Re: talking exactly about what we are talking about

Dear Karl and Jerry,

sorry for the delay: I like very much Pedro's rule! Let me just make a few (historical) remarks on the question
'what is a thing?' (I follow Heidegger's "The Question Concerning the Thing", a lecture of the year
1935/36 on Kant).

Aristotle made a difference between natural things ('physika') and 'artificial
things' ('poiumena'). Natural scientists study natural things or 'phainomena' (that, which
appears'). Newton writes (Principia, III, regula IV): "in philosophia experimentale propositiones ex
phaenomenis per inductionem collectae non obstantibus contrariis hypothesibus pro veris aut
accurate aut quamproxime haberi debent, donec alia occurrerint phaenomena, per quae aut
accuratiores reddedantur aut exceptionibus abnoxiae" (roughly: experimental scientists take their
measure from the phaenomena, and try to come near to them (with their propositions), as far
as there are no other phenomena that contradict these propositions).

As you can imagine, the concept of 'phaenomena' for Aristotle and for Newton is not the same, for intance
with regard to motion which is dependent, for Aristotle, on the nature of the 'physical things'
('physika somata'), while according to Newton: "corpus omne, quod a viribus impressis non
cogitur, uniformiter in directum moventur." "Corpus omne" i.e. no distinction between earthly
and heavenly things, no primacy of circular movement etc. Such a 'corpus', as Heidegger remarks,
does no exist. It is an invention (Galilei writes: "mobile... mente concipio omni secluso impedimento')
and this is exactly what old and new concepts of things are: a theoretical (or practical) projection that allows
us to see 'things' in this or in other way (and to conceive a world). The consequence (!) of
this modern view is that we can (need to) apply a 'measure' that is the same for
all things, and this measure are numbers. Modernity makes a 'twist' from the 'phainomena'
to the 'subject' ('mente concipio') and this movement leads to Descartes' ego
and to Kant's distinction between 'things in themselves' and 'things as they appear'
(according to the 'measure' of the subject...).

The Scholastic definiton of truth was: veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei, i.e.
the measure (commensuratio, convenientia) for human reason were things in
themselves (as conceived by God...)

Modern science according to Kant (following Newton) is restricted to
nature as an 'island' (Kant's famous metaphor), 'the land of truth' in the middle
of a stormy ocean (of 'appearences'). Kant (and Newton) project or 'cast' appearences
according to (epistemological) principles. Things become 'objects' (of possible
experience). But Kant makes a leap behind and beyond 'objects' as he appeals
to the 'givenness' as primordial to our knowledge activity. Matter and form, and thus
IN-FORMATION are now (partly) on the side of the subject. We are, in fact,
conditioned (as knowers) by things but we can trascend them, otherwise we would not
be able to conceive them in different ways. But more basically: we can not only make
a difference between different things, as well as between ways of conceiving
things but (possibilitating these differences) we can make a difference between
thing and 'no-thing'!... And this is, indeed, I believe, a major capability of our brain...

Which is the (right) measure of things? maybe 'no-thing'? Or put it positively:
it seems as if we can 'cast' things in their being in different ways (for instance as
a combination of matter, energy and... information) and it seems as if they
correspond to (some of) our (ontological) castings. As far as I can see we are
now casting being(s) within the horizon of digitality. I speak therefore about
'digital ontology' (not: digital metaphysics, which would mean that we make a
strong assertion about the 'nature' of things, instead of a 'weak casting'...)

Is information a thing? I remember Hilary Putnam's "Representation and
Reality" where he tells a nice story about being in a room two persons, a lamp,
a book, a pencil and a desk, and one asks to the other: 'how many things
are in this room?' Four, of course, is the answer. Well: what about the pages
of the book? and the hole of your nose? and what about all elementary
particles and ... what about you and me? are we 'things'?"

Well the story is just the show what Putnam calls the
'porosity' of human language (and this insight allows him to criticize his
own former 'belief' in AI...). Probably we should think about linking
different concepts of information in the sense of Wittgenstein's family
ressemblances... (In German I like to say: "wir sind nicht alle ganz dicht"
which means (also) that we are not completely 'normal' or 'closed'

Sorry, this is becoming too long (it is late in the evening)

Cheers

Rafael

Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro, FH Stuttgart, Hochschule der Medien (HdM)
University of Applied Sciences, Wolframstr. 32, 70191 Stuttgart, Germany
E-Mail: capurro@hdm-stuttgart.de; rafael@capurro.de
Tel. : +49 - 711 - 25 706 - 182
Universit�t Stuttgart, Institut f�r Philosophie, Dillmannstr. 15, 70049 Stuttgart, Germany
Private: Redtenbacherstr. 9, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany. Tel.: +49 - 721 - 98 22 9 -22 (fax: -21)
Homepage in German/English/Spanish/French: www.capurro.de
ICIE (International Center for Information Ethics): http://icie.zkm.de
Received on Mon May 27 22:32:05 2002