RE: opinions vs knowledge - The Cave is Constructed

From: <[email protected]>
Date: Wed 11 Sep 2002 - 23:01:20 CEST

To Norbert, John, and Pedro:

First, Norbert, I was puzzled by the content of your message of Sept. 11.
You provide "Answers" but I am uncertain what the propositions were.
Later, I recognized that the remarks you attributed to Ted were not
written by Ted. As this has happened before, I ask that you take
extra precautions in the future to ensure that you are quoting your
colleagues correctly. Your contributions to the community of FIS
could become even more valuable.

John: you write:

> There is no empirical evidence for a logically necessary link
>between 'information' and
data, knowledge or truth or for the instantiation of 'information' in rational
processes (or computing). An informational experience is notoriously
good or bad
according to its perceived usefulness not its logicality. <

In general, scientific thought operates on empirical information.
The source of empirical information is a specific system and a
specific set of circumstances. The design, planning and conduct of
scientific operations are grounded in one-to-one correspondence
relations, although this ideal is often impossible to realize in
practise. The relations between mathematics and science are also
grounded in correspondence relations. If a coherent structure is
proposed, then the structure is subject to explanation on these
bases. These bases also serve to either generate a wide acceptance
of the structure or a general rejection of the proposed structure,
depending on the acceptance or rejection of correspondence relations.
 
It is crucial to distinguish between empirical information with
supporting correspondence relations and (philosophical) abstractions
about nature. Your usage of general terms suggests to me that you
are speaking in terms of your personal philosophy and what you
consider to be "good" or "bad" based on utilitarian axia.

The abstractions of science fiction stimulate our capabilities to
image nature, but such abstractions must be recognized as
non-empirical.
Or, have I missed your intended communication?

John: You further write:
>My personal theory (at the risk of spamming the conversation) is that we
>(and possibly all living organisms) qua species informationis relate
>to each other
>and to the Umwelt cinematically rather than computationally.
>
>We pan towards meaning, focus empathetically or zoom in and out of
>conversations.
>Informational experiences provide us with 'shots' which make varying
>degrees of sense.

To me, the view of biology implied by your sentences seems to be at
least a century out of date.
More than three centuries ago, the invention of the microscope
revealed a microscopic world that was beyond the normal range of
human sensory systems.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, the science of chemistry revealed
microscopic structures of natural systems. In some cases, these
structures could be added together to generate human sensory
experience - for example, the taste of tartaric acid or the taste of
vinegar could be related to the quality of wine. Modern science
continues to exploit the realization that a microscopic world at the
nanoscale can be directed related to human experience. Many of the
modern practises of medicine are directly related to relations among
atomic elements (as composed into molecules) at the nanoscale.

While I also am puzzled about the nature of conscious human
experience, I do not think it is the sole basis of human experience
and it alone is not sufficient to construct a basis for communication
of information. If one wants to construct a coherent view of nature,
it is essential to identify the complex sets of correspondence
relations that links the range of human senses to the extraordinary
capabilities and fantastic dynamic and spatial ranges of human
artifacts (instrumentations) to detect the "invisible" communications
intrinsic to the complexities of nature.

Pedro: I concur with most of your recent post. At the base, we need
generating functions that support natural language. I strongly agree
that interdisciplinary confusion is a very deep problem that will
endure for many generations. Interdisciplinary communication may be
the most intractable problem facing FIS.

Perhaps you could expand on what you mean by:

> Helas, a central problem that also impinges in my previous comments
>(above) on logics is the lack of a central theory of the
>neurosciences, really making sense of the dynamics of our cognition.

Another colleague used language similar to yours in a lecture
recently. I guess I am either missing the point or that my
philosophy of biology has become so radical that I am inadvertently
excluding your line of reasoning. Could to identify more
specifically what a "central theory of the neurosciences" would
contribute to our knowledge of communications?

Cheers

Cheers

Jerry LR Chandler

 

 
>Ted,
>
>You wrote:
>
> <My point was that most workers in logic have many different logics.
><All are invented for different purposes and distort the reality they
><represent and about which they reason.
>
>I agree that 'logics' are legion. The distortion occurs in the expression
>(language) and in the rational process (thought). The corollary is that all
>information may be in fact misinformation (distortion of reality)
>be it the myth of Oedipus, Seven Day Creationism or Superstring theory.
>
>Remember that old trickster Hermes is the patron god of libraries
>and messengers.
>
>The flow of information (like the arrow of time) is an illusion.
>
>There is no empirical evidence for a logically necessary link
>between 'information' and
>data, knowledge or truth or for the instantiation of 'information' in rational
>processes (or computing). An informational experience is notoriously
>good or bad
>according to its perceived usefulness not its logicality.
>
><We are talking about...
>
><4. How the entities involved "express and reason about how things work"
>
>I support your emphasis on what information (and its conceptual
>family) does rather
>than what it speculatively is or means. An example might be the way
>Don Norman picked up
>on JJ Gibson's notion of affordance and incorporated it into the
>practice of computer design.
>
>Our first task is to identify the substratum of supervenient
>entities with family resemblances
>to our long lost cousin information rather than attempt to formulate
>a reductionist
>Grand Unifying Theory. Intelligent fragmentation of views is inevitable.
>
>As an aside how do you incorporate into your Fourth Domain non-linear concepts
>like turbulence, rhythmic entrainment, dynamic coherence, affordance
>and agility
>- all those intriguing mental models which have emerged in recent times
> to enhance and develop (but not overthrow) First Order Logic?
>
>How do we ground expression/reason in 'how things work'?
>
>How do we make moves on the chessboard if we are the pieces in the game?
>First Order Logic is like the notation on the scoresheet of a previous match -
>good for postgame analysis but not for mate in two. Peircean anthropo-logic
>only gets us partially into informational relationships (say through
>the opening gambits not into the intuitive middle-game).
>
>My personal theory (at the risk of spamming the conversation) is that we
>(and possibly all living organisms) qua species informationis relate
>to each other
>and to the Umwelt cinematically rather than computationally.
>
>We pan towards meaning, focus empathetically or zoom in and out of
>conversations.
>Informational experiences provide us with 'shots' which make varying
>degrees of sense.
>
>If I'm not misinformed, the emergence of the camera both reflects and furthers
>the epistemiologic development of homo sapiens. Computational
>posthumanism (Fredkin, Hayles)
>is really digital reductionism and we cannot unravel the plot of information
>by categorical logic or semantics alone.
>
>John H
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Ted Goranson [mailto:tedg@sirius-beta.com]
>Sent: Tuesday, 10 September 2002 5:36
>To: Multiple recipients of list FIS
>Subject: Re: opinions vs knowledge - The Cave is Constructed
>
>
> >It is really have some difficulty to understand how we can think that
> >"logic" is a (narrow) human invention!!!????
>
>Fenzl--
>
>(My second posting this week. Limiting to two seems a good rule.)
>
>We are talking about four domains here:
>
>--1. How things actually work
>
>--2. How things appear to work
>
>--3. How we express and reason about how things work
>
>--4. How the entities involved "express and reason about how things work"
>
>Edwina used the term "logic" in the context of Socratic caves,
>Aristotle and Peirce. She used terms like "rational" and
>"reasonable." To my mind (and many I presume) her use of the term
>puts her use in domain 3. My point was that most workers in logic
>have many different logics. All are invented for different purposes
>and distort the reality they represent and about which they reason.
>
>You used the term "logic" in such a way that means (I think) that
>there is some coherent set of laws in domain 1 that result in
>reproducable effects. That's different.
>
>As common terms of art in computer science, I use "mechanics" and
>"physics" for domain 1, and "logic" variously for the rest. I believe
>there is a large distance of abstraction among these four. Edwina at
>least believes 2 and 1 are the same or close and "logic" covers both.
>Whatever you choose is a religious decision, but there are tens of
>thousands of places where you can recount what people said about the
>the relationships among 1, 2 and 3. I suppose it has pedagogical
>value, but that Christmas tree is pretty well decorated.
>
>I interpret the FIS to agenda to be concerned with domain 4 and
>relationships with the others. There are very few forums for this, so
>I suppose the focus here to be worth preserving.
>
>I can even claim some small role in "creating" a logic myself. Twenty
>years ago a problem somewhat similar to the FIS one was defined in
>terms of the restrictions of existing logics. We specified
>characteristics of a new logic to design, and essentially established
>a research center to do so. I played a minor role in the problem
>identification and arranging the funding. The center is still strong
>at Stanford. The project was led by our probably greatest living
>logician at the time (who died last year). The logic is "situation
>logic," which at his death was being extended to "channel logic" to
>address something much like domain 4.
>
>Whatever we invent, it will likely be algebra-friendly and exploit
>group theory. The route of abstraction among the four domains
>(especially 3 and 4) must be formally specified; I am hopeful that
>category theory will guide that.
>
>Best, Ted
>--
>Ted Goranson
>Advanced Enterprise Research Office
>
>Attachment converted: Macintosh HD 4GB:InterScan_Disclaimer.txt 20
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Received on Wed Sep 11 23:01:47 2002

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