Re: Doctrine of Limitation

From: <[email protected]>
Date: Sat 28 Sep 2002 - 03:34:43 CEST

Dear Colleagues:

In this email, I respond to several recent posts (pedro, John, Terry)
of interest. This semester is unusually busy and I am disappointed
that I lack the time to enter into these topics at greater depth.

Pedro:

 From the perspective of the natural sciences, I do not understand
your post on "Doctrine of Limitation." I am particularly puzzled by
the usage of the term Doctrine? Is this an essential part of your
view or is it merely a substitution for another term, such as Law?
I am equally puzzled by the term, Limitation. Is a limitation being
imposed? If so, what is being imposed and who is acting as the
imposer?

The discussion you provide in the support of the Doctrine addresses a
significant number of relatable ideas but the nature of these
relations is not clear to me. For example, would it be appropriate
to consider the role of history in relating the function of the
central nervous system? Should the role of neuronal transmitters as
communicators *between* cells be considered? This introduces a new
issue: the logic of "betweenness" in contrast with simpler
classical binary logic. I do not understand the issues with regard
to electric fields as even a simple microbe sustains a membrane
potential.

Underlying these issues is the question of complexity - if we choose
to simplify our descriptions of complex behaviors by removing the
complexity, what have we gained?

Terry asks:

  " Is Information a Disease?"

and then describes the consequences of various forms of professional
communications.

Would it be helpful to first ask: What is a disease?
And then enquire as to the nature of the sources of the disease?

Many physicians believe that diseases are the consequence of a
particular etiology - a particular sequence of processes that link an
individual to its surroundings. Terry apparently acknowledges this
when she writes:
"All depends on the specifics and psychodynamics of the case."

John writes (Sept. 20 post):

"This is where PI meets Philosophy of Language. The separation of meaning from
grammar (Carnap, Chomsky et al) and from communication theory
(Shannon and Weaver) has pretty well thrown out
the baby information with the bathwater of semantics. Hopefully PI
will revisit some of these abandoned agendas.

Connectionists like David Chalmers have conveniently created the
notion of 'information spaces and states' -

'Physics requires information states but cares only about their
relations, not their intrinsic nature;
phenomenology requires information states but cares only about their
intrinsic nature..
Experience is information from the inside; physics is information
from the outside.'
(The Conscious Mind p. 305)".

I believe John's questions deserve very serious consideration.
At issue is source of the concept of information.
Does the concept of information depend on communication?

As John notes, the separation of meaning is not restricted to grammar
and Shannon information theory. Most philosophers of mathematics
claim that no meaning is attached to mathematical rules or
structures. By way of contrast, the language of chemistry and
chemical grammars are meaningful - a matter of common experience.

If one assumes that formally, "information" has no meaning, then one
must turn elsewhere to identify the source of meaning and
communication.
As a logical parallel, I would point out that the nature of entropy
(as a physical phenomenon) depends of the co-existence of temperature
and energy.
In bare bone terms:
  you get nothing from nothing;
  you get something from something.

Or, to place these notions in a more formal setting:
If the transfer of information generates new meanings for the
recipient, what are the sources of the generating functions?
To what extent are the generating functions for human communication
intrinsic to the nature of being human?

Cheers

Jerry LR Chandler

 
Received on Sat Sep 28 03:35:02 2002

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