re Jerry's posting, (1) I wonder if he woud define what he means by
orgnicism. As well (2) what is the difference between "chemical atoms" and
"logical atoms"?
Jerry asks which philsophy -- mathematical or "organic" is invoked
when using hierarchy theory. The answer is clear to me inmy work. The
hierarchical structures themselves e mathematical in nature. Hierarchy
makes a mathematically based theory or model of material (not just organic)
relations.
Jerry's "organicism", he says, is "grounded in chemical symbols".
Would this conform to the usage of Joseph Needham or Luwig von Bertalanffy,
Whithead, Ross Harrison or Paul Weiss? Somehow I don't think so, inasmuch
as levels are visualized in part in order to eschew the characteristic
downward reductionism of biology.
Jerry's "I pointed out that families of words, words all derived from
the same root, bear a logical resemblance >to one another. This quality of
resemblance is extremely useful in describing organicism. As a method of
>communication, the "family of a root" provides a basis for logical
extension from less perplex objects to more >perplex objects" Here what
comes to my mind is biological systematics -- taxonomy. It is a branching
system relations that can be modeled as a specificaion hierarchy -- one
branch would be: {animal {primate {human}}}. This is all just standard
logic, and has been modeled mathematically, I believe.
Jerry asks: " Or, the question can poised in another manner: On what
grounds can mathematical symbols be >claimed to be superior to chemical
symbols for the purpose of representation of matter?" I would suggest the
answer is that mathematical systems can be productive, by way of
mathematical manipulatons. In addition, mathematical sysmbols can
represent anything,while chemical symbols can represent only chemicals. In
the context of hierarchy -- say, the scale hierarchy -- does Jerry think we
should represent the brain by way of its chemicals?
STAN
>Dear Soren, Rafeal, Loet and Others:
>
>One of the central issues of communication is the role of
>mathematical or symbolic representations as carriers of information
>among individuals.
>
>Shannon information theory presupposes that mathematical symbols are
>sufficient for transfer of encoded information between machines in
>the present of noise. FIS readers are probably unanimous in their
>admiration of the remarkable success of this theory and the wonderful
>benefits we have derived from it.
>
>Of special concern to FIS is the issue of extensibility of the
>concept of information from machines to other (organic) systems. In
>this post, I seek to address these and related issues from the
>perspective of organicism.
>
>If the extension of the concept of information was merely a matter of
>mathematics, then one would expect that a suitable mathematical
>theory of chemical communication or cellular communication or
>biological communication or human communication would be invented.
>(Tom Schneider's work is a novel step in this direction.) The
>richness of the mechanical tool set of mathematics is nearly
>unimaginable. The number of mathematical theories available is huge
>- set theory, hyperset theory, semi-groups, groups, rings of various
>sorts, fields, vector spaces, graphs (various sorts) topolgies,
>(virtually endless number of types,) matroids, categories,
>N-categories, and so forth. Analogously, the number of
>mathematicians and engineers (and industrial organizations)
>interested in communication is also huge. Why is a satisfactory
>theory of organic communication lacking?
>
>One approach to generating a general theory of communication is to
>break the problem into levels or degrees of organization, simpler
>systems of communication among simpler objects and more perplex
>systems of communication among more perplex objects. (Perplex is used
>in the sense of "repeated enfoldings of structures.")
>
>I wish to contrast two philosophies of communication theories
>relevant to the question of "levels" or "hierarchies" or "degrees of
>organization".
>
>One philosophy is represented by Loet. This philosophy presupposes
>that mathematical terms and terminology can be transubstantiated.
>That is, given a discourse among generalized "objects",(molecules,
>cells, humans, social groups, etc), the mathematical terminology can
>be directly applied to the discourse. For example, Loet wrote of
>"orthogonality" in the time domain of economic thinking and of
>orthogonality among the sciences. This sort of language hides behind
>the reputation of mathematics and mechanical thinking. This
>mechanical reasoning is consistent with an engineering perspective
>and well grounded in traditional scientific concepts. But, the
>transubstantiation of matter into mathematical symbols lies at the
>heart of transferring the logic of the discourse from the chemical
>(biological) system to mathematical symbols. After more than two
>decades of efforts, I can NOT identify the mechanical processes in
>living systems that are consistent with the theories of mathematics
>that I am aware of. Of course, my lack of success is nothing more
>than a failure to identify such a system. Nevertheless, I am
>extremely skeptical that such a system exists. My skepticism is
>firmly grounded on profound distinction between chemical atoms and
>logical atoms.
>
>The second philosophy of communication theories emerges from medicine
>and the practise of medical therapies. This philosophy is grounded
>in organicism. The medical philosophy of organicism holds that
>diseases are organic in nature. Failures of health result from
>failures in organic functions of organs and organ systems. The
>corollary to this presupposition is that if normal organ function can
>be restored, then "health" will be restored. (Alternatively, removal
>of the malfunctioning organ may also solve the problem.) This
>philosophy of medicine has had some successes. This philosophy is
>grounded in the transmutive nature of matter, not the
>transubstantiation of matter into symbols.
>
>Communication's terminology is widely used in discussions of
>organicism. We speak of messengers, second messengers, messenger
>RNA, codes, etc. The philosophy of organicism is not derived from
>mechanical operations on mathematical symbols, rather it emerges from
>both clinical and biological experimentation. Although a number of
>symbol systems are employed within modern organicism, the primary
>basis of organicism symbols are chemical symbols. The rigid
>structures and corresponding exact predictive powers of groups,
>rings, vector spaces and so forth are NOT at the logical roots of the
>philosophy of organicism.
>
>Now, we come to a crucial question:
>
>When we construct more perplex objects from less perplex objects,
>that is, we adopt a language of "levels", which of these two
>philosophies do we invoke?
>
>In my own work, I explicitly state that I am defining (limiting,
>bounding) my remarks to "degrees of organization". This terminology
>is used because I seek to allude to the concepts of organicism in my
>approach to analysis of communication and its role in health and
>disease.
>
>Because organicism is grounded in chemical symbols, the primary
>correspondence relations are with structures -- chemical structures,
>cellular structures, organ structures, and so forth. The
>symbolization of such structures is a code, but it is radically
>different code than that from a mathematical or mechanical code. The
>nature of the ground set of chemical symbols is static. If one
>wishes to introduce time and space, these concepts must be introduced
>separately. (This separation of meanings of symbols into different
>classes should be contrasted with quantum theory where matter, time,
>space and identity are confounded into intertwined gemisch.)
>
>Clearly, Loet rejects organicism in his remarks about
>"orthogonality". How can one move from Loet's view of
>"orthogonality" to the structures and codes of life? The task of
>relating organic terms to the codes and structures of life is being
>approached in several different sciences without invoking concepts
>>from liner algebra.
>
>Some weeks ago, I posted a FIS message on the role of the roots of
>words in communication. I pointed out that families of words, words
>all derived from the same root, bear a logical resemblance to one
>another. This quality of resemblance is extremely useful in
>describing organicism. As a method of communication, the "family of
>a root" provides a basis for logical extension from less perplex
>objects to more perplex objects WITHOUT INVOKING MECHANICAL
>(MATHEMATICAL) symbols. The method allows one to use numbers without
>invoking the machinery of mathematical functions. The method allows
>one to speak of relations without invoking a rigid mathematical
>structure that denies the individuality of each cell, each organ and
>each individual. The method allows one to develop syllogisms for
>enumeration of organic structures.
>
>Loet rejected this approach, offering a counter example with another
>word, nature. Loet's counterexample misses the point entirely. One
>is seeking to construct commutative diagrams among terms from
>different disciplines. Only a small fraction of the natural language
>words will be defined rigorous in multiple disciplines. If the word
>roots can not be used to construct a commutative diagram that spans
>disciplines, then I would suggest that the "family of a root" not be
>used for such purposes. For example, the family of the root, "organ"
>includes a wide range of terms in chemistry and medicine. (But, the
>only derivative of "organicus, organikos" used in mathematics is
>limited to "organization" and I am not aware of a formal mathematical
>definition for this term.)
>
>Soren: I agree with the concept that human communication is a much
>larger and more important issue than machine communication. But, I
>think we differ on what will be the basis of the development of a
>theory of human communication.
>
> How long will it require for traditional philosophy to come to grips
>with the chemical concept of "matter" as the foundational units of
>human sensory systems and human experience?
>
>I remain astounded that philosophical acceptance of
>transubstantiation of matter into (mathematical) symbols without
>recognition of the premier role of transmutation of matter in human
>growth and development and the emergence of human mentality.
>
> Or, the question can poised in another manner: On what grounds can
>mathematical symbols be claimed to be superior to chemical symbols
>for the purpose of representation of matter?
>
>I suspect that a new "mathematics" will be necessary to represent the
>chemical and biological sciences - a system of logic that allows the
>expression of flexible relationships which we observe in organic
>systems. Such a system of logic, to be useful, would require a
>systematic usage of commutative diagrams over "families of roots" in
>order to generate coherent relations over natural "degrees of
>organization".
>
>Cheers
>
>Jerry LR Chandler
>
>
>
>
>>Pavel wrote:
>>
>>Much in the same way, information science can be blamed for being
>>non-scientific, as principles of information science, and behavior of
>>information systems, cannot be
>>derived from thermodynamics. Information science does not directly fall
>>into a sphere of natural sciences. Does information science destroy a
>>plot of thermodynamics?
>>
>>It can be suggested, that at each "layer of abstraction" cognition
>>occurs by accomplishing the following tasks: (1) identification of
>>properties and laws of the given layer; (2)
>>integration of the previous layer as "an aspect" of the given layer, (3)
>>contribution to the construction of a next layer.
>>
>>Accordingly, information science may deal with following tasks:
>>1. identify properties of information and "laws" of natural information
>>systems
>>2. integrate thermodynamic aspect of information processes as a part of
>>information science
>>
>>If there cannot be an "informational" concept of meaning, then one has
>>to admit that semiotics builds up a new layer of cognition, to which
>>information science can only
>>contribute, but which it is unable to explain fully.
>>
>>In my opinion, we are faced with following questions, based on what is
>>outlined:
>>1. is there a possibility for a concept that integrates meaning into
>>information perspective, or is meaning a concept of a "new layer of
>>cognition"?
>>2. similarly, is language a "layer of cognition" that cannot be
>>described and comprehended within the information / semiotics
>>perspective? (assuming that you speak of natural languages in the
>>society, and not "language as a code")
>>
>>If we accept a point of view that there are information processes that
>>can be attributed only to living systems, and those attributed only to
>>social systems, then these somehow are distinct. A universal information
>>theory that is suitable for both molecular reactions and social
>>interactions by no means is capable to capture perks of the latter - it
>>can only capture commonalties.
>>---------------------
>>
>>We still have not discussed what the impact is for a science of
>>information of having to accept level theory. In my opinion it destroys
>>the idea of information science and forces us into a much bigger
>>project.
>>
>>--
>>Best wishes S�ren Brier
>>
>>Copenhagen Business School
>>Dept. of Management, Politics and Philosophy
>>Bl�g�rdsgade 23 B, 3. floor, room 326, DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
>>Telephone +45 38152208, mail sbr.lpf@cbs.dk .
>>
>>Old home page with full text papers:
>>http://www.flec.kvl.dk/personalprofile.asp?id=sbr&p=engelsk
>>
>>Ed. of Cybernetics & Human Knowing http://www.imprint-academic.com/C&HK
>>Subscription sandra@imprint.co.uk, support this interdisciplinary
>>cybernetic, systemic and semiotic endeavor! Vol. 10:3-4 is a unique
>>tribute to Heinz von Foerster!
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>fis mailing list
>>fis@listas.unizar.es
>>http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>fis mailing list
>fis@listas.unizar.es
>http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
_______________________________________________
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
Received on Sun Feb 15 21:18:57 2004
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Mon 07 Mar 2005 - 10:24:46 CET