AW: Counting and optimization

Dear colleagues,
yes I would like to demonstrate how practical the interaction between
sequences and mixtures can be made. I'd love to get an invitation to a
seminar or for a semester or for a year or to work in a group.

I am ready to accept offers of a motivational nature.
Looking forward your suggestion on this matter,
Karl

-----Ursprungliche Nachricht-----
Von: fis@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es]Im Auftrag von
jlrchand@erols.com
Gesendet: Samstag, 19. Oktober 2002 22:42
An: Multiple recipients of list FIS
Betreff: Counting and optimization

Dear Colleagues:

This message responds to a number of posts (Heiner, John H., Pedro, Karl,
Christophe) over the past several weeks. In most cases I include quotes from
the author to help inform the readers of the original issue of
correspondence.

Heiner Benking post of Sun, 22 Sep 2002 09:55:26 +0200 (MET DST) proposes to
bridge ...
<?color><?param 0000,0000,FFFF>the space between data and meaning by adding
some work
done in the field of terminology research. This "zooming" into the space
between data and meaning is made clear at:
http://benking.de/Global-Change/Con-con.gif
more can be found at: CONCEPT AND CONTEXT MAPPING - TKE 1996 Vienna
http://www.ceptualinstitute.com/genre/benking/term/terminology.htm
and
http://benking.de/Global-Change/spatial-spacial.html

<?/color>I do not understand how this sort of global classification solves
the problems of the information sciences. Subjective classifications are
difficult precisely because they require judgments that are controversial.
The usual approach to resolving such controversies is to count. Perhaps
Heiner would demonstrate how this "zooming in" process approaches Karls
commentary on counting.

For example, Karl wrote on Tue, 24 Sep 2002 13:00:57 +0200 (MET DST)
<?color><?param 0000,0000,FFFF>"My contention --jumping to a theoretical
science level-- is that we have to let loose the conceptualizations
transported by our way of counting (1,2,3,...) because they carry in an
implicit way of thinking that does not agree with biological phenomena. The
ideas behind a basic assumption about the world that are implicit in
counting like 1,2,3,... seem to be:

-- all elements are alike in their basic unit (there is only one kind of
basic
units),
-- the distance between elements is the same,
-- the increase from one element to the next is the same (the basic
element),
-- there is no end in sight to this series,
-- there are no preferred sizes to elements,
-- there are no two basic kinds of elements that cooperate in the generation
of a new element."

<?/color>To what extend can Heiner's classification meet the criteria of
Karl?

Pedro wrote (within his doctrine of limitation, on Fri, 27 Sep 2002 14:46:01
+0200 (MET DST)

<?color><?param 0000,0000,FFFF>The neuronal information processing
capabilities are built exclusively upon cellular building blocks that
continuously instantiate their signaling abilities. The cellular use of
electric fields becomes a prolongation of the transgenerational processing
of genomes, both mapping into terribly different time scales, material
substrates and 'topological' processes the overall fitness of the organism.

<?/color>Karl prefers to relate to the issues raised by Pedro by iterating
his views on partitioning [Wed, 9 Oct 2002 14:32:27 +0200 (MET DST)]:

<?color><?param 0000,0000,FFFF>My hypothesis is that (his) { "his" refers to
another reference, not Pedro} type of simple partitional exercise, reminding
a random walk, may serve quite well for making sense of the interactions
between the atomic components (how neutrons, protons and electrons may add
up to compose the multi-dimensional atomic truth table).

<?/color>Perhaps, Karl, you would clarify your ideas by demonstrating such a
truth table? Biological organization generates exponential functions, not
merely addition, does it not?

In response to my question,
<Does the concept of information depend on communication?
<?color><?param 0000,0000,FFFF>John Holgate <?/color>replies on Thu, 3 Oct
2002 09:42:36 +0200 (MET DST)
<?fontfamily><?param Arial><?smaller>That's the big question, isn't it?
<?color><?param 0000,0000,FFFF>What we really need is a solid theory of
'agency' and mediated interaction.
(both Goranson and Fuchs come at agency from different angles in their
papers).

Coeira's 'Mediated Agent Interaction' might be of interest
<?/color><http://www.coiera.com/papers/AIME-01.pdf><?color><?param
0000,0000,FFFF>http://www.coiera.com/papers/AIME-01.pdf
It looks at the contextual constraint of 'common ground' .
<?/color><?/smaller><?/fontfamily>John: Thank you for the reference. This
paper is well worth the time. The author clearly distinguishes between the
concept of transmission and mere translation. This distinction deserves
wider attention, especially in relation to the meaning of information.
Shannon information is "freely" translatable among different computer
systems (no deep conceptual problems, but lots of practical technical
problems.)

Pedro follows the doctrine of limitations, recognizing the cost of
partitioning Fri, 4 Oct 2002 15:13:32 +0200 (MET DST)

<?color><?param 0000,0000,FFFF>"The biggest cost is related to the painful
process of 'decomposing' the big global problem into very small ones
addressed towards a population of thousands of 'limited' specialized
scientists and engineers."

<?/color>In mathematics, a general formula for partitioning has been
available for several decades. I have never seen this formula for
partitioning cited by a biologist or a physician. Is this because the
fundamental problem of communication is not merely dividing the whole into
the sum of its parts?

Pedro continues:
<?color><?param 0000,0000,FFFF>Finally, the discussions we are having on a
non-mechanistic conceptualization of info, may have some intriguing
connection with that very social-cognitive problem --How sciences working as
a collective nervous system may throw 'anticipatory light' to overcome the
impending menaces upon our planetary survival? In other words, we need to
develop 'the art of socially playing with the Rubik cube of knowledge'. Our
knowledge system has devoted countless scientific-philosophical energies to
discussions on reductionism and the like, an almost nothing to
'integrationism', 'perspectivism', 'limitation', etc. A mature info
perspective (or science) could help, and should help, to readdress the
cognitive imbalance.

<?/color>The metaphor of "the Rubik cube of knowledge" is delightful!

On a deeper level, Pedro brings to mind the extensive work of Herbert Simon,
The Sciences of the Artificial, etc. Simon introduces the concept of
"satisfactory and sufficient" in place of optimization. The long history of
"optimization" in engineering and mathematical theory suggest that the term
will bring substantial confusion if used with respect to the dynamics of the
CNS.

In response to my question:
> Can you provide an example of an MGS that produces meaningless
> information?
>
Christophe responds on Wed, 9 Oct 2002 22:58:03 +0200 (MET DST):
<?color><?param 0000,0000,FFFF>It is the purpose of a MGS to produce a
meaningful information
that will allow action implementation for the satisfaction of the
constraint S of the MGS. So it is not in the function of a MGS to
produce meaningless information.
It is to be noted also that action implementation can take place
only in locations where the constraint S exists.
We can call these locations "Domain of Efficiency S". So a
meaningful (S) information can be efficient (S) or not, depending
if it is located in the Domain of Efficiency S or not.
In brief, a MGS produces only meaningful information, but these
meanings can be efficient or not. (if you want to know more on
this, see I.3 in http://www.theory-meaning.fr.st/).

<?/color>The cultural difference between engineering and biology emerges in
this response. In the "Sciences of the Artificial", human ingenuity
construct systems that are then put into motion. Biological systems simply
run on internal sources of motion; the constraints are the organism itself.
Ultimately, the "information" suffices for either life or death. Should the
notion of "constraints" be viewed as a physical metaphor for biology and
medicine?

In response to my question:

"Karl: Is chemical and biochemical counting sufficiently complex to
>address your concerns about the nature of counting in FIS? Is
>correspondence with chemical counting a necessity for biological
>counting?"

Karl responds (Wed, 9 Oct 2002 14:32:27 +0200 (MET DST))
<?color><?param 0000,0000,FFFF>In my opinion, the entries in the periodic
table of elements by Mendeleiev can well be regarded as entries into a
multi-dimensional truth table. Now, which kind is the truth question to
which these answers yield always .t. (true)?

We presently have reason to assume that there exist about 104
distinguishable kinds of logical .t. values, which are to be splitted up
into some several hundred varieties, as each entry may have from 1 up to
some dozen of equivalent forms (what the physicists call "isotopes"). The
roughly 100 main archetypes of logical truths are subject to a manifold of
logical relations. (there are some that cannot be present both at the same
time--but it is another separate discussion).

The entries into the above truth table have an intrinsic ordering principle
which does not adhere strictly to their "weight". This would be like saying
that some subsets are similar to each other irrespective of their
cardinality. Also, their building grammar appears to start at integer values
of n=2i**2, with i = 1,2,3,... One may want to look into the generating
function:

Function m(n); local integer tmp, first, len, zero, m; tmp = int(sqrt(n/2));
first = 2*tmp**2; len = 4*tmp + 2; zero = if(n-first < len/2, first + tmp,
first + len/2 + tmp); m = n - zero; return(m).
which gives one a "long" periodicity starting off at values of n=2i**2, with
half-periodicities included.

<?/color>Truth tables can be constructed for logical propositions and for
first order logic and for higher order logics. I do not understand the
reason for focusing on the concept of logical truth table in this context.
Chemistry and biology are experimental sciences; only limited abstraction is
possible. How does one relate the truth table values of chemical
propositions to communication? The experimental observations of chemical
compounds are constructions from the elements, *not* partitioning of the
elements.

Karl, while I agree that generating functions are critical to mathematics,
how does one move from the mathematical concept of a generating function to
communication? Do you intend that the "psuedo - code" you include in your
message should be given meaning in terms of chemical structures, such a
neural transmitters?

The following paragraphs:
<?color><?param 0000,0000,FFFF>In drawing-of-samples it helps to add to the
Gauss distribution the Euler distribution which is hugely asymmetric. In my
opinion, the Euler distribution is far more important than the Gauss one.
With it, one finds a
extremely useful connection between "size-of-set", "number-of-chunks" and
"size-of-chunk". (And of course also the other two ways around, too.) The
Euler distribution is very simple and elegant, although shamefully
neglected. Just chart the number of partitions into k summands for each n (1
graph per each number, k horizontally, f vertically) and then integrate with
n -> inf.

Then, to speculate on whether there is a material 'constant' of which these
logical chemical archetypes are built up (the second question we are trying
to answer), one needs to generate the .2. set of partitions. Those for which
sum(m(ni))=m(n). On these, one may start adding pairwise: those that fall
down where .3. holds true, these converge. One does not know whether the
left or the right half-periodicity is the right one and they differ ever so
slightly. My hypothesis is that his type of simple partitional exercise,
reminding a random walk, may serve quite well for making sense of the
interactions between the atomic components (how neutrons, protons and
electrons may add up to compose the multi-dimensional atomic truth table).

<?/color>are not understandable to me. The system under discussion, the
domain of discourse is not stated as it relates to communication. I suspect
that the basic presupposition is that communication is merely a statistical
abstraction. How does one read the notation: .2. and .3. with respect to
conjunctions and disjunctions of propositions or first order statements? Is
the discourse related to marketing consumer products? Biochemically,
biological communication demonstrates both specificity and sensitivity. The
issues of Gaussian vs Eulerian distributions seldom arises.

This post is rather long. Individual respondents may hope to find some
relationships among my ordering of the responses.

Cheers to All

Jerry
Received on Tue Oct 22 15:15:18 2002