Re: [Fis] CONCLUDING THE SESSION

Dear Loet. Thank you. To me you get closest to the essence of the
problem I work with here:

"The meaning of information can be defined only with reference to a
system that is able to organize the information. The generation of
meaning therefore assumes a system operating over time. The
specification of a system of reference provides the (Shannon-type)
information with system-specific meaning. That is, a system contains a
substance in which information is communicated. This substance can also
be considered as a medium of the communication."

I do not disagree very much with this. The intersting part is (to me),
what this "substance in which information is communication" is and that
is the "medium of communication".

To me this is the field of meaning, and it is generated by the embodied
mind in living systems. Un-embodied systems like the computer can
therefore not really produced meaning that means anything to humans. i
claim that the biological and the psychological autopoietic systems
produce this substance of meaning that the socio-communicative system
then operates in and modulates! What about that?

Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>
> Dear Soeren:
>
> I will probably not be able to convince you, but here is the quote from pp.
> 270 f.:
>
> "Despite the confusion of the two concepts of information in the literature
> (Hayles, 1990), the biological theory of autopoietic systems (e.g., Maturana
> & Varela, 1984) and the information-theoretical approach (e.g., Abramson,
> 1963; Theil, 1972) have been consistent in excluding each other's
> definitions of "information" for analytical reasons (Boshouwers, 1997).
> Biological systems can be considered as "natural," and therefore the
> biologist is inclined to begin with the specification of an observation
> rather than the uncertainty of an expectation. As Maturana & Varela (1980,
> p. 90) formulated it:
>
> Notions such as coding and transmission of information do not enter in the
> realization of a concrete autopoietic system because they do not refer to
> actual processes in it.
>
> While these authors insisted on the biological realization of "actual
> processes," Shannon's co-author Weaver (1949, pp. 116f.) noted the problem
> of defining "meaning" from a mathematical perspective when he formulated the
> following:
>
> The concept of information developed in this theory at first seems
> disappointing and bizarre--disappointing because it has nothing to do with
> the meaning, and bizarre because it deals not with a single message but
> rather with the statistical character of a whole ensemble of messages,
> bizarre also because in these statistical terms the two words information
> and uncertainty find themselves to be partners.
>
> I think, however, that these should be only temporary reactions;
> and that one should say, at the end, that this analysis has so penetratingly
> cleared the air that one is now, perhaps for the first time, ready for a
> real theory of meaning.
>
> My purpose is to abstract from observers as biological systems and to
> discuss systems of communication that are able to communicate about meaning
> and expectations in addition to observations. I therefore follow the
> intuition of Weaver and try to define "meaning" first without reference to
> any specific "realization."
>
> The meaning of information can be defined only with reference to a system
> that is able to organize the information. The generation of meaning
> therefore assumes a system operating over time. The specification of a
> system of reference provides the (Shannon-type) information with
> system-specific meaning. That is, a system contains a substance in which
> information is communicated. This substance can also be considered as a
> medium of the communication. A probabilistic entropy is generated whenever
> the communication system operates and the medium is consequently
> redistributed. This Shannon-type information can be measured, but the
> measurement results could additionally be provided with a substantive
> interpretation if the system of reference were to be specified.
>
> For example, information theory can be elaborated into a statistics for the
> study of economic transaction processes (Theil, 1972) or for the study of
> biological evolution processes (Brooks and Wiley, 1986). Substantive
> theorizing is needed for the specification of the relevant system(s) of
> reference (MacKay, 1956) so that another theory of communication--such as
> one concerning economic exchange relations--can be generated (Steinmueller,
> 2002). The mathematical theory of communication can be used as a formal
> methodology for studying the non-linear dynamics of substantive systems thus
> specified."
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "S�ren Brier" <sbr.lpf@cbs.dk>
> To: "Loet Leydesdorff" <loet@leydesdorff.net>; <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Sent: Thursday, October 09, 2003 12:19 PM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] CONCLUDING THE SESSION
>
> Dear loet
>
> 1.An interesting and well written paper. But I did not find that kind of
> definition of meaning I was looking for. Maybe you will point out where
> you think it is?
>
> 2. Functionalistic meaning can probably bee described for certain uses
> as an operator. But it is not an operator in itself.
>
> 3. It is my point of view that all meaning and value comes from our
> existential awareness of of being embodied. I know it blows a hole in
> presents sociological self-understanding.
>
> 4. Biology is as much "just a science" as mathematics, physics and
> chemistry. They all represents our attempts to comes to terms with
> ontological levels of reality and the question of time, irreversibility,
> evolution and self-organization - and that is where the information
> concept comes in. Yes biology is not very essential for information
> science. I agree. It is foundational for a theory of meaning and
> signification. That was what Tom Sebeok saw!
>
> 5. Now embodiment has both a scientific and a phenomenological side to
> it. Merleau-Ponty saw that especially in some of his last lectures only
> in French I have understood.
>
> 6. Generally both you and Luhmann are working functionalistic jumping
> the phenomenological dimension, because - as you rightly say - from a
> sociological point of view meaning cannot be seen, only inferred as a
> dynamics.
>
> 7. But functionalism and its differentiations are working strategies,
> not really philosophies. I do not think that you can be a functionalist
> except inside a metaphysical framework. You do not escape that as so
> many seems to think. When reading Spencer-brown carefully you also see a
> framework, although not completely developed. Lou Kauffman has in his
> columns in CHK tried to develop that further. This can also be seen in
> his article published in the double issue on von Foerster that is on it
> way to the printer soon.
>
> 8. What reduces to what is an interesting fight about ontology and about
> hegemony. Yes evolution is such a much bigger thing than the history and
> sociology of human society and does provide the foundation for it. But
> that does not threaten the independence of this science. As we can see
> from the sociology of science then it also learns us about the limits of
> scientific explanations- such as evolutionary theory. But that does not
> mean that you can avoid reflecting them into your foundation. All the
> sciences are entangled with each other and again with their
> metaphysical foundations.
>
> > Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: S�ren Brier [mailto:sbr.lpf@cbs.dk]
> > > Sent: Thursday, October 09, 2003 10:12 AM
> > > To: Loet Leydesdorff
> > > Subject: Re: [Fis] CONCLUDING THE SESSION
> > >
> > >
> > > Dear Loet.
> > >
> > > Thank you for the answers. I think they enlighten our
> > > differences and why I think biosemiotics is necessary.
> > >
> > > 1. I do not think you or Luhmann managed to produces a
> > > definition of meaning. You somehow just accept that this is
> > > what humans live in. Sociologically this is correct, but if
> > > we have to discriminate between ontological levels in a FIS
> > > theory that is not enough.
> >
> > Dear Soeren:
> >
> > A full elaboration of the definition of meaning and knowledge as
> > codifiers of information can be found in
> > The Construction and Globalization of the Knowledge Base in
> > Inter-human Communication Systems, Canadian Journal of Communication
> > 28(3) (2003) 267-289; <pdf version> ; available from my website (at
> > http://www.leydesdorff.net/list.htm ).
> >
> > While living can be directly observed by biologists, meaning is not of
> > this ontological order. It is an operator. One can observe the
> > consequences and conditions of the operation, but the operation has to
> > remain a hypothesis. The order of expectations is not given, but
> > remains emerging and fragile. All derivatives of the Latin "esse" (to
> > be) have to be replaced with derivatives of the Latin "frangere" (to
> > break): fractal, fragments, etc.
> >
> > >
> > > 2. I agree with Luhmann's threefold autopoietic view. But I
> > > think that the embodiment of knowing in living systems is a
> > > prerequisite for the psychological and they are a
> > > prerequisite for the socio-communicative as they provide that
> > > field of meaning that the socio-communicative feed on and
> > manipulate!!
> > >
> > > 3. Bio-semiotics is that theorizing - or one of them - of the
> > > living based on what we experimentally know that attempt to
> > > distinguish theoretically between the living, the dead
> > > mechanically and the social. I think Luhmann - to my
> > > knowledge fails to produce such a theory. That is why I want
> > > semioticize Luhmann. He did not have a good understanding of
> > > Peircian semiotics.
> >
> > I don't share your vision of prioritizing the biological level.
> > Biology is just one of the sciences. It is not fundamental to
> > information processing, but one can study it in this domain.
> >
> > >
> > > 4. This view of course makes me shy away from the idea that
> > > we should be able to define meaning on any mathematical
> > > level, as I see meaning as embodied attached to the
> > > evolutionary fight for existence and when you add awareness
> > > you have the start of the existential dimension of meaning.
> > > This leads to discussions of values, the good life, the
> > > meaning of life, religion and philosophy in the social
> > > conscious human.
> > >
> >
> > I don't think that meaning should be defined existentially. That would
> > reduce social science to biology and might make cultural evolution
> > subordinate to natural evolution.
> >
> > With kind regards, Loet
> >
> > >
> > > Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: Soeren Brier [mailto:sbr.lpf@cbs.dk]
> > > > > Sent: Thursday, October 09, 2003 12:10 AM
> > > > > To: Loet Leydesdorff
> > > > > Cc: Fis
> > > > > Subject: Re: RE: RE: [Fis] CONCLUDING THE SESSION
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Dear Loet
> > > > >
> > > > > 1. Meaning is an "update value"? Is that a social thing?
> > > >
> > > > No, a property of a system. But not all systems can update. For
> > > > example, systems that are fixed in their information content by
> > the
> > > > engineering cannot update neither can systems that are completely
> > > > volatile.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > 2. At the same time you define it statistically as
> > > > > reduction of uncertainty? But this goes for physical systems
> > too.
> > > > >
> > > > Yes.
> > > >
> > > > > 3. Then add that this needs a selective system. Does that
> > > > > imply that only social systems are selective?
> > > > >
> > > > No. Any system which is able to select (using its structure).
> > These
> > > > questions are not yet system-specific. The point is whether we can
> > > > define meaning more abstractly at the level of the
> > > mathematical theory
> > > > of communication. Additionally, one needs substantive theorizing
> > at
> > > > the level of the system of reference (e.g., the living cell).
> > > >
> > > > > 4. Unless you want to define the social from the concept
> > > > > of meaning, then it is not a reducing of the social to claim
> > that
> > > > > all living systems work with meaning, and add that only language
> > > > > producing system make conscious meaning.
> > > >
> > > > I agree, but language is not only an operator of the
> > > producing system,
> > > > but also of the produced one. The social system operates by
> > > > communicating both meaning and information. Language can be
> > > considered
> > > > as the evolutionary achievement that allows us to communicate
> > using
> > > > these two channels at the same time.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > 5. Do you restrict "the social to humans? Chimpanzees then
> > > > > do not have social organization and interaction?
> > > >
> > > > I am particularly interested in scientific communication,
> > > as you know.
> > > > Chimpanzees certainly have social organization and interaction,
> > but
> > > > whether they can also communicate meaning is questionnable. In any
> > > > case, they do not seem to be able to communicate higher-order
> > > > codifications of information. Information is first coded by
> > > meaning,
> > > > but some meanings are more meaningful than others. Knowledge can
> > be
> > > > considered as a meaning which makes a difference. Human minds and
> > > > social systems seem the ones which are able to generate and
> > process
> > > > these higher-order codifications exclusively. (Computers?)
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > 6. Luhmann says that meaning is a reduction of complexity.
> > > > > Is that not what all living system do?
> > > >
> > > > Yes, but not only living systems can do so. Complexity can also be
> > > > reduced by means other than generating meaning (e.g., selection).
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > 7. What are the non-living systems that produce meaning
> > > > > never the less??
> > > >
> > > > Scientific communication, for example. Of course, the meaning is
> > > > initially generated by someone and the reproduction can also be
> > > > attributed to someone, but the dynamics of meaning (for example,
> > > > inside a paradigm) are not determined by the individual
> > > contributions.
> > > >
> > > > For example, the conservation of momenta and energy in
> > > physics can be
> > > > attributed to Newton in the clear formulation. But the
> > > authors before
> > > > him (including Galilei) already had a notion of the conservation
> > of
> > > > movement. One can also say that Newton only formalized
> > > these concepts.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > 8. Are your meaning concept based on Luhmann? Because I do
> > > > > not understand neither yours not Luhmann's concept of meaning.
> > > >
> > > > I am sorry to hear that. It is quite simple: both the social
> > system
> > > > and individual minds operate in terms of meaning generation and
> > > > processing. The two systems are structurally coupled
> > > (Maturana) in the
> > > > processing, but they have a non-linear dynamics which operates
> > > > differently. For example, human minds tend to develop
> > individually,
> > > > while the social can be considered as a dividuum (a distribution).
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > 9. Maybe it is because your theory is not able to think
> > > > > the living, but only either the dead physical-chemical or
> > > the social
> > > > > meaningful?
> > > >
> > > > The living can not be thought only analytically, but it has
> > > also to be
> > > > studied empirically. In addition to formal theorizing (non-linear
> > > > dynamics and entropy statistics) one needs always substantive
> > > > theorizing in order to say something informed about a system of
> > > > reference.
> > > > >
> > > > > 10. To be consistent you then have to put the biological
> > > > > system under the mechanical and let meaning appear by the
> > > creation
> > > > > of souls from the Divine in a thinking world or somehow
> > > emerge from
> > > > > the mechanical world?
> > > >
> > > > That is Luhmann's position, but I try to ground meaning in
> > > a system's
> > > > operation.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > 11. But that is philosophy of course, not sociology - and
> > > > > it is my experience that those researchers, who like you define
> > > > > themselves as sociologist, do not feel obliged to answer those
> > > > > questions, because they are ontological.
> > > >
> > > > I do my best to answer the questions. (I have a MA in
> > > philosophy, but
> > > > moved to sociology in the PhD because of my interest in
> > substantive
> > > > theorizing.)
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > 12. But FIS is about foundations, so I do think we need to
> > > > > address the foundations here.
> > > > >
> > > > Yes, I agree.
> > > >
> > > > With kind regards, Loet
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > > From: Loet Leydesdorff <loet@leydesdorff.net>
> > > > > Date: Wednesday, October 8, 2003 8:59 pm
> > > > > Subject: RE: RE: [Fis] CONCLUDING THE SESSION
> > > > >
> > > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > > From: Soeren Brier [ <')" >sbr.lpf@cbs.dk> sbr.lpf@cbs.dk]
> > > > > > > Sent: Wednesday, October 08, 2003 6:19 PM
> > > > > > > To: Loet Leydesdorff
> > > > > > > Subject: Re: RE: [Fis] CONCLUDING THE SESSION
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Dear Loet
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > To your answer's here. I cannot see how there can be any
> > > > > connection
> > > > > > > between neg-entropy and meaning. I agree that it is
> > > only living
> > > > > > > system that can attach meaning to information patterns.
> > > > > This is done
> > > > > > > because living systems are individuals with an interest in
> > > > > > > surviving. This is the first level of meaning. Peircer taks
> > > > > > > about signification when an organism get mening out of
> > > > > > > non-intensional signals and turn then into sign by
> > > giving them
> > > > > > > meaning in
> > > > > relation
> > > > > > > to it form of life.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Meaning can be generated by any system that can provide the
> > > > > incoming
> > > > > > information with an update value. One can consider this as
> > > > > a -?H when
> > > > > > using the Shannon notation (Brillouin, 1964). This information
> > > > > > (negentropy) reduces the uncertainty prevailing in the
> > > system. The
> > > > > > probabilistic entropy is related to ("normalized in
> > > terms of") the
> > > > > > expected information content of the system updating
> > > > > (Brillouin, at p.
> > > > > > 11: "The knowledge of such additional information allows us
> > > > > > ...."). Some uncertainty can then discarded as noise. However,
> > > > > > this selection presumes a selecting system. This system thus
> > > > > > provides the
> > > > > information
> > > > > > with a first-order meaning. Meaning can be considered as
> > > > > implied when
> > > > > > the information is codified (by a system).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > It is not possible to reduce the meaning in social exchanges
> > to
> > > > > > the living carriers of the communication because that would
> > not
> > > > > > sufficientlyappreciate the interaction terms (as different
> > from
> > > > > > the aggregation). Social systems process meaning, but are not
> > > > > necessarily
> > > > > > alive. (In my opinion, the distinction between human-centered
> > > > > > psychology and the studyof interpersonal communication is the
> > > > > > major achievement of
> > > > > > Luhmann'ssociology.) Social systems, for example, produce
> > > > > > situational meaning in addition to the meaning
> > > perceived by each
> > > > > > of the participants.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Therefor I do not like to used the term ' pattern
> > > recognition"
> > > > > > > at the molecular level. I prefer 'pattern fitting*,
> > > becaue the
> > > > > > > operation do not demand an awareness with a memory.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I thus see the information level as a straight
> > > > > physical-statistical
> > > > > > > level without meaning assumptions - and without a
> > > full theory of
> > > > > > > life.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > I agree with this last conclusion. However, I appreciate the
> > > > > > informationtheoretical concepts because I wish to study
> > > non-living
> > > > > > systems that process meaning nevertheless. I am not a
> > > biologist,
> > > > > > but a social scientist. Reducing social science to biology has
> > > > > > been a recipee for social and scientific disaster.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > With kind regards, Loet
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Best wishes S�ren Brier
> > >
> > > Copenhagen Business School
> > > Dept. of Management, Politics and Philosophy
> > > Bl�g�rdsgade 23 B, 3. floor, room 326, DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
> > > Telephone +45 38152208, mail sbr.lpf@cbs.dk .
> > >
> > > Old home page with full text papers:
> > > http://www.flec.kvl.dk/personalprofile.asp?> id=sbr&p=engelsk
> > >
> > >
> > > Ed. of Cybernetics & Human Knowing
> > > http://www.imprint-academic.com/C&HK
> > > Subscription sandra@imprint.co.uk
> > >
> > > Speaker at the Heinz von Foerster conference
> > > http://www.asc-cybernetics.org/2003/index.htm
> > >
>
> --
> Best wishes S�ren Brier
>
> Copenhagen Business School
> Dept. of Management, Politics and Philosophy
> Bl�g�rdsgade 23 B, 3. floor, room 326, DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
> Telephone +45 38152208, mail sbr.lpf@cbs.dk .
>
> Old home page with full text papers:
> http://www.flec.kvl.dk/personalprofile.asp?id=sbr&p=engelsk
>
> Ed. of Cybernetics & Human Knowing http://www.imprint-academic.com/C&HK
> Subscription sandra@imprint.co.uk
>
> Speaker at the Heinz von Foerster conference
> http://www.asc-cybernetics.org/2003/index.htm

-- 
Best wishes S�ren Brier
Copenhagen Business School
Dept. of Management, Politics and Philosophy 
Bl�g�rdsgade 23 B, 3. floor, room 326, DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
Telephone +45 38152208, mail sbr.lpf@cbs.dk .
Old home page with full text papers:
http://www.flec.kvl.dk/personalprofile.asp?id=sbr&p=engelsk
Ed. of Cybernetics & Human Knowing http://www.imprint-academic.com/C&HK  
Subscription sandra@imprint.co.uk
Speaker at the Heinz von Foerster conference 
http://www.asc-cybernetics.org/2003/index.htm
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