Re: [Fis] meaning of meaning

If meaning (M), information (compressed date, I), message (rough date
received in communication, D), and all have the unit in bit, can we
say M<I<D (M has the least number of bits)? I want to have some
numeric idea.

Shu-Kun

Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> Dear Soeren and colleagues,
>
> > Bateson write : "In fact, what we mean by information
> > - the elementary unit of information - is a difference which
> > makes a difference,...." (Bateson 1973, p. 428).
>
> The problem with this definition is that it does not sufficiently
> distinguish between information and meaningful information. Shannon's
> definition of information is based on a first difference (e.g., a
> variable, a probability distribution). A difference can only make a
> difference with reference to a system. Shannon's definition precedes the
> reference to a system and is therefore mathematical.
>
> The specification of the system of reference provides the information
> with meaning. Thus, Soeren, here you have your "qualia"! A "science of
> consciousness", for example, can be expected to be different from
> molecular biology or sociology. The systems can be expected to be
> different in terms of how they communicate the disturbances
> (differences) internally. Thus, they provide system-specific meaning to
> the information.
>
> The meaningful information should then be distinguished from the meaning
> processing within the system. Some systems, but not all, are able to
> process both meaning and information. Other systems stabilize the
> meaning and process only information. The interaction term between
> information processing and meaning processing can be considered as
> meaningful information (a difference which makes a difference). The
> meaningful information adds to the probabilistic entropy historically
> (with the axis of time), while meaning generation and meaning processing
> feeds back on the arrow of time (potentially as negentropy).
>
> The various systems of reference can be specified, for example, by using
> Spencer Brown's heuristics of "draw a distinction". However, I find it
> more useful to say "specify the system of reference": what does the
> system communicate when it communicates. For example, consciousness
> processes thoughts; a living system communicates in terms of molecules.
> Thus, another science is generated. The specification of how the system
> communicates provides us with testable hypotheses. Non-linear dynamics
> and information theory provide us only with the formal perspective.
>
> The accolade among all these specific theories of communication can be
> provided by the mathematical theory of communication as a formal theory.
> It facilitates the formulation of analogies and heuristics. The idea of
> a grandiose theory which unites everything (like in Pierce's
> philosophy), however, has to be abandoned as an historical project of
> the late 19th and early 20th century ("the unity of science"). Of
> course, one is welcome to dream, but it leads to speculative
> philosophies. This project is incompatible with what we know about the
> empirical development of the sciences: they develop in parallel and
> sometimes incommensurate.
>
> With kind regards,
>
>
> Loet
>
>
> >
> > Allow me to quote from my own paper
> >
> > "To Bateson mind is a cybernetic phenomenon, a sort of mental
> > ecology. The mental relates to the ability to register
> > differences. It is an intrinsic system property. The
> > elementary, cybernetic system with its messages in circuits
> > is in fact the simplest mental unit, even when the total
> > system does not include living organisms. Every living system
> > has the following characteristics which we are accustomed to
> > call mental:
> >
> > "1.The system shall operate with and upon differences.
> >
> > 2.The system shall consist of closed loops or networks of
> > pathways along which differences and transforms of
> > differences shall be transmitted. (What is transmitted on a
> > neuron is not an impulse, it is news of a difference).
> >
> > 3. Many events within the system shall be energized by the
> > respondent part rather than by impact from the triggering part.
> >
> > 4. The system shall show self-correctiveness in the direction
> > of homeostasis and/or in the direction of runaway.
> > Self-correctiveness implies trial and error." (Bateson 1973 p. 458)
> >
> > Mind is synonymous with the cybernetic system which is
> > comprised of the total, self-correcting unit that prepares
> > information. Mind is immanent in this wholeness. When Bateson
> > says that mind is immanent he means that the mental is
> > immanent in the entire system, in the complete message
> > circuit." (Brier 1992, p.79)
> >
> > The problem with Bateson and your suggestion, I think , is
> > that it can only work in a Peircean framework or some other
> > kind of objective idealism. Bateson do not want to separate
> > mind and intellect and talks about the intelligence of
> > emotions. But when you look into his philosophical frame work
> > he never left Wiener's idea that. I quote my analysis again:
> >
> > In "Mind and Nature" (1980 p.103) Bateson further develops
> > his criteria for a cybernetic definition of mind:
> >
> > "1.A mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or components.
> >
> > 2.The interaction between parts of mind is triggered by
> > difference, and difference is a nonsubstantial phenomenon not
> > loca-ted in space or time; difference is related to
> > negentropy and entropy rather than to energy.
> >
> > 3.Mental process requires collateral ener-gy.
> >
> > 4.Mental process requires circular (or more complex) chains
> > of determination.
> >
> > 5.In mental process, the effects of difference are to be
> > regarded as transforms (i.e. coded versions) of events
> > preceding them. The rules of such transformation must be
> > comparatively stable (i.e. more stable than the content) but
> > are themselves subject to transformation.
> >
> > 6.The description and classification of these processes of
> > transformation disclose a hierarchy of logical types immanent
> > in the phenomena."
> >
> > These criteria are all famous within cybernetic understanding
> > of mind, and I will not discuss them further here. My
> > critique is concentrated on the foundation of the second
> > criteria: "difference is related to negentropy and entropy..."
> >
> > It is problematic, that Bateson is following Norbert Wiener's
> > idea of a basic community between thermodynamics and Shannon
> > and Weaver's theory of information based upon a shared
> > starting point in the concept of entropy.
> >
> > Regarding the problem of the relation between the concept
> > "information" and the concept "negative entropy". Bateson
> > writes (Ruesch & Bateson 1968, p. 177):
> >
> > "Wiener argued that these two concepts are synonymous; and
> > this statement, in the opinion of the writers, marks the
> > greatest single shift in human thinking since the days of
> > Plato and Aristotle, because it unites the natural and the
> > social sciences and finally resolves the problems of
> > teleology and the body-mind dichotomy which Occidental
> > thought has inherited from classical Athens".
> >
> > However, Shannon's theory of information has never had
> > anything to do with the semantic content of messages. Shannon
> > and Weaver (1969 p.31-32 ) write:
> >
> > "The fundamental problem of communication is that of
> > reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a
> > message selected at another point. Frequently the messages
> > have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated
> > according to some system with certain physical or conceptual
> > entities. These semantic aspects of communication are
> > irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect
> > is that they are selected from a set of possible messages."
> >
> > So, what people and animals conceive as information is
> > something quite different from what Shannon and Weaver's
> > theory of information is about. As von Foerster (1980 p.
> > 20-21) concludes:
> >
> > "However, when we look more closely at these theories, it
> > becomes transparently clear that they are not really
> > concerned with information but rather with signals and the
> > reliable transmission of signals over unreliable channels
> > ..." " (Brier 1992, p. 82-83).
> >
> > The cybernetic view point fits nicely into a neodarwinistic
> > viewpoint of meaning for the organism as weel as the species
> > is 'survival value'. As such the cybernetic functionalism and
> > objective information concept fits nicely with neodarwinism.
> >
> > But I am dissatisfied with the possiblity of defining life,
> > mind, emotions and meaning on this foundation, because there
> > is not a theory of qualia in this whole paradigm - a paradigm
> > that is also prevailing in the attempt to make a 'science of
> > consciousness'. My alternative is like Stan's and
> > biosemioticians to use Peirce's semiotic philosophy as the
> > fra,mework, because it includes a theory of qialia, mind,
> > meaning and signification. What we discuss is how radical we
> > want to interpret Peirce. Here Stan is the most radical in
> > his pansemiotism, biosemiotic at the other side. But the
> > major disagreement is between the cybernetic informationalist
> > and the Peircian semioticians. Cybersemiotics is an attempt
> > to unite the two paradigms in a broader framework integrating
> > the core knowledge in the both.
> >
> > But anyway this point connnects FIS to the whole
> > philosophical problems of mind and matter, qualia and meaning
> > and 'what is life'? - and I am not satisfied with
> > Schr�dingers answer to that question.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Pedro C. Mariju�n" <marijuan@unizar.es>
> > Date: Friday, February 6, 2004 2:21 pm
> > Subject: Re: [Fis] meaning of meaning
> >
> > > Dear colleagues,
> > >
> > > Thinking on the cellular foundations of 'meaning' does not
> > > necessarily mean
> > > that there is a stumbling block of complexity that at the time
> > > being cannot
> > > be crossed. Even if the two extremes ---molecular details awfully
> > > networked
> > > in every direction, and the absence of a viable 'dynamic' whole
> > > scheme for
> > > the cell-- are rather obscure yet, there are intermediate
> > > territories where
> > > one can point to some cellular 'doctrine' of meaning elaboration
> > > by the cell.
> > >
> > > Years ago I pointed out that filling-in the occurring 'functional
> > > voids'
> > > provoked by the incoming signal, was the central response of the
> > > cellular
> > > productive machinery, involving both synthesis of proteins and
> > > their
> > > degradation. However, putting this approach in some formal track
> > > ('informationally') was not easy at all. I much thank ideas
> > > received from
> > > Shu-Kun's papers about mol. recog. & entropy of mixing, and also a
> > > very
> > > elegant message I could not answer from Loet (fis: 20.12.03. I
> > > have pasted
> > > it below) so that a conceptual road to approach cellular
> > > processing of
> > > signals looms.
> > >
> > > The whole speculation would combine Robert Rosen's dynamic scheme
> > > on
> > > 'forcing' and enzyme networks, with SK approach, Loet's and my
> > > functional
> > > voids idea (handled by a population of enzymes working as
> > > 'molecular
> > > autiomata'). It looks too heterogeneous, but at least one gets a
> > > formal
> > > idea on how COMMUNICATION with the environment relates to changes
> > > in the
> > > advancement of a cycle, MEANING thus, derived of the entrenchment
> > > between
> > > GENERATIVE and STRUCTURAL forms of information whose unending
> > > processes
> > > weave and unweave the fabric of life.
> > >
> > > A big question would be whether philosophies germane to the above
> > > could be
> > > applied to 'meaning' in other informational realms. Even to
> > > establish a
> > > natural background on mentality and the conceptual realm.
> > >
> > > best
> > >
> > > Pedro
> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > ---------
> > >
> > >
> > > Dear Pedro and colleagues,
> > > I take the liberty to fight this argument all the way since I wish
> > > it to be
> > > correctly understood. I agree with much of what you say and I
> > > appreciate
> > > the example of the enzyme regulating the flux efficiently.
> > > However, I think
> > > that it is important not only to distinguish between the flux of
> > > resources
> > > and the entropy that it generates, but also between the
> > > thermodynamic and
> > > probabilistic entropy that is generated by this flux. Thus, there
> > > would be
> > > three systems of reference (theories) in the case of your example.
> > > The distinction is important because we are interested in
> > > information
> > > theory. Historically, authors from the side of physics and
> > > chemistry have
> > > attempted to subsume probabilistic entropy under thermodynamic
> > > entropy as a
> > > special case or a little fraction that can be fully understood
> > > using
> > > (chemical) physics. The argument becomes then often unclear
> > > because the
> > > authors do not specify the system of reference other than as "the"
> > > system.
> > > With "the" system, of course, they mean "nature". (One can show
> > > that the
> > > probabilistic entropy is smaller than the thermodynamic entropy
> > > times the
> > > Boltzmann-contant.)
> > > Information theory however provides us with an entropy calculus
> > > that is
> > > first independent of the system of reference. Therefore we can
> > > also study
> > > the probabilistic entropy in an economic system. Whenever
> > > something is
> > > communicated a probabilistic entropy is generated by this
> > > redistribution.
> > > For example, in this exchange of emails we can count the threads,
> > > the
> > > mails, the words, etc., and compute in each dimension how much
> > > (probabilistic) entropy is generated. This is straightforward and
> > > it does
> > > not have anything to do with the thermodynamic entropy produced by
> > > or the
> > > energy needed for all the systems which carry the exchange. (One
> > > can
> > > compute a thermodynamic entropy of the exchange of message, but
> > > that would
> > > not inform us at all about the exchange.)
> > > I am sure that you are able to elaborate this for your example of
> > > the
> > > enzyme. The question one has to raise first when one studies the
> > > probabilistic entropy of a system is: what does the system
> > > redistribute
> > > when it communicates? This provides us with the specification of
> > > an
> > > hypothesis. (George Spencer Brown would call this an observation =
> > > a
> > > distinction + an identification, but that may be confusing.)
> > > Second, one
> > > can ask how one can indicate the communication. This provides us
> > > with an
> > > operationalization. Thirdly, the measurement can inform us about
> > > the
> > > relative quality of the hypothesis. A system which operates in
> > > terms of
> > > energy redistribution can then be considered as a special case
> > > that
> > > requires a special theory (e.g., physics). But the one system
> > > cannot
> > > reduced to the other without a specific theory (that can be
> > tested!).
> > >
> > > Loet
> > >
> > > Loet Leydesdorff
> > > Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
> > Kloveniersburgwal
> > > 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
> > > Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
> > loet@leydesdorff.net ;
> > > http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > fis mailing list
> > [email protected] http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
> >
>

-- 
Dr. Shu-Kun Lin
Molecular Diversity Preservation International (MDPI)
Matthaeusstrasse 11, CH-4057 Basel, Switzerland
Tel. +41 61 683 7734 (office)
Tel. +41 79 322 3379 (handy)
Fax +41 61 302 8918
E-mail: lin@mdpi.org
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