Re: info & physics

At 11:12 AM 15/05/02, Gottfried wrote:

I'll skip what we agree on.

>you wrote:
>
> >Especially, I am have become quite
>intolerant of arguments to the effect that since information depends
>on the receiver information capacity depends on the receiver's
>desires, prejudices, beliefs, whims, intelligence or stupidity. There
>may be information there to be found but the receiver is just to
>dense to notice it. We need a way to talk about that sort of
>circumstance that is both systematic and integrated into a
>general theory of information.<
>
>Ther is no emitter, and there is therefore no receiver of information. They
>are autopoietic systems, which process information on their own. While doing
>so, they �communicate�, that means they produce noise necessary for
>information to arise.

I find this very obscure. I see no reason to assume that there is any
internal processing of information unless it there is transfer of
information through external correlations. There are some standard
arguments from various sources, notably Quine and Wittgenstein,
that a private language is not a meaningful language. Why should I
suppose that self-contained musings contain any information
at all? I certain can't accept that this is part of the meaning of
"information".

> >I think that there is a lot to be said for integrating the notion of
>information capacity with information, as Gyuri and Norbert
>seem to be suggesting. There is a great deal of unifying power.<
>When searching for a unified theory, as the vienna group does, this power is
>unmeasurable. Thanks to them.
>
>
> >If we define information in intentional terms, does that mean
>that information theory is hopelessly circular as an approach
>to understanding intentionality and meaning?<
>
>If we do so, the circle does not open, I agree.
>But if we come to a shareable concept of communication, we will look at a
>circuit, where intentions, expectations and meaning get its sense. (view my
>posted paper)

David Lewis proposed a view of language that involves correlations
of this sort in his 1970 book "Convention". The problem with the
view is that correlations result from interpersonal interactions, and ]
that it is these that set the meanings, not what goes on inside. It
seems to me that you are saying just this when you say "we will look at a
circuit, where intentions, expectations and meaning get its sense."

This seems to me to place the source of the information in the circuit,
not in the minds of the participants. They can use it only because
of the existence of the circuit. This is a version of the no private
language argument.

John

----------
Dr John Collier john.collier@kla.univie.ac.at
Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research
Adolf Lorenz Gasse 2 +432-242-32390-19
A-3422 Altenberg Austria Fax: 242-32390-4
http://www.kli.ac.at/research.html?personal/collier
Received on Thu May 23 11:36:51 2002