Theses on the Place of Purpose in Nature

Theses on the Place of Purpose in Nature

(1) Almost all human actions appear to have a means-ends structure. The
ends (or "goals" or "purposes") of our actions establish normative
criteria in relation to which our actions may be said to "succeed" or
"fail." But are such human purposes real or illusory?

(2) If they are illusory, then how do we explain the fact that the very
notion of an "illusion" is itself normative, since it implies a
veridical cognitive state with respect to which the illusory state is
deviant?

(3) If human purposes are real, then we must try to explain them by
seeking their roots further down the phylogenetic scale. But how far
down? At least at the level of the cell, because the means-ends
structure is clearly observable in the behavior of the cell. This is a
simple empirical fact. Nothing is implied about any possible (but
unknowable) subjective experience that may or may not be accompanying
this behavior.

(4) Clearly life is a cell-level phenomenon, but equally clearly much,
if not most, activity at the subcellular level has a means-ends
structure, as well. Furthermore, some aspect of the self-organizing
principle at the heart of the phenomenon of life---whatever it turns out
to be---must be postulated to exist below the cell level, if we are to
have any hope of explaining the origin of life. There is no way to get
from random chemistry to the cell without positing a stepwise,
self-organizing process. So these are two good reasons for postulating
some autonomous, proto-means-ends principle at the below-cell level, as
well.

(5) Isn't the cell just a "machine"? No, because in a machine there is
no intrinsic connection between the normative or "correct" functional
state and its material instantiation. The correct state is imposed on
the matter from the outside as a set of boundary conditions that are
arbitrary with respect to the desired functional behavior. There is no
principle intrinsic to the machine tending to preserve the correct
boundary conditions or the correct behavior. That is why external
intervention is required---the correctness is entirely in the eye of the
human being. The machine itself does not give a damn (so to speak) about
its functional state, which is only "functional" because we say it is.

(6) The functional behavior of the cell, in contrast, arises out of the
intrinsic physical properties of the matter the cell is made of. The
relationship between structure and function in a protein is not
arbitrary and extrinsic, as in a machine, but rather essential and
intrinsic. The result of this intrinsic connection between structure and
function in the cell is that living things are constantly actively
adjusting all their internal processes in such a way as to preserve
their global stability. We describe this as the "struggle to survive."
This fact is not mentioned as a solution to anything; it is merely a
description of an empirically observable phenomenon. It is the heart of
the problem that we need to solve.

(7) The problem clearly transcends ordinary biochemistry, because the
cell is not just minimizing energy. Rather, it is deploying energy
(doing work), using informational means, to achieve the end of
preserving global stability. If "agency" means acting spontaneously by
virtue of one's own causal powers, and if "intelligence" means adjusting
means to ends, then the cell is clearly an "intelligent agent."

(8) Doesn't natural selection remove the necessity for speaking about
"purpose"? No, because selection theory always presupposes the
functional integrity of the system being "selected." It is this
assumption of comparatively superior functioning that is really doing
all the explanatory work. Since selection theory presupposes the
normativity of organismal function, it cannot explain it.

(9) What would an alternative to the reductionist, neo-Darwinian
framework look like? Here is one possible answer:

"At present, protein structure, metabolic sequences, and cytoplasmic
streaming are regarded as disparate subjects . . . It is, of course,
possible . . . that the cell functions by adopting average situations
which result from summation of all the independent processes operating
at a given moment. It is, however, unlikely that this mode of function
could explain the ordered movement exhibited by cells. Subcellular
movement takes place as though directed by an underlying co-ordination,
implying a unifying principle which links metabolic chemical energy
reciprocally with macroscopic mechanical forces. This principle is
clearly one of structure existing throughout subcellular space, and of
all subcellular components, I think that water is the only one capable
of fulfulling this role." (John G. Watterson, "The Interactions of Water
and Proteins in Cellular Function," in P. Jeanteur et al., eds.,
Progress in Molecular and Subcellular Biology, Vol. 12, Berlin:
Springer, 1991, pp. 113--134; the quote is on pp. 130--131.)

Watterson's own speculations focus on the possible large-scale
organization of an ordered water (or liquid crystalline) state in the
cytoplasmic gel. (See, also, Mae-Wan Ho et al., "Organisms as Polyphasic
Liquid Crystals," Bioelectrochemistry and Bioenergetics, 1996, 41:
81--91; and Gerald H. Pollack's "Cells, Gels, and the Engines of Life,"
Seattle: Ebner & Sons, 2001.)

For other speculations on the coherence of biological functionality that
invoke a variety of nonlinear dynamical and quantum field theoretic
principles, see the writings of F. Eugene Yates, G. Ricky Welch, A.S.
Davydov, Herbert Frohlich, Emilio Del Giudice, Giuliano Preparata,
Giuseppe Vitiello, Robert Laughlin, and others (I will be happy to
supply references if anyone is interested).

(10) Belief in the necessity of a physical principle underlying the
functional coherence of life does not stand or fall with any particular
theory about the nature of that principle. We can very well know that
the currently dominant theoretical framework is broken, even if we don't
know for sure how to fix it.

(11) Renaming a problem (e.g., "teleonomy") does solve it. I think it is
better to call a spade a spade. That is why I speak of "purpose,"
"teleology," "intelligent agency," etc.

(12) Is this "anthropomorphism"? No, because if "ho anthropos" is itself
a product of nature, then human nature must already be latent within
life and the cosmos at large. To ban the investigation of purpose at
lower levels of life is to make it impossible to understand ourselves
naturalistically.

(13) As Whitehead noted, "Scientists animated by the purpose of proving
that they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study."
("The Function of Reason," Boston: Beacon Press, 1929, p. 16)
Received on Tue Jul 2 17:37:00 2002