Re: [Fis] a definition of information

Dear Loet and all

Overall I agree in the big lines put up here. But there are some holes and lacks I think:

1. There is a lack of use of a basis for determining meaning. It seem to be connected with the psychological and the social subjects. Along with this there is no theory of the existence of first person experience and qualia, but I guess it is assumed as real in humans (psychological level).

2. Connected to this is the lack of a semiotic vocabulary and theoretical background. To biosemiotic it start when you talk about meaningful information.

3. The there is the problem of levels of meaning. A Seagull that has as part of its mating ritual to bring in a small piece of food (a little fish) to the other (mostly the male to the female) as it would if she was a young or nesting is making a coded message. Actually ethologists interpret it as a sign of non-hostile intentions because those other situation, which the feeding 'symbolizes', are caring and non-threatening situations. Etholgists calls it ritualization. Many of us would say that the fish is a symbol and a metaphor, on a very low level that is not conscious. We would further say that these "sign plays" ( a Cybersemiotic expression" are the prerequisite for psychological and socio-communication. The meaning and pragmatic functioning of the concept 'bachelor' in a given society is based on ritualized seeking for a mate. Thus meaning is biologicalkly embodied, psychologically experienced and socially expressed and ritualized in language.

----- Original Message -----
From: Loet Leydesdorff <loet@leydesdorff.net>
Date: Saturday, February 28, 2004 7:45 am
Subject: [Fis] a definition of information

> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> It seems to me that one is able to draw some conclusions from the
> discussions of the last few weeks:
>
>
>
> 1. �Information� can be defined mathematically, i.e., without
> reference to a specific system. The advantage of using Shannon�s
> (1948) definition of information as uncertainty is its direct
> relation with the concept of probabilistic entropy. However, one
> can also use other definitions of information.
>
>
>
> In answer to Syed�s question:
>
> The expected information content of a distribution ? i pi is then
>
> H = ? ? i pi 2log pi
>
> Using the 2log, the bit of information is then defined as the
> 50/50 case since:
>
> H = ? � 2log � ? ? � 2log � = 1
>
>
>
> In summary, information can be measured in bits of information.
>
> 2. �A difference which makes a difference� (Bateson) can be
> considered as �meaningful information.� Meaning, however, assumes
> a system. Information can only be meaningful for a system.
> Meaningful information (ad 2) is to be distinguished from
> information as uncertainty (ad 1). One cannot measure �meaningful
> information� without the specification of a system of reference.
>
> 3. Meaning cannot be defined without reference to a system,
> but it can be defined at the level of general systems theory,
> notably as an operation of the system. Meaning can then be defined
> as the update value of the incoming information. When the update
> mechanism and the expected information content of the system are
> known, one is perhaps able to measure the meaningful information,
> that is, the mutual information between information processing and
> meaning processing. Meaning can only be provided by a system which
> is able to use the information content along its recursive axis
> for discarding the noise. Meaning, however, is provided with
> hindsight (ex post), while information processing goes with the
> arrow of time because of the second law. (Theil (1972, at pp.
> 59f.) has shown that the second law is valid for probabilistic
> entropy.)
> 4. Information gets specific meaning by specifying a system of
> reference. Biological meaning, psychological meaning, etc. can be
> considered as different expectations of communication because the
> update operations are different. In principle, each system of
> reference can thus provide us with a special theory of
> communication (that is, substantive theory).
>
> 5. Biological systems, for example, can provide meaning to
> information, but they cannot exchange the meanings thus generated
> among themselves in a next-order layer. The system would need
> language to develop meaning into codified meaning or knowledge
> that can be exchanged. Thus, biological systems are able to retain
> (that is, to reproduce) a first-order codification in the
> hardware, but not a second-order one of providing meaning with
> specified (that is, knowledge-based) meaning. Maturana, for
> example, carefully distinguished between the generation of
> biological observers within the networks and human super-observers
> who use the language of biology as a science for studying the
> biological processes.
>
> 6. The psychological system is expected not only to process
> meaning, but also to generate identity. Thus, the anticipation is
> towards hierarchical control at a center. Unlike the social
> system�which remains distributed by definition�the dynamics at the
> level of the individual identity can under conditions become
> historically fixed. The distinction can then also be identified.
>
> 7. Luhmann sometimes used the word �dividuum� for the
> distinction of the social system from an individuum. The social
> system can entertain all these degrees of freedom at the same
> time. Globalization of meaning can historically be realized when
> the processing of meaning is not only variable, but also
> differentiated in terms of the codes of the communication. The
> operation of this system can be discussed in terms of various
> forms of reflexivity (e.g., hyper-reflexivity and infra-
> reflexivity) and correspondingly in terms of different forms of
> meaning of the communication.
>
> 8. The problem of defining meaning is so difficult because
> scientific discourses themselves can be considered as social
> systems of communication. Thus, meaning can be specified with
> reference to the evolving system of communication as a participant
> and with reference to the system under study as an observer. (In
> sociology, Giddens (1976) has called this �a double hermeneutics.�
> One can also use the emic/etic distinction (Geertz, 1973).) The
> specification of meaning (and its derivatives at other levels like
> hyper-meaning, infra-meaning, etc.) requires the specification of
> one or more systems of reference. Otherwise, confusion can be
> expected to prevail.
>
>
>
> With kind regards,
>
>
>
>
>
> Loet
>
>
>
> _____
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
> Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
> Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
> <')" >loet@leydesdorff.net> loet@leydesdorff.net ; <"
> target="l">http://www.leydesdorff.net/> http://www.leydesdorff.net/
>
>
> <" target="l">http://www.upublish.com/books/leydesdorff-sci.htm>
> The Challenge of Scientometrics ; <"
> target="l">http://www.upublish.com/books/leydesdorff.htm> The Self-
> Organization of the Knowledge-Based Society
>
>

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Received on Sun Feb 29 22:54:41 2004