Re: Fw: info & physics

Dear Karl, Rafael and Colleagues:

At last, the discussion is beginning to address some of the basic
issues of communication.

Rafael, your post suggests that traditional metaphysics can be
extended to include the concept of "information". But, you do not
provide us with a clue on how this extension is created. In your
view, does the extension of metaphysics to information require the
consideration of matter only? Or is time also necessary? And what
about space? Or, the metaphysics of message genesis? Or, the
metaphysics of message utilization? These questions are pointed at
the Shannon view of communication, where two or more systems and a
process of transmission are required for communication. In the
Shannon model, which is extraordinarily successful for engineering
purposes, the model requires two or more systems. Does your
metaphysic extension of "information" require two or more systems
(beings)? This question is significant, in part, because
thermodynamics, as a bilinear group, is restricted to one system and
the "non-system" surrounding the closure of the system. (Many forget
that Shannon's mathematics is restricted mainly to the engineering
problems of reproducible transmission between two systems and
generally does not address message generation or message utilization.)

Karl, I had a very difficult time attempting to understand your message.
In your usage of the term, "things", are your referring to matter,
for example, physical or chemical particles? Or does your usage
exclude the concept of microscopic "things"?

When you say:
In fact, once we agree about what is a "thing", then we shall have
solved all our deep problems, then only calibrational, technical
questions remain.

the intent of your sentence is unclear, unless you merely wish to
echo Laplace's views in a 21 st century context.

When you say:
Let me propose a very technical approach to what we may call a
"thing". This central concept involves every other concept also,
because it can only be explained in the tension between "now" and
("sooner" or "later"); "is" as opposed to "could also have been";
"such" as opposed to "any kind of properties".

it appears that you are assuming a philosophy that ignores Rafael's
proposition that:
Of course it is possible to say: everything
that is, is information (as we can say:
everything that is, is matter or whatever).

by substituting the notion of "thing" for the notion of "information."

Your "very technical approach" could be translated as a special type
of super-reductionism by incorporating temporal relations and
conditional propositions into materialism. Can you relate this "very
technical approach" to complex systems and such problems as evolution?

In your summary:

>To summarise:
>
>-- talking in logical sentences that have exact meaning one talks
>about relations of concepts to each other: this means using numbers;
>-- considering whether I talk about a collection ("cross-section",
>"now") or about a sequence, I discover that I can say differing many
>logical sentences;
>-- matching the sentences that describe as well a process and as
>well a state (the momentary state and the next step in
>one-and-the-same sentence) I shall find some sentences that remain
>unexplained (the moment contains more material than the past or the
>future); then I know what I shall term the "thing".

the concept of time is intertwined with the concept of number. How
do you justify this interrelation? At issue is the nature of
continuity.

Your conjecture:
>
This may appear useless gibberish but I assure you that it can be
translated into very solid number theory.

is intriguing. I find no foundation for a theory of time or
metaphysics within number theory. More critically, from a
theoretical chemical point of view, I am skeptical that number theory
can be extended directly to either chemical structures or chemical
dynamics, both of which are closely related to graph theory.

Karl, you have introduced a number of interesting issues. I look
forward to learning how you propose to transcend the gap between well
established principles of number theory and the concepts of
communication between two or more systems.

Cheers

Jerry LR Chandler

PS: Karl, I complement your adherence to the rules proposed by
Pedro. I hope others will follow your example.

>Dear Rafael and colleagues
>
>Yes, I adhere to Pedro's two messages per week rule --so the
>apparent delay of this replay.
>
>If I have understood right (see mess. below), you state, Rafael,
>that in order to understand the concept of information, one should
>first clarify the meaning of the term "thing". To this end you
>propose 3 ways of defining the concept "thing", namely:
>
>1) things (or: what is) are information (similar
>to Pythagoras: things are numbers)
>2) there are some things that are informational
>(particularly: that exist as 'digital' information)
>3) we can look at things (including nature)
>from the point of view of information (i.e. of
>informational processes) but this does not
>imply that they are only information.
>
>I cannot state that I agree, nor that I disagree with you as I have
>no knowledge about what you mean by talking about "things". Of
>course, as a sensual experience I know what a "thing" is if I run
>into a thing. As a child, I have learnt to avoid hitting things or
>being hit by things. But I believe you mean a concept of "thing"
>that is more sophisticated than what a child learns to call a
>"thing". In fact, once we agree about what is a "thing", then we
>shall have solved all our deep problems, then only calibrational,
>technical questions remain.
>
>Let me propose a very technical approach to what we may call a
>"thing". This central concept involves every other concept also,
>because it can only be explained in the tension between "now" and
>("sooner" or "later"); "is" as opposed to "could also have been";
>"such" as opposed to "any kind of properties". In order to
>understand the concept of a thing, one has to concentrate at the way
>one looks at concepts generally:
>Do I regard cross-sectional states or do I regard processes? (this
>is "now" against "sooner" or "later").
>Do I look at that what remains or do I look at that what has been
>accounted for, has been accomodated, has obeyed the rules (this is
>the approach of "is" as opposed to "could have been")?
>Do I look at the specifics of the remaining, unexplained,
>momentarily existing collection of logical statements, or do I
>deduct their properties from that what they are not (this is "such"
>as opposed to "any kind of properties")?
>
>To summarise:
>
>-- talking in logical sentences that have exact meaning one talks
>about relations of concepts to each other: this means using numbers;
>-- considering whether I talk about a collection ("cross-section",
>"now") or about a sequence, I discover that I can say differing many
>logical sentences;
>-- matching the sentences that describe as well a process and as
>well a state (the momentary state and the next step in
>one-and-the-same sentence) I shall find some sentences that remain
>unexplained (the moment contains more material than the past or the
>future); then I know what I shall term the "thing".
>
>This may appear useless gibberish but I assure you that it can be
>translated into very solid number theory.
>If there are things in the world, then we should be able to talk
>about them in a precise way. Like "harmony" was a subjective,
>sensual concept until Pythagoras made his lyra, like "the golden
>cut" was a subjective, aesthetic experience until they figured out
>the proportions a:b=b:(a+b), like "my position in my boat in the
>midst of the endless ocean" was a subejctive, anxiety-filled
>experience until they figured out astronomy and eventually satellite
>positioning. This year, the concept of "thing that is energy and
>material and place and forces and information" is a complicated and
>subjective mixture of impressions, emotions and concepts, until they
>have figured out the relation between logical sentences referring to
>structures and sequences.
>
>In genetics we see that a sequence (the DNA) rules a mixture (the
>living cell). Obviously, there is an interaction between what is now
>and what is later, between what is later and what shall become now.
>How many descriptive sentences can you make about a collection that
>is now (as a concurrently present collection) as opposed to a
>collection that comes one-after-the-next? There, this little riddle
>has many serious implications...
>
>Karl
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: <mailto:capurro@hdm-stuttgart.de>Rafael Capurro
>To: <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>Multiple recipients of list FIS
>Sent: Montag, 20. Mai 2002 16:01
>Subject: Re: info & physics
>
>Karl,
>
>what we are discussing now (concerning
>the physical/biological/psychical...) status
>of information are less theological and
>more ontological or metaphysical questions.
>The question of being underlies this
>discussion, for better for worse.
>Of course it is possible to say: everything
>that is, is information (as we can say:
>everything that is, is matter or whatever).
>This can be understood in several ways:
>1) things (or: what is) are information (similar
>to Pythagoras: things are numbers)
>2) there are some things that are informational
>(particularly: that exist as 'digital' information)
>3) we can look at things (including nature)
>from the point of view of information (i.e. of
>informational processes) but this does not
>imply that they are only information.
>The first thesis is a metaphysical one, the
>second should be considered within a broader
>ontology, the third implies that we may
>project reality within the horizon of information
>abut also within the horizon of matter etc.
>If we understand by information a process
>of selection out of a message (which is indeed
>also the terminology used by Shannon) then
>we can say that we are already involved in a
>natural information process (the theological
>question being then how it is possible to
>send a message to 'nothing' i.e. a message
>that 'creates' and not simply 'informs' the
>receiver...). Of course the concept of message
>(implying a sender, a receiver, a structure to
>be 'interpreted'/selected and... an address!)
>is basic. The complexity of human messages
>is indeed of different kind (but not simply
>opposed or even contradictory...) to the complexity
>of, say, a DNA-messenger or of a quantum state.
>What I am trying to say is that the (modern)
>paradigm of message communication (underlying
>in different ways the concept(s) of information)
>is (seems to me) basic for our scientific view
>of nature and society and... it seems to be
>highly productive too, independently of the
>ontological/metaphysical (and theological)
>discussion...
>
>Is this somehow acceptable for further discussion?
>
>Rafael
>
>Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro, FH Stuttgart, Hochschule der Medien (HdM)
>University of Applied Sciences, Wolframstr. 32, 70191 Stuttgart, Germany
>E-Mail: <mailto:capurro@hdm-stuttgart.de>capurro@hdm-stuttgart.de;
><mailto:rafael@capurro.de>rafael@capurro.de
>Tel. : +49 - 711 - 25 706 - 182
>Universit�t Stuttgart, Institut f�r Philosophie, Dillmannstr. 15,
>70049 Stuttgart, Germany
>Private: Redtenbacherstr. 9, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany. Tel.: +49 -
>721 - 98 22 9 -22 (fax: -21)
>Homepage in German/English/Spanish/French:
><http://www.capurro.de>www.capurro.de
>ICIE (International Center for Information Ethics):
><http://icie.zkm.de>http://icie.zkm.de
>
Received on Thu May 23 07:38:09 2002