Re: Platonic information theories

At 09:18 AM 03/01/2003, Edwina wrote:
>In reply to Rafael, I hope that we are not moving into a re-usage of
>the Platonic theory of the eternal form - which is quite different
>from Aristotle's hylomorphic theory - for Aristotle rejects an eternal
>form. I think it's an important question that Rafael has raised - the
>relationship of time to information. That is, if we reject the
>Newtonian absolute time - as Koichiro has pointed out - and instead
>move into a notion of relativistic time, then, we get a very different
>understanding of matter/information. Why? Because time becomes an
>actual component of matter/information. Time doesn't sit 'up there' as
>an abstract referential ruler but exists only when it is a component,
>by encoding, of matter/information...and this means that time exists
>in relations. And, that there are different modes of time.

I think that what Edwina says about time is exactly right. It is worth
expanding on a bit. The same idea applies to space, where the basic
argument for immanence is easier to see. Newton introduced
absolute space and time over and above the relative space and time
in order to account for inertial forces. The way that time comes into
the argument is not obvious, so I will set that aside for a moment,
and consider just the spatial side of the argument.

Basically, Newton's argument is an empirical argument to the best
explanation. He would have called it a deduction from the phenomena,
but the argument is really an inductive one, with an abductive element.
First he considers relative locations and times, as we observe and
measure them. He has two lines of argument that the relative versions
are not sufficient. The first is metaphysical, and it is generally rejected
nowadays, and was never widely accepted by his contemporaries.
Leibniz and Berkely, in particular, developed very effective arguments
against metaphysical versions of absolute space.

The second argument, known as the bucket argument, starts
with the observation that if we spin a bucket of water, the water first
remains flat, but as it picks up momentum from the bucket, its
surface becomes concave. If the bucket is stopped, the water
continues to spin, and the surface of the water remains concave.
Note that we have three states to compare: 1) the bucket, rotates;
the water does not; the water is flat; 2) both rotate; the water is
concave; 3) the water rotates; the bucket does not; the water
is concave. Newton noted that the relative motion between the
water and bucket is not the relevant factor. What is? Traditionally,
it is called object alpha. Note how the argument for object alpha works:
there is a difference, so something must be postulated to
explain the difference (from Newton's rules of reasoning). None
of the things mentioned in the bucket experiment can be object
alpha, so it must be something not mentioned. Given the presumed
universality of bucket type experiments, object alpha must be
very special, being everywhere, and having the same sort of
effect -- it has to have very special invariant properties. Newton
thought that absolute space was the best candidate. From this,
and the connection between space and time in his dynamics,
we also require absolute time (if time is relational, then the dynamics
won't be general).

The bucket argument is not met by any of the arguments of Newton's
contemporaries that raised metaphysical objections. Part of the
reason is that the argument is an empirical one, not a metaphysical
argument (Koyre is just wrong when he claims that Newton parted
with his empiricism in postulating absolute space and time).

Mach argued that other things could do the job, like the distributed
matter of the universe. Unfortuantely, nobody has been able to show how
Mach's Principle would work, so his possibility claim is suspect.
Einstein took one part of Mach's argument seriously, though. mach
had noted that if space and time played the role Newton said it
did, then it violated Newton's law of reaction -- since it is unaffected
at the same time it has dynamical effects (Aristotle's Prime Mover
is equally weird from a causal point of view). So, Einstein dropped
this assumption, and we got relative space and time. it is also
required to make mechanics consistent with electrodynamics,
so it is also empirically supported, not just for this metaphysical
reason coming from Mach.

So, the immanence of space and time is an empirical matter,
soundly and firmly established.

On the other hand, information is also closely related to logic,
and logic was separated from psychology and other empirical
studies by Frege and Husserl in Europe, and Peirce in America,
at great length, and I think convincingly. Peirce also related logic
to information.

My own feeling is that the concept of information transcends
the distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian versions of
morphs, and that is one of its strengths.

John
Received on Sat Jan 4 22:27:17 2003