Re: [Fis] A definition of Information

S�ren: Replying top S�ren:

>Dear Stan
>Where is pure feeling in your scheme? How does first person experience arise?
     SS: Note that in the specification hierarchy, one moves from the most
generally present realm to the most particular: {found everywhere
{{restricted to biology {further restricted to some particular human
culture {{restricted to one particular individual -- what I usually refer
to as 'psychology'}}}}}}. So, a person arises as a member of all of these
classes, going from being at first a purely physical embodiment as a
material gradient in an egg cell all the way in its development to a
person, as in {gradient in egg cell {fertilized egg cell {embryo {fetus
{baby {adult}}}}}}, all the while becoming more and more definite and
individuated. Where feeling emerges I would not be able to say at this
point.

>Why is that not important for saying that something is an interpretation
>and therefore generating an interpretant and making a difference or
>constraint a sign?
     SS: If one is a pansemiotician, it is not necessary to be restricted
to human individuals in discussing semiosis.

>You think that the theory that you have outlined now fits into John
>Deely's framework and developing the physical, chemical and informational
>part that he has only worked on very abstractly not going into present day
>science? Because then I think you do need to have an opinion on this stuff.
     SS: OK. I am just trying to carry forward the pansemiotic viewpoint.
At present it has not developed very far I must admit.

>This is where the alternative to modern mechanistic and even informational
>science comes in - in my opinion.
     SS: Yes, I agree with this. Natural science could not take up
semiotics without becoming radically transformed from its current
mechanicism.

>There are many attempts to make consciousness science or theories on an
>informational scientific basis. I fail to see how they can ever come up
>with a theory for first person experience.
     SS: You may be right. My above treatment of the individual as the
innermost subclass in the specification hierarchy might be criticized by
claiming that all of the other subclasses refer to kinds, not to particular
indviduals, and so, how can an individual be introduced in the central
subclass. My answer is that the individual as represented there is
actually not being taken for a true individual, but a class of socially
defined roles -- father, brother, engineeer, poet, middle aged person,
etc., etc. all located simultaneously at one restricted locale.

>This is where the waters part in my opinion. Can we give a solution to the
>problem of life, first person experience and defining meaning without
>changing frame work.
     SS: Possibly not. The above hierarchical understanding is an
externalist construction. For what you are looking for I think we need to
construct an internalist understanding. Koichiro Matsuno and I, among a
few others, have begun working on this.

STAN

It seem that you agree with me in that the changing of frame work is
necessary. But where is it that yours differ form mine or others? Or what
problems is that you think has not been solved or you are strugling with?
>>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Stanley N. Salthe" <ssalthe@binghamton.edu>
>Date: Saturday, February 28, 2004 0:19 am
>Subject: Re: [Fis] A definition of Information
>
>> Replying to S�ren's interesting questions, see interleavings:
>>
>> >Dear Stan
>> >Then I did get it right the first time. My question is again how this
>> >view fits with being a pansemiotician
>> SS: One relevant approach would be to look at how the different
>> semioses as outlined by John Deely relate to each other:
>> {physiosemiosis{chemosemiosis {biosemiosis {anthroposemiosis}}}}.
>> Each level of semiosis
>> emerges from the more generally present one to its left. In a big
>> picture,each one to the right could be seen to be an interpretant
>> generated by the
>> one to its left.
>>
>> >, and how you see it fitting with a Peircean semiotic evolutionary
>> >philosophy.
>> >In other words where is mind and meaning?
>> SS: Following Peirce, we can have {Universal Mind {inorganic
>> realm{organic realm {biological realm {human cognitive realm}}}}}.
>> Each realm
>> is an intensification of the prior one (the subclass to its left).
>>
>> >I presume that when you talk of energy you are using
>> >standard physical language.
>> SS: Yes. As in the prior message below.
>>
>> >So how does energy, information and
>> >semiotics fit together in a theory of FIS in your framework.
>> SS: Information would generally be any restriction or
>> constraint on
>> variety or possibilities. Meaning emerges from such restrictions
>> when a
>> system of interpretance generates interpretants on the basis of such
>> restriction. A system of interpretance can be any system (abiotic or
>> biotic) that can modify its form or behavior after encountering a
>> constraint in its environment. I have elaborated on these things in
>> Semiotica 120:381-394; 127: 481-495, 134:359-380.
>>
>> Do you have
>> >a coherent and internal consistent theory developed?
>> SS: I would say rather that I am working on it.
>>
>> STAN
>> >
>> >"Stanley N. Salthe" wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Replying again to S�ren:
>> >> First, as a model of the intensional complexity of the world, the
>> >> specification hierarchy; {physical world {material world
>> {biological world
>> >> {{{etc.}}} shows that energy is the primary, and primal, stuff
>> in the
>> >> world, out of which all else comes. So it is in the most
>> general category.
>> >> The material world generates friction and delay = entropy, and
>> so entropy
>> >> is not as foundational as energy, as we can see by {energy {entropy
>> >> {{{etc.}}}. But entropy would be foundational with respect to
>> biology>> because the informational constraints found in genetic
>> information are
>> >> historical in origin, and history is just a record of the
>> results of
>>> >> friction and delays. So: {energy {entropy {history {etc}}}.
>> The etc. here
>> >> could be read as human cultural discourse. This could be
>> summarized as
>> >> 'story telling'. Then we would have {energy {entropy {history
>> {story>> telling}}}}.
>> >>
>> >> STAN
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>

_______________________________________________
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
Received on Sun Feb 29 22:42:17 2004