Re: Theses on the Place of Purpose in Nature

From: Karl Javorszky <[email protected]>
Date: Thu 04 Jul 2002 - 15:56:40 CEST

The following are contributions to james a barham's theses

> (1) Almost all human actions appear to have a means-ends structure. The
> ends (or "goals" or "purposes") of our actions establish normative
> criteria in relation to which our actions may be said to "succeed" or
> "fail." But are such human purposes real or illusory?
what has this to do with genetics?
does one's philosophy that one lives a meaningful, reasonable life alter that person's concepts about what is information? once we know that x is a religious believer, then it is no information (for the receiver) that x sees everywhere the masterful hand of god.
> (2) If they are illusory, then how do we explain the fact that the very
> notion of an "illusion" is itself normative, since it implies a
> veridical cognitive state with respect to which the illusory state is
> deviant?
does intellectual masturbation create information or is it a repetitive (anancastic, stereotype) series of actions? is not lust in itself a congruence between "sollwert" and "istwert" (expected value and observed value)? cyclic thinking generates lust. deviation between sollwert and istwert is what psychology is all about. that is freedom, variability, mutation.
(allow me to point out that due to the differing numerosities of states of sets once considered as a contemporary assembly and once considered as a sequential assembly, and this in dependence of the cardinality of the set, one will find acceptable varieties arising from the translation. to one "dna" there are several equally valid "cells", to one "cell" there are several equally valid "dna"s. the translation slack is up to 3.8 in one direction and up to 3.4 in the other direction. one could call the random selection of one dna - among up to 3.4 differing, equally valid varieties - VARIATION and one could call the random selection of one cell - among up to 3.8 differing, equally valid varieties - MUTATION.)
> (3) If human purposes are real, then we must try to explain them by
> seeking their roots further down the phylogenetic scale. But how far
> down? At least at the level of the cell, because the means-ends
> structure is clearly observable in the behavior of the cell. This is a
> simple empirical fact. Nothing is implied about any possible (but
> unknowable) subjective experience that may or may not be accompanying
> this behavior.
the term "behaviour" is clearly defined in the relevant science, namely psychology. in this point, barham appears to look a free will into a cell. that would be a good example of anthropomorphism.
if a cell cannot "behave" in any other way as it is observed to behave, one should speak of "reacrtion", not of "behaviour".
reaction yes, behaviour no.
> (4) Clearly life is a cell-level phenomenon, but equally clearly much,
> if not most, activity at the subcellular level has a means-ends
> structure, as well. Furthermore, some aspect of the self-organizing
> principle at the heart of the phenomenon of life---whatever it turns out
> to be---must be postulated to exist below the cell level, if we are to
> have any hope of explaining the origin of life. There is no way to get
> from random chemistry to the cell without positing a stepwise,
> self-organizing process. So these are two good reasons for postulating
> some autonomous, proto-means-ends principle at the below-cell level, as
> well.
Yes, very good, clear reasoning. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that there is a trick of self-organising entities. This trick has traditionally been called "secret of life". The tzrick appears to be accessible to reasoning by assuming:
a) the organismus in question contains n elementar units;
b) the n elementar units can once be talked about as a contemporary assembly (that what is "now");
c) the n elementar units can on the other hand be talked about as a sequence in time (that what "was" or "shall be");
d) watching how the sentences under b) restrict the possibilities for sentences under c) and how the sentences under c) restrict the possibilities for sentences under b);
e) call the cyclic translation and re-translation between "now" and "later" life.
> (5) Isn't the cell just a "machine"? No, because in a machine there is
> no intrinsic connection between the normative or "correct" functional
> state and its material instantiation. The correct state is imposed on
> the matter from the outside as a set of boundary conditions that are
> arbitrary with respect to the desired functional behavior. There is no
> principle intrinsic to the machine tending to preserve the correct
> boundary conditions or the correct behavior. That is why external
> intervention is required---the correctness is entirely in the eye of the
> human being. The machine itself does not give a damn (so to speak) about
> its functional state, which is only "functional" because we say it is.
Of course if we say "<property>" to something then this something has the property "<property>" only because we say it. In other words "look, Mom, I can speak and give names to things!" and "if I decide that I see something <so> then this something is in my eyes <so>". Bravo.
Now to the problems of grown-ups:
It is correct to assume on the functioning of an idealised cell a set of boundaries. The cell obviously does not function inexplicably and randomly and hap�hazardly. So far, genetics has not had been understood with respect to the nature of the regulatory mechanisms that are obviously at work.
Le me propose that one uses following abstractional steps to clarify how a regulatory mechnism can function:
a) let us consider the cell as a collection of n elementary units;
b) blah-blah-blah-blah see above.
> (6) The functional behavior of the cell, in contrast, arises out of the
> intrinsic physical properties of the matter the cell is made of. The
> relationship between structure and function in a protein is not
> arbitrary and extrinsic, as in a machine, but rather essential and
> intrinsic. The result of this intrinsic connection between structure and
> function in the cell is that living things are constantly actively
> adjusting all their internal processes in such a way as to preserve
> their global stability. We describe this as the "struggle to survive."
> This fact is not mentioned as a solution to anything; it is merely a
> description of an empirically observable phenomenon. It is the heart of
> the problem that we need to solve
If I see life as a struggle, then I see everywhere a struggle.
Otherwise: good, fine, partly excellent reasoning.
There is an intrinsic connection between structure and function in the cell. Very good. That what some of us call "behaviour" of the cell (the cyclicity and neighbourhood relations of the constituents of the cell) arises out of intrinsic physical properties of the matter the cell is made of. Accepted.
One may assume a property of stability in systems which makes us say "that what has been the case very often is likely to happen again". Yes, this is true. One may call this axiom of probability theory "stability" or "homeostasis". Living cells seem to follow this, too.
>
> (7) The problem clearly transcends ordinary biochemistry, because the
> cell is not just minimizing energy. Rather, it is deploying energy
> (doing work), using informational means, to achieve the end of
> preserving global stability. If "agency" means acting spontaneously by
> virtue of one's own causal powers, and if "intelligence" means adjusting
> means to ends, then the cell is clearly an "intelligent agent."
This is pure theology. Please read St Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, specifically Vol. 12, Human Intelligence (I1. 84-89). I find this approach discussed e.g. in Question 86: "What our intellect knows with respect to material realities", and Question 85: "The mode and order ofg understanding".
It is definitely a heresy to ascribe to a being without a soul (and I assume barham does not think a soul into a cell) an intellect.
But: what has this to do with genetics?
>
> (8) Doesn't natural selection remove the necessity for speaking about
> "purpose"? No, because selection theory always presupposes the
> functional integrity of the system being "selected." It is this
> assumption of comparatively superior functioning that is really doing
> all the explanatory work. Since selection theory presupposes the
> normativity of organismal function, it cannot explain it.
Some combinations of translating-into-sequence of structures and retranslating-into-structure of a sequence have a higher probability of reproducing unto themselves even under more varied external circumstances than other combinations of translating-into-sequence of structures and retranslating-into-structure of a sequence. See explanation above relating to VARIATION and MUTATION.
This is like saying "giving the proportions of a triangle by using prime numbers is a more challenging task than giving the proportions of a triangle without any restrictions".
The longevity of logical statements that describe an assembly depends on a) the properties of the assembly, and b) the words chosen to describe the assembly. ("Longevity": the descendant still points out that what the parent has pointed out. Like: animals have to have nourishment -> mammals have to eat.)
> (9) What would an alternative to the reductionist, neo-Darwinian
> framework look like? Here is one possible answer:
>
> "At present, protein structure, metabolic sequences, and cytoplasmic
> streaming are regarded as disparate subjects . . . It is, of course,
> possible . . . that the cell functions by adopting average situations
> which result from summation of all the independent processes operating
> at a given moment. It is, however, unlikely that this mode of function
> could explain the ordered movement exhibited by cells. Subcellular
> movement takes place as though directed by an underlying co-ordination,
> implying a unifying principle which links metabolic chemical energy
> reciprocally with macroscopic mechanical forces. This principle is
> clearly one of structure existing throughout subcellular space, and of
> all subcellular components, I think that water is the only one capable
> of fulfulling this role." (John G. Watterson, "The Interactions of Water
> and Proteins in Cellular Function," in P. Jeanteur et al., eds.,
> Progress in Molecular and Subcellular Biology, Vol. 12, Berlin:
> Springer, 1991, pp. 113--134; the quote is on pp. 130--131.)
>
> Watterson's own speculations focus on the possible large-scale
> organization of an ordered water (or liquid crystalline) state in the
> cytoplasmic gel. (See, also, Mae-Wan Ho et al., "Organisms as Polyphasic
> Liquid Crystals," Bioelectrochemistry and Bioenergetics, 1996, 41:
> 81--91; and Gerald H. Pollack's "Cells, Gels, and the Engines of Life,"
> Seattle: Ebner & Sons, 2001.)
>
> For other speculations on the coherence of biological functionality that
> invoke a variety of nonlinear dynamical and quantum field theoretic
> principles, see the writings of F. Eugene Yates, G. Ricky Welch, A.S.
> Davydov, Herbert Frohlich, Emilio Del Giudice, Giuliano Preparata,
> Giuseppe Vitiello, Robert Laughlin, and others (I will be happy to
> supply references if anyone is interested).
Accepting that reversal between surjective and injective pictures between mixtures and sequences happens in dependence of the cardinality of the set (that once the cell generates a dna, and once the dna generates a cell, and this in dependence of the growing-and-splitting of the cell) means that one will conclude that there must exist a "filler" that increases and/or shrinks the cardinality property of a set. In biologic reality this may well be H2O. In number theoretical "reality" it is a translation function of great simplicity and frappant novelty.
> (10) Belief in the necessity of a physical principle underlying the
> functional coherence of life does not stand or fall with any particular
> theory about the nature of that principle. We can very well know that
> the currently dominant theoretical framework is broken, even if we don't
> know for sure how to fix it.
Very well chosen description of the concept, that indeed there must be a rational method of coming to understanding the functioning of genetics, or biology in general. Let me disagree with we don't know for sure how to fix it. I happen to know how to fix the theoretical fractures of scientific systems. Indeed, one will have to go down to discussing how many is that many.
(11) Renaming a problem (e.g., "teleonomy") does solve it. I think it is
> better to call a spade a spade. That is why I speak of "purpose,"
> "teleology," "intelligent agency," etc.
One may speak in tongues as one wishes. This is a free land and this scientific discussion allows anyone to speak whatever one feels the necessity to speak. It may turn out to be useful to use words that have a public, clear meaning, in case one is result-oriented. Let me suggest to use such words as have a clear meaning, namely 1,2,3,...
This allows us to speak about what we see in the microscope. If the guys looking thru the microscope talk useful sentences, they shall invariably say sentences like:
n1 parts of the cell have property s1,
n2 parts of the cell have property s2,
...
nk parts of the cell have property sk,
and the cell consists alltogether of n parts with n1 + n2 + ... + nk = n.
As long as they talk sense they cannot say anything different. Then we can start counting to how many of the parts of the cell have they assigned how many different symbols. Then we are in business.
 
> (12) Is this "anthropomorphism"? No, because if "ho anthropos" is itself
> a product of nature, then human nature must already be latent within
> life and the cosmos at large. To ban the investigation of purpose at
> lower levels of life is to make it impossible to understand ourselves
> naturalistically.
In order to understand Nature we have to understand our concepts about Nature first, that is, we have to understand how we generate and use concepts. We have to discuss, how many different concepts one may have. Let us assume one's brain has n units of storage capacity. Let us assume we assign to n1 of the concepts a symbol s1. Does this sound familiar? How are the subsets of a maximally structured set ordered (arranged) spatially? Is this question equivalent to the question: how many ways are there to enumerate an assembly consecutively and how many ways are there to enumerate a set non-consecutively (that is, as a sequence and as a cointemporary assembly)?
> (13) As Whitehead noted, "Scientists animated by the purpose of proving
> that they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study."
> ("The Function of Reason," Boston: Beacon Press, 1929, p. 16)
Name-dropping is a bad habit, as Lenin said.
Who has problems with leading a purposeless life? Who keeps repeating "there must be a reason behind all this" and "those who see no reason behind this are all awfully dumb"? There is an under-production of some hormones if one keeps looking for a reason. The present case is a subclinical one. In the full picture it is called Beziehungswahn (relational obsession / obsession with reasons). ("This can't be without a reason / purpose / hidden goal".)
-----------------
The following is an answer to the question of John Holgate:
Even Karl Javorszky's definition 'such comes next to such' depends on the
(possibly unmeasurable) notion of 'coming' (why not 'going'?).
Can we even talk about numbers 'coming'? Is that not poeticising
mathematics?
The word "comes" implies that there is a sequence in a sequnce. The successor comes after the predecessor and the predecessor goes after the successor. A sequence is sequenced. That means one element comes after the other. If one counts backwards then one element goes before the next.
We can talk about numbers coming if we see that a cyclicity is at the same time a contemporary assembly (in its quality as a whole, regarding all of its elements) and a sequneced assembly (in its quality as many elements that are in an ordered sequence).
Thank you seeing poetics into mathematics. Indeed, once one grasps the beauty of congruences between "how it is now" and "when shall it be again like this", one leads a fulfilled life with plenty of aesthetical pleasures.
One recognises correct thinking by having an inner satisfaction. The feeling of evidence is closely related to feelings of Gestalt, a well-ordered assembly.
What is your approach to a well-ordered assembly? Would you like to discuss the properties of an assembly with me? Please, take this loud cry in the waste seriously. Is anyone out there?

 
Received on Thu Jul 4 15:58:25 2002

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