Re: [Fis] meaning of meaning

Dear colleagues,

Thinking on the cellular foundations of 'meaning' does not necessarily mean
that there is a stumbling block of complexity that at the time being cannot
be crossed. Even if the two extremes ---molecular details awfully networked
in every direction, and the absence of a viable 'dynamic' whole scheme for
the cell-- are rather obscure yet, there are intermediate territories where
one can point to some cellular 'doctrine' of meaning elaboration by the cell.

Years ago I pointed out that filling-in the occurring 'functional voids'
provoked by the incoming signal, was the central response of the cellular
productive machinery, involving both synthesis of proteins and their
degradation. However, putting this approach in some formal track
('informationally') was not easy at all. I much thank ideas received from
Shu-Kun's papers about mol. recog. & entropy of mixing, and also a very
elegant message I could not answer from Loet (fis: 20.12.03. I have pasted
it below) so that a conceptual road to approach cellular processing of
signals looms.

The whole speculation would combine Robert Rosen's dynamic scheme on
'forcing' and enzyme networks, with SK approach, Loet's and my functional
voids idea (handled by a population of enzymes working as 'molecular
autiomata'). It looks too heterogeneous, but at least one gets a formal
idea on how COMMUNICATION with the environment relates to changes in the
advancement of a cycle, MEANING thus, derived of the entrenchment between
GENERATIVE and STRUCTURAL forms of information whose unending processes
weave and unweave the fabric of life.

A big question would be whether philosophies germane to the above could be
applied to 'meaning' in other informational realms. Even to establish a
natural background on mentality and the conceptual realm.

best

Pedro
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Dear Pedro and colleagues,
I take the liberty to fight this argument all the way since I wish it to be
correctly understood. I agree with much of what you say and I appreciate
the example of the enzyme regulating the flux efficiently. However, I think
that it is important not only to distinguish between the flux of resources
and the entropy that it generates, but also between the thermodynamic and
probabilistic entropy that is generated by this flux. Thus, there would be
three systems of reference (theories) in the case of your example.
The distinction is important because we are interested in information
theory. Historically, authors from the side of physics and chemistry have
attempted to subsume probabilistic entropy under thermodynamic entropy as a
special case or a little fraction that can be fully understood using
(chemical) physics. The argument becomes then often unclear because the
authors do not specify the system of reference other than as "the" system.
With "the" system, of course, they mean "nature". (One can show that the
probabilistic entropy is smaller than the thermodynamic entropy times the
Boltzmann-contant.)
Information theory however provides us with an entropy calculus that is
first independent of the system of reference. Therefore we can also study
the probabilistic entropy in an economic system. Whenever something is
communicated a probabilistic entropy is generated by this redistribution.
For example, in this exchange of emails we can count the threads, the
mails, the words, etc., and compute in each dimension how much
(probabilistic) entropy is generated. This is straightforward and it does
not have anything to do with the thermodynamic entropy produced by or the
energy needed for all the systems which carry the exchange. (One can
compute a thermodynamic entropy of the exchange of message, but that would
not inform us at all about the exchange.)
I am sure that you are able to elaborate this for your example of the
enzyme. The question one has to raise first when one studies the
probabilistic entropy of a system is: what does the system redistribute
when it communicates? This provides us with the specification of an
hypothesis. (George Spencer Brown would call this an observation = a
distinction + an identification, but that may be confusing.) Second, one
can ask how one can indicate the communication. This provides us with an
operationalization. Thirdly, the measurement can inform us about the
relative quality of the hypothesis. A system which operates in terms of
energy redistribution can then be considered as a special case that
requires a special theory (e.g., physics). But the one system cannot
reduced to the other without a specific theory (that can be tested!).

Loet

Loet Leydesdorff
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
[email protected] ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/

   
Received on Fri Feb 6 13:54:59 2004