians with this question without getting a good answer. But in this case, what we call objects in physics is a production of both firstness, secondness and thirdness. Thus if they do not have any independent existence then all is signs and there are no objects.

S�ren Brier, +45 3528 2689

http://www.flec.kvl.dk/personalprofile.asp?id=sbr&p=engelsk

Ed. of Cybernetics & Human Knowing

http://www.imprint-academic.com/C&HK

>>> taborsky@primus.ca 21-05-02 15:53 >>>
With regard to the last few posts (Fenzl, Brier, Menant), I agree very
much with all of Norbert's comments on the nature of signs and
information - and that physico-chemical systems are most certainly
involved in information processing. As he points out, the difference
between abiotic and biotic information processing is the difference in
'quality' of the whole process. I feel that all systems process
'information' in a triadic manner (input of sensate data; mediation
via normative rules; and resultant interpretation). That is, our
universe is a complex system at all levels. However, the relations in
this triadic process are different at each level, moving from the most
simple relation (iconic) to indexical to symbolic. Only humans process
information within symbolic relations.

However, I think that terms have to be clarified, for I feel that we
are confusing 'sign', 'information'.
The interpretive process is triadic. A variation of energy, between X
system and Y system, as pointed out by Menant, is experienced by the
two systems as a signal. In Peircean terms it would be an 'immediate
object' in a categorical mode of Firstness. This is NOT YET
information. It is 'data', signal, sensation'..or whatever term you
use to mean an acceptance of energy/matter within your system's
boundaries...but not yet an interpretation (absorption, functional
usage) of that energy/matter.
This input of energy/matter is then transformed by the normative rules
of your system. These normative rules can be both innate (laws of
chemical molecular formation; genetic patterns) or learned (behaviour)
but they act as normative constraints that consider all input
energy/matter. This mode is defined by Peirce as Thirdness. Another
term is 'knowledge'. Or Representamen in Peirce's terms.
THEN - the final result is an 'interpretant' (and there can be several
steps to this)...which is 'information'. It is in a state of
Secondness.

Now- what, in Peircean terms, is a Sign? It's the whole triadic
process. .

So- the triadic process is always in operation. Can any of these modes
exist per se, all alone 'out there". Here I disagree with Soren who
feels that Secondness can exist by itself. I also disagree with his
conclusion that Thirdness can exist without 'having a genuine sign'.
A formation of energy, completely by itself, in a state of Secondness
(2-2-2 would be the triadic code)...well, an example is a weathervane,
a mechanical unit. But it doesn't really exist 'by itself', for even
its mere existential existence is dependent on its differential
relations with other energy (the tree from which it is formed, the
fence to which it is attached, the wind that blows it). As for
Thirdness, can the normative rules exist without involvement in a
sign - No. That would be Platonic, those pure Platonic Forms. Peirce
was not a Platonist, but an Aristotelian - and Aristotle writes
extensively against the separation of Form from its actualization
within matter.

A 'proto-sign', a 'quasi-sign', would be energy that has moved into
the anticipatory zone, the interface area, of a system A, but has not
yet been processed via Thirdness. It can be readily dissipated.

As for the conclusions of the Fuschl meeting, they fit , as noted,
right into the basic Peircean framework.

Edwina Taborsky
39 Jarvis St. #318
Toronto, Ontario M5E 1Z5
(416) 361.0898
Received on Tue May 21 18:36:31 2002

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