Re: Vedr.: Semiotics and abduction

In reply to Soren:

My comment to the first paragraph below, with the phrase "interpreting
things that are not intended to be a sign" is that this is a
semiological and not a semiotic perspective, understanding
semiological to refer to language based or symbolic interaction. A
sign, to me, using the Peircean framework can refer to its object
iconically, indexically or symbolically. It is only in the latter
case, the 'symbolic' style of object-reference, that anthropomorhpic
intentionality is inserted. But, as Soren points out, for Peirce,
intentionality is basic to all levels of semiosis.

As for classical logic being without meaning, that refers only to the
Form of its infrastructure. However, since I am not a Platonist -
where Form is operative separated from context (ie, pure form or
design separated from matter)....then, I feel that such a state simply
cannot exist. A pure abstract Form, in Peircean terms would be a
rhemetic iconic legisign, which is an abstract diagramme. BUT, no
abstract diagramme exists as such, floating in the air, in all its
pure design. The action of abstracting that diagramme from the
particular realities in which that design actually exists, is a
process carried out by Mind. The abstract diagramme - as abstract and
general - is without context (ie, without meaning). BUT, it cannot
exist as such a universal in reality, for universals do not exist
separately from context (unless, again, you are a Platonist). They
only exist (and universals ARE real) as contextualized within
particulars (Aristotle).

Finally, I don't think that Peirce sees logic as evolving from
signification, which suggests that the latter is prior to the former.
They are co-evolving. Signification or semiosis is a logical process.
There's no such thing as signification (semiosis?) separate from
logic.

Dear John and Edwina

"Sign games" is my term for what animals have ,seen in relation to the
human "language games". It is the life context for communication
processes. You could say that every interpretation is signification,
but as far as I can se Winfried N�th uses it spe
cifically for the process in - what he calls ecosemiotics -
interpreting things that are not intended to be a sign to stand for
something anyway. This is the crucial difference between Peirce and
Saussure's theories of signs, that Peirce accept non-inte
nti
onal signs.

I think that classical logic in itself is supposed to be meaningless.
content and meaning comes from what you apply it to. But Edwina is
right that Peirce sees logic as evolving from signification and
therefore always be in a meaningful context. I also t
hink that it is a great advantage in his theory.

S�ren Brier, +45 3528 2689

http://www.flec.kvl.dk/personalprofile.asp?id=sbr&p=engelsk

Ed. of Cybernetics & Human Knowing

http://www.imprint-academic.com/C&HK

>>> taborsky@primus.ca 07-08-02 15:21 >>>
In reply to John Holgate

It's minor, but the usual term is 'semiotician' rather than
'semiotist' (as used by JH)...but..who can say that it won't change.

However - I'm unclear why 'signification' is set up as a synonym for
'sign games'. Indeed, I have no idea what a sign game is.

(1)Then, John states that IF "so then signification (sign games) and
the abductive method rather than classical syllogistic (or Florido's
alethic) logic is our starting point. Alternatively , if 'information
science' is to be based on a theory of 'meaning' that's a whole new
ball game".

And also:
(2) Since Peirce redefined 'induction' away from the classical sense
towards
a heuristic principle of signification it may be fruitful to explore
his six modes of abduction
(hunch/symptom/metaphor/clue/diagnosis/explanation). If we could make
a connection between
'abduction' in the biomedical domain and 'abductive triggers'
(surprise/novelty/anomaly) in phenomenology it could have considerable
explanatory power for a unifying theory.

And also:
(3)If we separate meaning from classical logic (exemplified in
Florido's concept of semantic information) as has occurred more or
less in postKantian phenomenology (Heidegger, Derrida, Peirce etc) we
are left with the admittedly vague function of abductive inference and
context-bound interest . Does it yield 'too little knowledge' for a
working methodology which would satisfy all 'four corners'of your
model?

Let me comment, point by point.

(1) I'm not sure what signification=sign games means, so it's rather
difficult to comment on this. The signifying action is a process, made
up of at least three basic Relations. These relations establish
measurements, or 'organized links' within certain codes
(organizational patterns) of a mass of energy to another mass of
energy. By virtue of these relations, the mass is contextualized,
organized, 'held', so to speak in an existential reality in time and
space. THIS IS A LOGICAL PROCESS. The measurements or encoded actions
of organization must operate within a logic, a formal process. The
three relations are, in themselves, a logical process.
Indeed, the very basis of Peircean semiosis - is logic. Logic, to
Peirce, is another term for semiotics.

(2) Again, I'm not sure what you mean by defining induction away from
the classical sense to a 'heuristic principle of signification'. The
notion of induction as a means of establishing statistical probability
rather than necessary conclusions is 'classical'...and is Peircean.
Abduction is one of the three classical (Aristotelian and Peircean)
methods of 'finding knowledge', and is, as Soren points out, premissed
on the notion of chance and freedom. What's so special about abduction
in the biomedical domain?

(3) I think that it would help if you defined your understanding of
'meaning'. I don't see that meaning has ever separated itself from
logic A logic without meaning is illogical. How can you put Peirce
side by side with the phenomenologists such as Heidegger and (yuck)
Derrida?? The point of the Peircean semiotics/logic, is that it
enabled a meaningful world - and that is valid within all processes
whether physico-chemical, biological or socioconceptual. Recall that
the Peircean semiotic triad, its syllogism, has a major premiss, -
that is, a cohesive ground of continuity. That prevents the
interpretant (meaning) from being ONLY defined within current-time
contexts and insists that the interpretant's reality (its meaning)
exists within links to a cohesive history of interactions, and to a
set of links to very wide contexts - not just the immediate local
context.

Edwina Taborsky
39 Jarvis St. #318
Toronto, Ontario M5E 1Z5
(416) 361.0898
Received on Wed Aug 7 20:41:26 2002