Re: Vedr.: Re: info & physics

From: Rafael Capurro <[email protected]>
Date: Tue 21 May 2002 - 21:31:18 CEST

Dear S�ren,

>Part of the debate is about the necessary ontological framework. But as you
state it is not clear what a pan-informational or pan-semiotic view means.-
I do not find any of them useful if it makes everything into information or
signs. >

In order to solve (or, better, 'disolve') the question of metaphysics
Kant postulated, as you know, the 'Ding an sich' i.e. the 'view from
nowhere' (or from the 'absolute') to things (as they appear). Karl-Otto
Apel has shown how Kant's semiotics was 'pragmatically' and
'socially' transformed by Peirce. What do we learn with regard to
a 'pragmatic ontology'? I am not sure that we can learn to postulate
a unity of interpretation in the sense of an ideal 'community of
interpretants' (as Apel does) which, in the long run, would play a
similar role as Kant's transcendental subject (or as the Absolute
in classical metaphysics). I would prefer to think this 'pragmatism'
in a more radical way as giving rise to know interpretations (and each
frame of interpretation is an ontology...) that may create a complex
system of 'appearences' in a more or less coherent way. What is
possible at the level of human interpretation (and 'world design')
is possible, mutatis mutandis, at a pre-human level. Weizs�cker
uses the concept of 'objectivized semantics' in order to differentiate
between the 'eidos' or 'form' or structure and, say, the sum of molecules it
is build of. My question is now, how far can we re-interpret Aristotle's
substantialism and 'hyle-morphism' (=in-formation) in, as I like to say,
postalic (and not only: semiotic!) categories. I say: not only semiotic,
because I like the idea of send a message and give it an address.
This is less a question of interpretation than a question of
communication. Is, for instance, quantum theory of this kind?
Cheers
Rafael
Received on Tue May 21 21:32:27 2002

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