Re: Conceptualizations of information and ways of thinking

(I redirect this returned mess. from Wolfgang. The server here seems to be
overloaded, unduly returning the mails to the list---Pedro)
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dear christophe, thank you for the comments.

>Dear Wolfgang,
>Here are some points your article brings up that I would like
>to comment.
>Presentation of "information" as a super concept that deserves
>being subdivised into relevant particular concepts is an interesting
>way to addres the subject, as it is true that "information" per se
>addresses an immense field of events.

well, to some degree it may be a kind of a terminological problem which one
of the related and cognate concepts is fixed in order to play the role of
the generic one. but what i want to capture by that is that there ought to
be a relationship between the concepts like the relationship between
something more general, universal, and something more specific, particular.
e.g., i think it makes sense to characterise knowledge as information with
certain concrete traits.

>Your next point is to propose three fields: Cognition (content of
>consciousness), communication (common understanding),
>cooperation (sense embodied in social structures).
>A comment would be about the entry point you choose (in terms
>of complexity) to introduce the concept of information: the level
>of human (cognition).

yes, at the first glance, it is the level of human systems/ social systems
where to find three fields of information processes. at a second glance,
however, three fields like the ones mentioned seem to be characteristic of
any systems. that is, in the systems perspective, you can focus on the
intrasystemic field (the interior of a system) or on the intersystemic
field (the field inbetween of systems) or on the suprasystemic field (the
supersystem which is made up by the systems in question). (this
categorisation, by the way, is due to the metasystem transition
evolutionary systems undergo - an initial phase of, so to say, solitary
systems, an intermediate phase of interacting systems and a phase of
integration of the systems with a higher order system.) investigating into
information processes in the first field is dealing with cognition, given
human systems, and it is dealing with similar processes (soemthing like
precognition) on the prehuman level. in the second field it is
communicative processes on the human and something like precommunication on
the prehuman level. and information processing for co-operation on the
human level in the third field, while something like pre-co-operative
processes on the prehuman level.

>I feel one can take information as beginning to exist at the level
>of basic life (lower organization level than human), or even
>at the level of matter (see Edwina's approach relative to
>"informed matter"). But later, in your "unifying perspective", you
>reword this entry point as "self organizing systems cognizing their
>umwelt". This wording can be looked at as containing basic life (but
>not matter). Could you provide more precision about your entry point
>for information concept introduction ?

ok. i side with edwina in this point. i do not identify the beginning of
information processes with the beginning of life but with the beginning of
self-organisation instead. the big divide between systems that show
information processes and those that don't is whether they are capable of
organising themselves or not. systems that do not self-organise do not
manifest information generacy. only self-organising systems are able to
generate information. the most simple unit that shows information
generation is the most rudimentary, the primordial self-organising system.
this is clearly in the physical realm, long before and below living
systems. it is my conviction that there you will be able to identify
rudiments of cognizability, of communicability and of co-operability as to
the three fields mentioned above. maybe my wording in the table is not
exact and should read "cognising resp. precognising".

>Also, you write that "properties of information in non human
>domains are usually extrapolated from properties of information in the
>human domain". I agree with this statement as being a fact, but do not
>really understand the rational behind it.

that's a misunderstanding. i do not advocate anthropomorphic
extrapolations. i warn against doing so.

>Indeed, I feel that information really exists, and is to be considered, at
>levels of organization lower that human. And extrapolating to non human
>cases the properties of information as understod for human is a bit risky.
>This because the level of human posseses specific performances (reflected
>consciousness, highly developped domain of emotions) that are not
>currently extrapolatable to non human cases.

sure, i absolutely agree. i try to favour a perspective that goes beyond
capurro's trilemma as well as beyond snow's two cultures. that is, i argue
against extrapolationism as well as reductionism.

>And anthropocentrism may be misleading (one could prefer an evolutionist
>approach starting from a well understood position at basic life level, and
>then climbing up the ladder of complexity. Understanding that the nature
>of human is still to be explained in scientific terms).

yes, in my opinion evolutionary systems thinking understood dialectically
promises to be the remedy. it tries hard neither to extrapolate qualities
appearing in a later stage of evolution onto earlier stages nor to reduce
qualities appearing in a later stage to qualities appearing in an earlier
stage. it looks upon evolution as a "discontinuous continuum". that is,
system qualities at different stages of evolution are linked by the
relationship of emergence: they have something in common, but they differ
by concrete forms - a succession of forms is resulting with each form
containing the previous form by negating the previous form. emergent
evolution adds new qualities to the old ones and redefines hereby what is
in common (what is general, universal) and what is not (what is specific,
particular). so the relationship of the universal and the particular is a
historical one (and not only a logical one).

>Then you distinguish two views on information: subjectivist and objectivist.
>This seems quite close to the two approaches of knowledge: constructivism
>(knowledge as specific build up of reality by the knowing element) and
>representationalism (knowledge as a true image of the outside world).
>Would you agree on this comparison ?

yes, that's the difference between the two views regarding human cognition.

like the options of capurro's trilemma and the options of snow's cultures
objectivism and subjectivism are one-sided, and therefore not completely
wrong. my intention is to reconcile the views by analysing what can be
accepted.

>If by any chance you have developped elsewhere some of the points
>addressed in your short article, please let us know.

unfortunately, since the end of october i have been trying to replace my
extended abstract on the website by a full version draft - the mdpi
webmasters could not help so far. i will attach my file to a personal email
to you.

>Regards
>
>Christophe

best,

wolfgang

**431-58801-18733

wolfgang

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Received on Tue Dec 17 14:36:59 2002