RE: [Fis] Information, autopoiesis, life and semiosis (Part I)

Dear Pavel,
 
I submit that one would gain explanatory power by considering the levels
that you distinguish not as levels, but as orthogonal dimensions. The
"bridging sciences" can then be analyzed in terms of covariations and
coevolutions (over time) that may develop into new dimension adding to
the systems complexity.
 
The multi-dimensional model of science can be operationalized, for
example, in terms of journal clusters.
 
With kind regards,
 
 
Loet

-----Original Message-----
From: fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es]
On Behalf Of ????? ????? ????????
Sent: Monday, January 26, 2004 9:37 AM
To: fis-listas.unizar.es
Subject: RE: [Fis] Information, autopoiesis, life and semiosis (Part I)

Dear Soeren and all,
 
I would like to elborate on some of the questions you have posed.
 
You say "The great thing about natural science is that physics,
chemistry and biology can be seen under one type of explanatory law
system. Why destroy that?"
>From discussions on this list, in particular, one can come up with the
conclusion that branches of a natural science do not use the same
explanatory law system. They share the same ideological basis - the
materialistic worldview; they have also developed border-line
disciplines (biophysics, biochemistry...) that bridge these scientific
domains. Yet, the development of both chemistry and biology was
necessary because physics alone was not (still is not, and maybe will
never be) capable to describe their phenomena. Both chemistry and
biology have developed their own language and concepts - indicating that
"objects" are different from those recognized by physics, and cannot be
reduced to a combination of concepts of the latter.
 
Similarly, neither biology nor physics alone are capable to describe
psychic and social phenomena, the "traditional" domains of meaning and
language. Can they share the same ideological basis, the materialistic
worldview? - of course. Can they develop "bridging" dicsiplines? - of
course, and there are already dozens of these disciplines,
neurophysiology and enviornmental economics to name a few. Can psychic
and social phenomena be reduced to the set of natural science concepts -
doubtfully.
 
This yields an answer to your other question, "Is a theory of levels
really necessary?"
Let me suggest it is inevitable. However, the identification of layers
can be different: yours is one structuring, Chandler's "10 categories"
recently mentioned in the list is another one. The identification
depends on researcher's perspective and purpose. But within each of
these categorizations, each level is introduced primarily because it
could not be described / explained completely by means at the previous
level. Reality itself may be interdependent, it is possible to say it
contains no layers. But our cognition is faced with its complexity,
either the limited computability (suggested as an explanation why neural
networks have been unable to imitate processes occuring in the brain) or
non-computability (suggested, I think, by Pattee as the key problem in
studies of life), and then a new "layer of abtsraction" is produced.
 
Consequently, you say that "Information science is supposed to explain
life in a scientific way that avoids theories of meaning. Thus doesn't
biosemiotics destroy the whole 'plot' of information science?"
Much in the same way, information science can be blamed for being
non-scientific, as principles of information science, and behavior of
infomation systems, cannot be derived from thermodynamics. Information
science does not directly fall into a sphere of natural sciences. Does
information science destroy a plot of thermodynamics?
 
It can be suggested, that at each "layer of abstraction" cogntion occurs
by accomplishing the following tasks: (1) identification of properties
and laws of the given layer; (2) integration of the previous layer as
"an aspect" of the given layer, (3) contribution to the construction of
a next layer.
 
Accordingly, information science may deal with following tasks:
1. identify properties of information and "laws" of natural information
systems
2. integrate thermodynamic aspect of information processes as a part of
information science
 
If there cannot be an "informational" concept of meaning, then one has
to admit that semiotics builds up a new layer of cognition, to which
information science can only contribute, but which it is unable to
explain fully.
 
In my opinion, we are faced with following questions, based on what is
outlined:
1. is there a possibility for a concept that integrates meaning into
information perspective, or is meaning a concept of a "new layer of
cognition"?
2. similarly, is language a "layer of cognition" that cannot be
described and comprehended within the information / semiotics
perspective? (assuming that you speak of natural languages in the
society, and not "language as a code")
 
If we accept a point of view that there are information processes that
can be attributed only to living systems, and those attributed only to
social systems, then these somehow are distinct. A universal information
theory that is suitable for both molecular reactions and social
interactions by no means is capable to capture perks of the latter - it
can only capture commonalities.
 
Kind regards
 
Pavel Luksha
Received on Mon Jan 26 14:23:59 2004