Re: [Fis] meaning of meaning

Dear Loet

Thank you for these very interesting observations, which I generally
agree with and find very interesting.

I think we have a misunderstanding about the use of living systems,
which makes me reflect on being more careful about the use of this term.

I of cause agree that social and psychic systems produce meaning. The
point is that all living systems also produce meaning, even if they do
not have a well differentiated psychic and /or social system. This is
the biosemiotic view.

As a biologist I tend to view psychic systems as part of the living
system and social systems as relations in living systems (an ecological
and evolutionary view).

But from a Lumanian point of view they are seen as rather independent
and usually not from an evolutionary view. This is where Cybersemiotics
differ from (or adds something to) Luhmann's system theory. We add the
Peircean biosemiotic evolutionary and ecological concept of meaning.

To me all psychic and social systems are embodied or based on
embodiment. I think from a Cybersemiotic point of view that Luhmann
underestimates this fact in his strong focus on the social-communicative
systems and his view of body and psyche as the environment for the
social. My point would be that this environment is very specific
determining what can go on and it is not passive. Here I find support in
Lakoff and Johnson's and other embodied cognitive semantics. But I
appreciate Luhmann's point that the body, the psyche and the
socio-communicative systems are closed to each other.

There are long discussion about on if text have information and meaning
when they are not read or the author is dead. As even quantitative
information is dependent on the context of interpretation just like
meaning, I would prefer to talk about potential information as well as
potential meaning. I would also differentiate between the intended
meaning of the author and the interpreted meaning.

Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>
> Dear Soeren,
>
> I agree that meaning processing and information processing remain
> structurally coupled in systems which are able to process meaning. (Not
> all systems are able to do so and for these systems one expects
> information processing without meaning processing). Following Rosen
> (1985) I would, however, expect that the clock in the model (providing
> meaning) runs faster than the system being modeled (represented), and
> that in such cases therefore the meaning may overshoot the information.
>
> At the level of the action system (consciousness) integration of meaning
> can be expected to have priority over differentiation (because of the
> need to maintain an identity). This reduces the clock speed. At the
> level of the social system, differentiation can prevail (under the
> condition of modernity). This increases the clock speed. For example,
> stock exchanges leave enormous amount of information traces behind them.
> The meaning processing in such systems cuts through the information
> processing as another (orthogonal) dimension.
>
> Let me take the opportunity to mention that I completely disagree with
> your equation of meaning to living in another email. This is an
> unnecessary reduction. Some forms of living are also able to attribute
> meaning and even fewer are then also able to process this meaning. While
> meaning and information are structurally coupled, information can be
> defined more abstractly than living. For example, a text can have a
> meaning long after the author died. This meaning does not have to be
> lost when the text is stored in an archive.
>
> However, I appreciate your comments on Pierce.
>
> With kind regards,
>
> Loet
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: S�ren Brier [mailto:sbr.lpf@cbs.dk]
> > Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2004 4:43 PM
> > To: lin@mdpi.org
> > Cc: Loet Leydesdorff; 'Pedro C. Mariju�n'; 'fis-listas.unizar.es'
> > Subject: Re: [Fis] meaning of meaning
> >
> >
> > Dear Shu-Kun
> >
> > The great question here is if we can represent meaning in
> > bits at all. I think we only get the informational level of
> > it. I think we can have information without meaning, but not
> > meaning without information.
> >
> >
> > "Dr. Shu-Kun Lin" wrote:
> > >
> > > If meaning (M), information (compressed date, I), message
> > (rough date
> > > received in communication, D), and all have the unit in bit, can we
> > > say M<I<D (M has the least number of bits)? I want to have some
> > > numeric idea.
> > >
> > > Shu-Kun
> > >
> > > Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
> > >
> > > > Dear Soeren and colleagues,
> > > >
> > > > > Bateson write : "In fact, what we mean by information > - the
> > > > elementary unit of information - is a difference
> > which >
> > > > makes a difference,...." (Bateson 1973, p. 428).
> > > >
> > > > The problem with this definition is that it does not sufficiently
> > > > distinguish between information and meaningful information.
> > > > Shannon's definition of information is based on a first
> > difference
> > > > (e.g., a variable, a probability distribution). A difference can
> > > > only make a difference with reference to a system. Shannon's
> > > > definition precedes the reference to a system and is therefore
> > > > mathematical.
> > > >
> > > > The specification of the system of reference provides the
> > > > information with meaning. Thus, Soeren, here you have
> > your "qualia"!
> > > > A "science of consciousness", for example, can be expected to be
> > > > different from molecular biology or sociology. The systems can be
> > > > expected to be different in terms of how they communicate the
> > > > disturbances
> > > > (differences) internally. Thus, they provide
> > system-specific meaning to
> > > > the information.
> > > >
> > > > The meaningful information should then be distinguished from the
> > > > meaning processing within the system. Some systems, but
> > not all, are
> > > > able to process both meaning and information. Other systems
> > > > stabilize the meaning and process only information. The
> > interaction
> > > > term between information processing and meaning processing can be
> > > > considered as meaningful information (a difference which makes a
> > > > difference). The meaningful information adds to the probabilistic
> > > > entropy historically (with the axis of time), while meaning
> > > > generation and meaning processing feeds back on the arrow of time
> > > > (potentially as negentropy).
> > > >
> > > > The various systems of reference can be specified, for
> > example, by
> > > > using Spencer Brown's heuristics of "draw a distinction".
> > However, I
> > > > find it more useful to say "specify the system of
> > reference": what
> > > > does the system communicate when it communicates. For example,
> > > > consciousness processes thoughts; a living system communicates in
> > > > terms of molecules. Thus, another science is generated. The
> > > > specification of how the system communicates provides us with
> > > > testable hypotheses. Non-linear dynamics and information theory
> > > > provide us only with the formal perspective.
> > > >
> > > > The accolade among all these specific theories of
> > communication can
> > > > be provided by the mathematical theory of communication
> > as a formal
> > > > theory. It facilitates the formulation of analogies and
> > heuristics.
> > > > The idea of a grandiose theory which unites everything (like in
> > > > Pierce's philosophy), however, has to be abandoned as an
> > historical
> > > > project of the late 19th and early 20th century ("the unity of
> > > > science"). Of course, one is welcome to dream, but it leads to
> > > > speculative philosophies. This project is incompatible
> > with what we
> > > > know about the empirical development of the sciences:
> > they develop
> > > > in parallel and sometimes incommensurate.
> > > >
> > > > With kind regards,
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Loet
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Allow me to quote from my own paper
> > > > >
> > > > > "To Bateson mind is a cybernetic phenomenon, a sort of
> > mental >
> > > > ecology. The mental relates to the ability to register >
> > > > differences. It is an intrinsic system property. The >
> > elementary,
> > > > cybernetic system with its messages in circuits > is in fact the
> > > > simplest mental unit, even when the total > system does
> > not include
> > > > living organisms. Every living system > has the following
> > > > characteristics which we are accustomed to > call mental:
> > > > >
> > > > > "1.The system shall operate with and upon differences.
> > > > >
> > > > > 2.The system shall consist of closed loops or networks of
> > > > > pathways along which differences and transforms of
> > > > > differences shall be transmitted. (What is transmitted on a
> > > > > neuron is not an impulse, it is news of a difference).
> > > > >
> > > > > 3. Many events within the system shall be energized by the
> > > > > respondent part rather than by impact from the triggering part.
> > > > >
> > > > > 4. The system shall show self-correctiveness in the direction
> > > > > of homeostasis and/or in the direction of runaway.
> > > > > Self-correctiveness implies trial and error." (Bateson
> > 1973 p. 458)
> > > > >
> > > > > Mind is synonymous with the cybernetic system which is >
> > > > comprised of the total, self-correcting unit that prepares >
> > > > information. Mind is immanent in this wholeness. When Bateson >
> > > > says that mind is immanent he means that the mental is > immanent
>
> > > > in the entire system, in the complete message > circuit." (Brier
> > > > 1992, p.79) >
> > > > > The problem with Bateson and your suggestion, I think , is
> > > > > that it can only work in a Peircean framework or some other
> > > > > kind of objective idealism. Bateson do not want to separate
> > > > > mind and intellect and talks about the intelligence of
> > > > > emotions. But when you look into his philosophical frame work
> > > > > he never left Wiener's idea that. I quote my analysis again:
> > > > >
> > > > > In "Mind and Nature" (1980 p.103) Bateson further develops
> > > > > his criteria for a cybernetic definition of mind:
> > > > >
> > > > > "1.A mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or components.
> > > > >
> > > > > 2.The interaction between parts of mind is triggered by
> > > > > difference, and difference is a nonsubstantial phenomenon not
> > > > > loca-ted in space or time; difference is related to
> > > > > negentropy and entropy rather than to energy.
> > > > >
> > > > > 3.Mental process requires collateral ener-gy.
> > > > >
> > > > > 4.Mental process requires circular (or more complex) chains
> > > > > of determination.
> > > > >
> > > > > 5.In mental process, the effects of difference are to be
> > > > > regarded as transforms (i.e. coded versions) of events
> > > > > preceding them. The rules of such transformation must be
> > > > > comparatively stable (i.e. more stable than the content) but
> > > > > are themselves subject to transformation.
> > > > >
> > > > > 6.The description and classification of these processes of
> > > > > transformation disclose a hierarchy of logical types immanent
> > > > > in the phenomena."
> > > > >
> > > > > These criteria are all famous within cybernetic understanding
> > > > > of mind, and I will not discuss them further here. My
> > > > > critique is concentrated on the foundation of the second
> > > > > criteria: "difference is related to negentropy and entropy..."
> > > > >
> > > > > It is problematic, that Bateson is following Norbert Wiener's
> > > > > idea of a basic community between thermodynamics and Shannon
> > > > > and Weaver's theory of information based upon a shared
> > > > > starting point in the concept of entropy.
> > > > >
> > > > > Regarding the problem of the relation between the concept
> > > > > "information" and the concept "negative entropy". Bateson
> > > > > writes (Ruesch & Bateson 1968, p. 177):
> > > > >
> > > > > "Wiener argued that these two concepts are synonymous; and
> > > > > this statement, in the opinion of the writers, marks the
> > > > > greatest single shift in human thinking since the days of
> > > > > Plato and Aristotle, because it unites the natural and the
> > > > > social sciences and finally resolves the problems of
> > > > > teleology and the body-mind dichotomy which Occidental
> > > > > thought has inherited from classical Athens".
> > > > >
> > > > > However, Shannon's theory of information has never had
> > > > > anything to do with the semantic content of messages. Shannon
> > > > > and Weaver (1969 p.31-32 ) write:
> > > > >
> > > > > "The fundamental problem of communication is that of
> > > > > reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a
> > > > > message selected at another point. Frequently the messages
> > > > > have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated
> > > > > according to some system with certain physical or conceptual
> > > > > entities. These semantic aspects of communication are
> > > > > irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect
> > > > > is that they are selected from a set of possible messages."
> > > > >
> > > > > So, what people and animals conceive as information is
> > > > > something quite different from what Shannon and Weaver's
> > > > > theory of information is about. As von Foerster (1980 p.
> > > > > 20-21) concludes:
> > > > >
> > > > > "However, when we look more closely at these theories, it
> > > > > becomes transparently clear that they are not really
> > > > > concerned with information but rather with signals and the
> > > > > reliable transmission of signals over unreliable channels
> > > > > ..." " (Brier 1992, p. 82-83).
> > > > >
> > > > > The cybernetic view point fits nicely into a neodarwinistic
> > > > > viewpoint of meaning for the organism as weel as the species
> > > > > is 'survival value'. As such the cybernetic functionalism and
> > > > > objective information concept fits nicely with neodarwinism.
> > > > >
> > > > > But I am dissatisfied with the possiblity of defining life,
> > > > > mind, emotions and meaning on this foundation, because there
> > > > > is not a theory of qualia in this whole paradigm - a paradigm
> > > > > that is also prevailing in the attempt to make a 'science of
> > > > > consciousness'. My alternative is like Stan's and
> > > > > biosemioticians to use Peirce's semiotic philosophy as the
> > > > > fra,mework, because it includes a theory of qialia, mind,
> > > > > meaning and signification. What we discuss is how radical we
> > > > > want to interpret Peirce. Here Stan is the most radical in
> > > > > his pansemiotism, biosemiotic at the other side. But the
> > > > > major disagreement is between the cybernetic informationalist
> > > > > and the Peircian semioticians. Cybersemiotics is an attempt
> > > > > to unite the two paradigms in a broader framework integrating
> > > > > the core knowledge in the both.
> > > > >
> > > > > But anyway this point connnects FIS to the whole
> > > > > philosophical problems of mind and matter, qualia and meaning
> > > > > and 'what is life'? - and I am not satisfied with
> > > > > Schr�dingers answer to that question.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > > From: "Pedro C. Mariju�n" <marijuan@unizar.es>
> > > > > Date: Friday, February 6, 2004 2:21 pm
> > > > > Subject: Re: [Fis] meaning of meaning
> > > > >
> > > > > > Dear colleagues,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Thinking on the cellular foundations of 'meaning' does not
> > > > > > necessarily mean
> > > > > > that there is a stumbling block of complexity that
> > at the time
> > > > > > being cannot
> > > > > > be crossed. Even if the two extremes ---molecular
> > details awfully
> > > > > > networked
> > > > > > in every direction, and the absence of a viable
> > 'dynamic' whole
> > > > > > scheme for
> > > > > > the cell-- are rather obscure yet, there are intermediate >
> > > > > territories where > > one can point to some cellular 'doctrine'
>
> > > > of meaning
> > elaboration
> > > > > > by the cell.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Years ago I pointed out that filling-in the
> > occurring 'functional
> > > > > > voids'
> > > > > > provoked by the incoming signal, was the central
> > response of the
> > > > > > cellular
> > > > > > productive machinery, involving both synthesis of
> > proteins and
> > > > > > their
> > > > > > degradation. However, putting this approach in some
> > formal track
> > > > > > ('informationally') was not easy at all. I much thank ideas
> > > > > > received from > > Shu-Kun's papers about mol. recog. &
> > > > entropy of
> > mixing, and also a
> > > > > > very
> > > > > > elegant message I could not answer from Loet (fis:
> > 20.12.03. I
> > > > > > have pasted
> > > > > > it below) so that a conceptual road to approach cellular >
> > > > > processing of > > signals looms.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The whole speculation would combine Robert Rosen's
> > dynamic scheme
> > > > > > on
> > > > > > 'forcing' and enzyme networks, with SK approach,
> > Loet's and my
> > > > > > functional
> > > > > > voids idea (handled by a population of enzymes working as >
> > > > > 'molecular > > autiomata'). It looks too heterogeneous, but at
> > least one gets a
> > > > > > formal
> > > > > > idea on how COMMUNICATION with the environment
> > relates to changes
> > > > > > in the
> > > > > > advancement of a cycle, MEANING thus, derived of the
> > entrenchment
> > > > > > between
> > > > > > GENERATIVE and STRUCTURAL forms of information whose unending
>
> > > > > > processes > > weave and unweave the fabric of life.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > A big question would be whether philosophies germane
> > to the above
> > > > > > could be
> > > > > > applied to 'meaning' in other informational realms. Even to
> > > > > > establish a > > natural background on mentality and the
> > > > conceptual realm. > >
> > > > > > best
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Pedro
> > > > > >
> > -------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > > ---------
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Dear Pedro and colleagues,
> > > > > > I take the liberty to fight this argument all the
> > way since I wish
> > > > > > it to be
> > > > > > correctly understood. I agree with much of what you say and I
>
> > > > > > appreciate > > the example of the enzyme regulating the flux
> > > > efficiently. > > However, I think
> > > > > > that it is important not only to distinguish between
> > the flux of
> > > > > > resources
> > > > > > and the entropy that it generates, but also between the > >
> > > > thermodynamic and > > probabilistic entropy that is generated by
> > > > this
> > flux. Thus, there
> > > > > > would be
> > > > > > three systems of reference (theories) in the case of
> > your example.
> > > > > > The distinction is important because we are interested in >
> > > > > information > > theory. Historically, authors from the side of
> > > > physics and > > chemistry have
> > > > > > attempted to subsume probabilistic entropy under
> > thermodynamic
> > > > > > entropy as a
> > > > > > special case or a little fraction that can be fully
> > understood
> > > > > > using
> > > > > > (chemical) physics. The argument becomes then often unclear
> > > > > > because the > > authors do not specify the system of
> > > > reference other
> > than as "the"
> > > > > > system.
> > > > > > With "the" system, of course, they mean "nature".
> > (One can show
> > > > > > that the
> > > > > > probabilistic entropy is smaller than the
> > thermodynamic entropy
> > > > > > times the
> > > > > > Boltzmann-contant.)
> > > > > > Information theory however provides us with an
> > entropy calculus
> > > > > > that is
> > > > > > first independent of the system of reference.
> > Therefore we can
> > > > > > also study
> > > > > > the probabilistic entropy in an economic system. Whenever >
> > > > > something is > > communicated a probabilistic entropy is
> > > > generated by this > > redistribution.
> > > > > > For example, in this exchange of emails we can count
> > the threads,
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > mails, the words, etc., and compute in each
> > dimension how much
> > > > > > (probabilistic) entropy is generated. This is
> > straightforward and
> > > > > > it does
> > > > > > not have anything to do with the thermodynamic
> > entropy produced by
> > > > > > or the
> > > > > > energy needed for all the systems which carry the
> > exchange. (One
> > > > > > can
> > > > > > compute a thermodynamic entropy of the exchange of
> > message, but
> > > > > > that would
> > > > > > not inform us at all about the exchange.)
> > > > > > I am sure that you are able to elaborate this for
> > your example of
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > enzyme. The question one has to raise first when one
> > studies the
> > > > > > probabilistic entropy of a system is: what does the system >
>
> > > > > redistribute > > when it communicates? This provides us with
> > > > the
> > specification of
> > > > > > an
> > > > > > hypothesis. (George Spencer Brown would call this an
> > observation =
> > > > > > a
> > > > > > distinction + an identification, but that may be confusing.)
>
> > > > > > Second, one > > can ask how one can indicate the
> > > > communication. This
> > provides us
> > > > > > with an
> > > > > > operationalization. Thirdly, the measurement can
> > inform us about
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > relative quality of the hypothesis. A system which
> > operates in
> > > > > > terms of
> > > > > > energy redistribution can then be considered as a
> > special case
> > > > > > that
> > > > > > requires a special theory (e.g., physics). But the one system
>
> > > > > > cannot > > reduced to the other without a specific theory
> > > > (that can be > tested!).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Loet
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Loet Leydesdorff
> > > > > > Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
> > > > > Kloveniersburgwal
> > > > > > 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
> > > > > > Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
> > > > > loet@leydesdorff.net ;
> > > > > > http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > fis mailing list
> > > > > fis@listas.unizar.es
> > http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/> fis
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > --
> > > Dr. Shu-Kun Lin
> > > Molecular
> > Diversity Preservation International (MDPI) Matthaeusstrasse
> > > 11, CH-4057 Basel, Switzerland Tel. +41 61 683 7734 (office) Tel.
> > > +41 79 322 3379 (handy) Fax +41 61 302 8918
> > > E-mail: lin@mdpi.org
> > > http://www.mdpi.org/lin/
> >
> > --
> > Best wishes S�ren Brier
> >
> > Copenhagen Business School
> > Dept. of Management, Politics and Philosophy
> > Bl�g�rdsgade 23 B, 3. floor, room 326, DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
> > Telephone +45 38152208, mail sbr.lpf@cbs.dk .
> >
> > Old home page with full text papers:
> > http://www.flec.kvl.dk/personalprofile.asp> ?id=sbr&p=engelsk
> >
> >
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-- 
Best wishes S�ren Brier
Copenhagen Business School
Dept. of Management, Politics and Philosophy 
Bl�g�rdsgade 23 B, 3. floor, room 326, DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
Telephone +45 38152208, mail sbr.lpf@cbs.dk .
Old home page with full text papers:
http://www.flec.kvl.dk/personalprofile.asp?id=sbr&p=engelsk
Ed. of Cybernetics & Human Knowing http://www.imprint-academic.com/C&HK  
Subscription sandra@imprint.co.uk, support this interdisciplinary
cybernetic, systemic and semiotic endeavor! Vol. 10:3-4 is a unique
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