Re: Reply to James Barham

From: mark burgin <[email protected]>
Date: Fri 21 Jun 2002 - 23:02:33 CEST

"by way of "Pedro C. Mariju�n" " wrote:

> (from jgr@gi.alaska.edu):
>
> JGR@DINO.GI.ALASKA.EDU
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Dear FISers:
>
> This is a reply to the comments by James Barham (3 June). I apologize for
> the delay, but his comments came when I just had returned to Alaska from
> three weeks at ICTP in Italy. Not just work at the office awaited me: its
> summertime in central Alaska, 22 hs of sunshine, 25�C average temperature,
> plants grow like crazy, and I have to help my wife to put and keep the
> garden in shape. Tomorrow I will reply to Pedro's comments of 5 June.
>
> Comments received are preceded by >>
>
> >>You seem to be saying that all pragmatic information use is communication.
> Here I disagree. I think we have to allow for a single organism interacting
> with the inorganic part of its environment as being an instance of genuine
> information use, as well.
>
> I really am not saying that! I should make that clear in my paper. I
> definitely agree that an organism ACQUIRING information from the
> environment, or STORING information in the environment, represents what I
> call "information-based interactions" (i.e., a genuine use of information).
> See further below the examples of prototype biological interactions.
>
> >>So, the question of the locus of information must be posed for each of the
> following four different cases:
>
> >monadic:
>
> >(A) inorganic, intrinsic
>
> >(B) organic, intrinsic
>
> >dyadic:
>
> >(B-A) organic-inorganic interaction
>
> >(B-C) organic-organic interaction
>
> >In regard to my first remark above, I simply want to emphasize that the
> dyadic relation (B-A) represents pragmatic information use just as much as
> (B-C) does. Indeed, I feel it is the more basic kind of interaction. I am
> not sure whether you will agree with me about this point, or not.
>
> I absolutely agree! (Again, see below).
>
> >>In regard to my second remark above, most here at FIS want to say that (A)
> embodies intrinsic information, while you and I (and Pedro and Jerry, I
> think) want to deny it. How can we clarify the point at issue between the
> pan-informationists and the bio-informationists?
>
> I certainly deny it. That is at the key of the reason why I prefer to start
> everything with the process of INTERACTION as a "metaphysical primitive". By
> definition, interaction means TWO or MORE bodies, systems or things.
>
> James' comments in that 3 June mail convinced me of a weakness in my paper:
> a lack of concrete examples, and a lack of clear grouping of prototypes (a
> term that may not be metaphysically correct). Here is what I am going to add
> to the paper's section 1 before submission (I apologize for the length):
>
> ***********************
> ""To elucidate more clearly the characteristics of information-based
> interactions, identify different prototypes, and compare them with the class
> of force-field driven interactions, let us analyze a few examples.
>
> 1. An electron scattered by a positive ion. From the point of view of
> quantum electrodynamics, the interaction mechanism consists of the emission
> and absorption of virtual photons by the interacting particles. In a
> first-order Feynman diagram the electron (or the ion) emits a photon which
> is then absorbed by the ion (or electron); energy and momentum balance at
> each node (emission/absorption process) account for a change in the motion
> of each particle. The end result, strictly reversible, is the sum total of
> all possible photon exchange processes; the total energy (and momentum) of
> the pair of particles is conserved. We are tempted to say (and often do so)
> that in this interaction, any virtual photon "carries information" from one
> particle to the other; however, this is purely subjective parlance: no
> information, information-processing and purpose are at work at either end of
> the emission/absorption process.
>
> 2. A small body orbiting an irregularly shaped massive asteroid. (e.g.,
> asteroid Ida with its satellite Dactyl). This is a macroscopic physical
> interaction. The resulting orbit, viewed from a system fixed to the
> asteroid, is very complicated due to the latter's irregular mass
> distribution; the resulting motion of the satellite is governed by the sum
> total of the gravitational actions (forces) of each element of mass of the
> asteroid, in each of which information and information-processing do not
> play any role. There is strict to-and-fro energy coupling (and functional
> continuity) between the orbital characteristics and the irregular features
> of the asteroid's gravitational potential. As there is a correspondence
> between the features of a particular orbit and the irregularities of mass
> distribution, we are again tempted to say that the orbital shape "carries
> information on the pattern of mass distribution in the asteroid". However,
> no information is at work in this natural system; each element of the
> pattern at the "source" or "sender" (the asteroid) contributes with a direct
> dynamic effect on the "receiver" (the satellite) and there is no need to
> invoke the concepts of information and information processing. Another
> similar example is the footprint of a rock that has been lying on the soil
> for a long time. Here we have a complex pattern on the ground carved by the
> elastic interaction with the rock's irregular surface-an interaction in
> which a fixed pattern has led to specific change in another "body". However,
> the change was produced by point-by-point physical interactions in which
> there was a direct coupling (force- and energy-wise) between the "source"
> and the "recipient". Again, no purpose can be identified in this process.
>
> In both above examples we have a physical interaction between two objects
> mediated by a "field", with energy coupling and continuity. There is no
> information, signals, messages, codes, decisions or purpose involved-unless
> we, humans, put them there by making a mental model of the interaction
> process in which analogies are drawn from subjective experience. The
> following are prototypes of information-based interactions.
>
> 3. A dog walking around an obstacle. The dog responds to the visual
> perception of the obstacle, a complex process that involves
> information-processing and decision-making at the "receiver's" end with a
> definite purpose. At the obstacle's (the sender's) side, we have scattering
> and/or reflection of incident light waves; no information and no purpose are
> involved-only physical processes are at work here. There is no energy
> coupling between sender and receiver; like in the example of the insects of
> Fig. 1, what counts is not the energy of the electromagnetic waves but the
> pattern of their spatial distribution. This is the prototype of
> information-based interactions that involves information extraction: it is a
> fundamental element in the interaction of any organism with the environment.
> The electromagnetic waves emitted by the obstacle and detected by the dog's
> sensors are signals. In this article we shall distinguish clearly between
> "signals" and "messages" (see example 5 below): thus defined, a signal has
> neither purpose nor any information at its origin, it only becomes
> information when it is detected and used (or deliberately discarded) by an
> organism. Note that this class of interactions must evolve; they cannot
> arise spontaneously in the abiotic world. As a matter of fact, Darwinian
> evolution itself embodies a gradual, species-specific information extraction
> from the environment (see section 4). Another example would be that of a
> geologist's brain processing the visual image of the rock's footprint from
> example 2 above.
>
> 4. An ant leaving a scent mark along its path. This is the reverse process
> of the preceding example, in which information is deposited in the
> environment for later use. The sender has a specific purpose and information
> is involved. At the other end of the interaction (the path) only physical
> (chemical) processes are at work (but later, another ant may eventually
> extract information from these physical signals). This is an example of
> deliberate environmental modification with a purpose. Writing an article is
> another.
>
> 5. A person talking to another. Here clearly we have information
> processes and purpose at both ends of the interactive link. The
> corresponding acoustical waves carry a message; what counts in this
> interaction is not the energy but the acoustical patterns. To function, a
> common code must exist at both ends (see next section). The interactive
> process is a prototype of communication. In principle, we can think of this
> prototype as a succession of types 4 and 3, in that order.
>
> Further on in the text, I will add the following remark:
>
> ""Concerning the interaction mechanism per se, there can be information
> processing at the sender's end (example 4, section 1), at the recipient's
> end (example 3) or at both ends (example 5). In all cases (excuse the purely
> anthropomorphic language!) an accord, a common code must exist between
> sender and recipient so that an interaction can take place (more on this in
> section 4). Indeed, example 3 (section 1) requires the evolution of a
> sensory apparatus able to detect and interpret the presence of the obstacle;
> example 4 requires the existence of other ants that will respond to the
> scent marks, and example 5 requires a common language.
>
> *************************
>
> Regards to all,
>
> Juan

Dear FISers:

This is a reply to the reply of Juan to the comments by James Barham (3 June).

> I really am not saying that! I should make that clear in my paper. I definitely
agree that an organism ACQUIRING information from the
> environment, or STORING information in the environment, represents what I call
"information-based interactions" (i.e., a genuine use of information).

Information cannot exist without interactions. However, interactions may be
actual, potential, and emerging.

>>In regard to my second remark above, most here at FIS want to say that (A)
embodies intrinsic information, while you and I (and Pedro and Jerry, I
> think) want to deny it. How can we clarify the point at issue between the
pan-informationists and the bio-informationists?

A tentative answer to this is given in the general theory of information. First,
on the empirical level, we can speak only about information for a system. Second,
the pan-informationists' view is represented by information in general, while the
bio-informationists' approach is reflected by proper information related only to
biological infological systems. This allows one to separate both approaches
without contradictions.

Examples 1 and 2 from the text of Juan show information in general, which is a
VERY broad concept, encompassing energy. Examples 3 - 5 show proper information.

Regards to all,
   Mark
Received on Fri Jun 21 23:03:36 2002

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