logic

I don't agree with Ted's 'four domains'
1. how things actually work
2. how things appear to work
3. how we express and reason about how things work
4. how the entities involved express and reason about how things
work.
First- this sets up 1 and 2 as contrary phenomenological problems.
And 3 and 4 become contrary analytic problems. I'm not analyzing
reality that way.
Then, Ted put me and my use of logic, rational, reasonable, in
domain 3. No - I'm not speaking of how 'we express and reason'.
That would be quite a limited domain. My use of logic refers to 'how
things actually work'.

I'm saying that all reality, which includes the physico-chemical,
biological and socioconceptual realms, operates within logic, by
which I mean long term pragmatic patterns of relations. All realms
operate by establishing normative patterns of relations. Those are
what I mean by logic.

Ted says that "Edwina believes 2 and 1 are the same or close".
No, I don't. I've no idea how you could conclude that. I'm not
talking about the phenomenological discrepencies or non-
discrepencies between what one 'observes' and what 'is'.

My theories - I wouldn't call them 'religious decisions', for that
would suggest that my theories are arrrived at only by revelation,
and are not testable by either rational or empirical means. I hope
that my theories are testable by both.

My focus is on how realities not simply 'express and reason about
how things work' for that would mean that they don't examine why
things work, but only describe it. I'm interested in why logical
patterns develop and the nature of those patterns. That has
similarities to Devlin's situation logic, but it's really Peircean logic,
which is all about relations.

Edwina Taborsky
Bishop's University Phone:(819)822.9600 Ext.2424
Lennoxville, Quebec Fax: (819)822.9661
Canada JIM 1Z7
Received on Mon Sep 9 22:19:39 2002