RE: [Fis] Information, autopoiesis, life and semiosis (Part I)

Dear Soeren and all,
 
I would like to elborate on some of the questions you have posed.
 
You say "The great thing about natural science is that physics, chemistry and biology can be seen under one type of explanatory law system. Why destroy that?"
>From discussions on this list, in particular, one can come up with the conclusion that branches of a natural science do not use the same explanatory law system. They share the same ideological basis - the materialistic worldview; they have also developed border-line disciplines (biophysics, biochemistry...) that bridge these scientific domains. Yet, the development of both chemistry and biology was necessary because physics alone was not (still is not, and maybe will never be) capable to describe their phenomena. Both chemistry and biology have developed their own language and concepts - indicating that "objects" are different from those recognized by physics, and cannot be reduced to a combination of concepts of the latter.
 
Similarly, neither biology nor physics alone are capable to describe psychic and social phenomena, the "traditional" domains of meaning and language. Can they share the same ideological basis, the materialistic worldview? - of course. Can they develop "bridging" dicsiplines? - of course, and there are already dozens of these disciplines, neurophysiology and enviornmental economics to name a few. Can psychic and social phenomena be reduced to the set of natural science concepts - doubtfully.
 
This yields an answer to your other question, "Is a theory of levels really necessary?"
Let me suggest it is inevitable. However, the identification of layers can be different: yours is one structuring, Chandler's "10 categories" recently mentioned in the list is another one. The identification depends on researcher's perspective and purpose. But within each of these categorizations, each level is introduced primarily because it could not be described / explained completely by means at the previous level. Reality itself may be interdependent, it is possible to say it contains no layers. But our cognition is faced with its complexity, either the limited computability (suggested as an explanation why neural networks have been unable to imitate processes occuring in the brain) or non-computability (suggested, I think, by Pattee as the key problem in studies of life), and then a new "layer of abtsraction" is produced.
 
Consequently, you say that "Information science is supposed to explain life in a scientific way that avoids theories of meaning. Thus doesn't biosemiotics destroy the whole 'plot' of information science?"
Much in the same way, information science can be blamed for being non-scientific, as principles of information science, and behavior of infomation systems, cannot be derived from thermodynamics. Information science does not directly fall into a sphere of natural sciences. Does information science destroy a plot of thermodynamics?
 
It can be suggested, that at each "layer of abstraction" cogntion occurs by accomplishing the following tasks: (1) identification of properties and laws of the given layer; (2) integration of the previous layer as "an aspect" of the given layer, (3) contribution to the construction of a next layer.
 
Accordingly, information science may deal with following tasks:
1. identify properties of information and "laws" of natural information systems
2. integrate thermodynamic aspect of information processes as a part of information science
 
If there cannot be an "informational" concept of meaning, then one has to admit that semiotics builds up a new layer of cognition, to which information science can only contribute, but which it is unable to explain fully.
 
In my opinion, we are faced with following questions, based on what is outlined:
1. is there a possibility for a concept that integrates meaning into information perspective, or is meaning a concept of a "new layer of cognition"?
2. similarly, is language a "layer of cognition" that cannot be described and comprehended within the information / semiotics perspective? (assuming that you speak of natural languages in the society, and not "language as a code")
 
If we accept a point of view that there are information processes that can be attributed only to living systems, and those attributed only to social systems, then these somehow are distinct. A universal information theory that is suitable for both molecular reactions and social interactions by no means is capable to capture perks of the latter - it can only capture commonalities.
 
Kind regards
 
Pavel Luksha
Received on Mon Jan 26 09:40:18 2004