[Fis] Organicism

Dear Soren, Rafeal, Loet and Others:

One of the central issues of communication is the role of
mathematical or symbolic representations as carriers of information
among individuals.

Shannon information theory presupposes that mathematical symbols are
sufficient for transfer of encoded information between machines in
the present of noise. FIS readers are probably unanimous in their
admiration of the remarkable success of this theory and the wonderful
benefits we have derived from it.

Of special concern to FIS is the issue of extensibility of the
concept of information from machines to other (organic) systems. In
this post, I seek to address these and related issues from the
perspective of organicism.

If the extension of the concept of information was merely a matter of
mathematics, then one would expect that a suitable mathematical
theory of chemical communication or cellular communication or
biological communication or human communication would be invented.
(Tom Schneider's work is a novel step in this direction.) The
richness of the mechanical tool set of mathematics is nearly
unimaginable. The number of mathematical theories available is huge
- set theory, hyperset theory, semi-groups, groups, rings of various
sorts, fields, vector spaces, graphs (various sorts) topolgies,
(virtually endless number of types,) matroids, categories,
N-categories, and so forth. Analogously, the number of
mathematicians and engineers (and industrial organizations)
interested in communication is also huge. Why is a satisfactory
theory of organic communication lacking?

One approach to generating a general theory of communication is to
break the problem into levels or degrees of organization, simpler
systems of communication among simpler objects and more perplex
systems of communication among more perplex objects. (Perplex is used
in the sense of "repeated enfoldings of structures.")

I wish to contrast two philosophies of communication theories
relevant to the question of "levels" or "hierarchies" or "degrees of
organization".

One philosophy is represented by Loet. This philosophy presupposes
that mathematical terms and terminology can be transubstantiated.
That is, given a discourse among generalized "objects",(molecules,
cells, humans, social groups, etc), the mathematical terminology can
be directly applied to the discourse. For example, Loet wrote of
"orthogonality" in the time domain of economic thinking and of
orthogonality among the sciences. This sort of language hides behind
the reputation of mathematics and mechanical thinking. This
mechanical reasoning is consistent with an engineering perspective
and well grounded in traditional scientific concepts. But, the
transubstantiation of matter into mathematical symbols lies at the
heart of transferring the logic of the discourse from the chemical
(biological) system to mathematical symbols. After more than two
decades of efforts, I can NOT identify the mechanical processes in
living systems that are consistent with the theories of mathematics
that I am aware of. Of course, my lack of success is nothing more
than a failure to identify such a system. Nevertheless, I am
extremely skeptical that such a system exists. My skepticism is
firmly grounded on profound distinction between chemical atoms and
logical atoms.

The second philosophy of communication theories emerges from medicine
and the practise of medical therapies. This philosophy is grounded
in organicism. The medical philosophy of organicism holds that
diseases are organic in nature. Failures of health result from
failures in organic functions of organs and organ systems. The
corollary to this presupposition is that if normal organ function can
be restored, then "health" will be restored. (Alternatively, removal
of the malfunctioning organ may also solve the problem.) This
philosophy of medicine has had some successes. This philosophy is
grounded in the transmutive nature of matter, not the
transubstantiation of matter into symbols.

Communication's terminology is widely used in discussions of
organicism. We speak of messengers, second messengers, messenger
RNA, codes, etc. The philosophy of organicism is not derived from
mechanical operations on mathematical symbols, rather it emerges from
both clinical and biological experimentation. Although a number of
symbol systems are employed within modern organicism, the primary
basis of organicism symbols are chemical symbols. The rigid
structures and corresponding exact predictive powers of groups,
rings, vector spaces and so forth are NOT at the logical roots of the
philosophy of organicism.

Now, we come to a crucial question:

When we construct more perplex objects from less perplex objects,
that is, we adopt a language of "levels", which of these two
philosophies do we invoke?

In my own work, I explicitly state that I am defining (limiting,
bounding) my remarks to "degrees of organization". This terminology
is used because I seek to allude to the concepts of organicism in my
approach to analysis of communication and its role in health and
disease.

Because organicism is grounded in chemical symbols, the primary
correspondence relations are with structures -- chemical structures,
cellular structures, organ structures, and so forth. The
symbolization of such structures is a code, but it is radically
different code than that from a mathematical or mechanical code. The
nature of the ground set of chemical symbols is static. If one
wishes to introduce time and space, these concepts must be introduced
separately. (This separation of meanings of symbols into different
classes should be contrasted with quantum theory where matter, time,
space and identity are confounded into intertwined gemisch.)

Clearly, Loet rejects organicism in his remarks about
"orthogonality". How can one move from Loet's view of
"orthogonality" to the structures and codes of life? The task of
relating organic terms to the codes and structures of life is being
approached in several different sciences without invoking concepts
from liner algebra.

Some weeks ago, I posted a FIS message on the role of the roots of
words in communication. I pointed out that families of words, words
all derived from the same root, bear a logical resemblance to one
another. This quality of resemblance is extremely useful in
describing organicism. As a method of communication, the "family of
a root" provides a basis for logical extension from less perplex
objects to more perplex objects WITHOUT INVOKING MECHANICAL
(MATHEMATICAL) symbols. The method allows one to use numbers without
invoking the machinery of mathematical functions. The method allows
one to speak of relations without invoking a rigid mathematical
structure that denies the individuality of each cell, each organ and
each individual. The method allows one to develop syllogisms for
enumeration of organic structures.

Loet rejected this approach, offering a counter example with another
word, nature. Loet's counterexample misses the point entirely. One
is seeking to construct commutative diagrams among terms from
different disciplines. Only a small fraction of the natural language
words will be defined rigorous in multiple disciplines. If the word
roots can not be used to construct a commutative diagram that spans
disciplines, then I would suggest that the "family of a root" not be
used for such purposes. For example, the family of the root, "organ"
includes a wide range of terms in chemistry and medicine. (But, the
only derivative of "organicus, organikos" used in mathematics is
limited to "organization" and I am not aware of a formal mathematical
definition for this term.)

Soren: I agree with the concept that human communication is a much
larger and more important issue than machine communication. But, I
think we differ on what will be the basis of the development of a
theory of human communication.

 How long will it require for traditional philosophy to come to grips
with the chemical concept of "matter" as the foundational units of
human sensory systems and human experience?

I remain astounded that philosophical acceptance of
transubstantiation of matter into (mathematical) symbols without
recognition of the premier role of transmutation of matter in human
growth and development and the emergence of human mentality.

  Or, the question can poised in another manner: On what grounds can
mathematical symbols be claimed to be superior to chemical symbols
for the purpose of representation of matter?

I suspect that a new "mathematics" will be necessary to represent the
chemical and biological sciences - a system of logic that allows the
expression of flexible relationships which we observe in organic
systems. Such a system of logic, to be useful, would require a
systematic usage of commutative diagrams over "families of roots" in
order to generate coherent relations over natural "degrees of
organization".

Cheers

Jerry LR Chandler

>Pavel wrote:
>
>Much in the same way, information science can be blamed for being
>non-scientific, as principles of information science, and behavior of
>information systems, cannot be
>derived from thermodynamics. Information science does not directly fall
>into a sphere of natural sciences. Does information science destroy a
>plot of thermodynamics?
>
>It can be suggested, that at each "layer of abstraction" cognition
>occurs by accomplishing the following tasks: (1) identification of
>properties and laws of the given layer; (2)
>integration of the previous layer as "an aspect" of the given layer, (3)
>contribution to the construction of a next layer.
>
>Accordingly, information science may deal with following tasks:
>1. identify properties of information and "laws" of natural information
>systems
>2. integrate thermodynamic aspect of information processes as a part of
>information science
>
>If there cannot be an "informational" concept of meaning, then one has
>to admit that semiotics builds up a new layer of cognition, to which
>information science can only
>contribute, but which it is unable to explain fully.
>
>In my opinion, we are faced with following questions, based on what is
>outlined:
>1. is there a possibility for a concept that integrates meaning into
>information perspective, or is meaning a concept of a "new layer of
>cognition"?
>2. similarly, is language a "layer of cognition" that cannot be
>described and comprehended within the information / semiotics
>perspective? (assuming that you speak of natural languages in the
>society, and not "language as a code")
>
>If we accept a point of view that there are information processes that
>can be attributed only to living systems, and those attributed only to
>social systems, then these somehow are distinct. A universal information
>theory that is suitable for both molecular reactions and social
>interactions by no means is capable to capture perks of the latter - it
>can only capture commonalties.
>---------------------
>
>We still have not discussed what the impact is for a science of
>information of having to accept level theory. In my opinion it destroys
>the idea of information science and forces us into a much bigger
>project.
>
>--
>Best wishes S�ren Brier
>
>Copenhagen Business School
>Dept. of Management, Politics and Philosophy
>Bl�g�rdsgade 23 B, 3. floor, room 326, DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
>Telephone +45 38152208, mail sbr.lpf@cbs.dk .
>
>Old home page with full text papers:
>http://www.flec.kvl.dk/personalprofile.asp?id=sbr&p=engelsk
>
>Ed. of Cybernetics & Human Knowing http://www.imprint-academic.com/C&HK
>Subscription sandra@imprint.co.uk, support this interdisciplinary
>cybernetic, systemic and semiotic endeavor! Vol. 10:3-4 is a unique
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>
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Received on Wed Feb 11 04:14:32 2004