Re: [Fis] A definition of Information

Dear Stan and all

I am going to Greece tomorrow and do not know how much I can get to the mail, so I will try to make a kind of summary of the discussions we have had, which I think have been very fruitful. I have already sent my opinions and questions to Loet's last productive scheme, so this one goes for Stan's and then sums up.

Dear Stan: I though that if one is a pansemiotician there are no objects in the sense of materialistic physics, but only signs? Therefore I cannot understand how the physical level can be the most general one. In my interpretation it would be Firstness. We would thern have to understand that the laws of physics are only approximations and only works because the law of mind is rather rigid at this stage.

The other problem that has been brought up is the question of when we can say that a system is alive. I have suggested Autopoiesis to be one criteria, together with those other specification criterie Jesper Hoffmeyer developed. But that has been viewed at outdated (but without a more comprehensive theory) and you stated that individuals could be only physical and not alive biologically speaking. We lack a good solution here. (I have so far not been able to understand Koichiro's and yours idea of Internalism or what the new contribution is.)

In combinations with the first mentioned problems this leaves me pusseled and unsatiesfied. In Cybersemiotics I am looking for this fruitful way of integrating a Peircian semiotic view with the cybernetic, thermodynamical and informational. A frame work that can unite yours and Loets perspectives with phenomenology. As a biologist I think you stay too much in the physical-chemical systems and Loet in the psychological-social-linguistc systems. If we give up Descartes dualism we have to make a new either monistic or triadic frame work as far as I can see. As we do not belive - as Spinoza did - that we can make an objective metaphysical language, we know that our views are generated on the back drop of a social-cultural consciousness.

When Rafael and others complains that these systems thinking frames becomes too all-encompassing like dialectical materialism my questions is then: what is the alternative if not an unreflected metaphysics and epistemology? Our metaphysics is at least a reflected one, knowing that it will never be the last word.

Thanks for some very good discussions.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Stanley N. Salthe" <ssalthe@binghamton.edu>
Date: Monday, March 1, 2004 0:06 am
Subject: Re: [Fis] A definition of Information

> S�ren: Replying top S�ren:
>
> >Dear Stan
> >Where is pure feeling in your scheme? How does first person
> experience arise?
> SS: Note that in the specification hierarchy, one moves from
> the most
> generally present realm to the most particular: {found everywhere
> {{restricted to biology {further restricted to some particular human
> culture {{restricted to one particular individual -- what I
> usually refer
> to as 'psychology'}}}}}}. So, a person arises as a member of all
> of these
> classes, going from being at first a purely physical embodiment as a
> material gradient in an egg cell all the way in its development to a
> person, as in {gradient in egg cell {fertilized egg cell {embryo
> {fetus{baby {adult}}}}}}, all the while becoming more and more
> definite and
> individuated. Where feeling emerges I would not be able to say at
> thispoint.
>
> >Why is that not important for saying that something is an
> interpretation>and therefore generating an interpretant and making
> a difference or
> >constraint a sign?
> SS: If one is a pansemiotician, it is not necessary to be
> restrictedto human individuals in discussing semiosis.
>
> >You think that the theory that you have outlined now fits into John
> >Deely's framework and developing the physical, chemical and
> informational>part that he has only worked on very abstractly not
> going into present day
> >science? Because then I think you do need to have an opinion on
> this stuff.
> SS: OK. I am just trying to carry forward the pansemiotic
> viewpoint.At present it has not developed very far I must admit.
>
> >This is where the alternative to modern mechanistic and even
> informational>science comes in - in my opinion.
> SS: Yes, I agree with this. Natural science could not take up
> semiotics without becoming radically transformed from its current
> mechanicism.
>
> >There are many attempts to make consciousness science or theories
> on an
> >informational scientific basis. I fail to see how they can ever
> come up
> >with a theory for first person experience.
> SS: You may be right. My above treatment of the individual
> as the
> innermost subclass in the specification hierarchy might be
> criticized by
> claiming that all of the other subclasses refer to kinds, not to
> particularindviduals, and so, how can an individual be introduced
> in the central
> subclass. My answer is that the individual as represented there is
> actually not being taken for a true individual, but a class of
> sociallydefined roles -- father, brother, engineeer, poet, middle
> aged person,
> etc., etc. all located simultaneously at one restricted locale.
>
> >This is where the waters part in my opinion. Can we give a
> solution to the
> >problem of life, first person experience and defining meaning
> without>changing frame work.
> SS: Possibly not. The above hierarchical understanding is an
> externalist construction. For what you are looking for I think we
> need to
> construct an internalist understanding. Koichiro Matsuno and I,
> among a
> few others, have begun working on this.
>
> STAN
>
> It seem that you agree with me in that the changing of frame work is
> necessary. But where is it that yours differ form mine or others?
> Or what
> problems is that you think has not been solved or you are
> strugling with?
> >>
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "Stanley N. Salthe" <ssalthe@binghamton.edu>
> >Date: Saturday, February 28, 2004 0:19 am
> >Subject: Re: [Fis] A definition of Information
> >
> >> Replying to S�ren's interesting questions, see interleavings:
> >>
> >> >Dear Stan
> >> >Then I did get it right the first time. My question is again
> how this
> >> >view fits with being a pansemiotician
> >> SS: One relevant approach would be to look at how the different
> >> semioses as outlined by John Deely relate to each other:
> >> {physiosemiosis{chemosemiosis {biosemiosis {anthroposemiosis}}}}.
> >> Each level of semiosis
> >> emerges from the more generally present one to its left. In a big
> >> picture,each one to the right could be seen to be an interpretant
> >> generated by the
> >> one to its left.
> >>
> >> >, and how you see it fitting with a Peircean semiotic evolutionary
> >> >philosophy.
> >> >In other words where is mind and meaning?
> >> SS: Following Peirce, we can have {Universal Mind {inorganic
> >> realm{organic realm {biological realm {human cognitive realm}}}}}.
> >> Each realm
> >> is an intensification of the prior one (the subclass to its left).
> >>
> >> >I presume that when you talk of energy you are using
> >> >standard physical language.
> >> SS: Yes. As in the prior message below.
> >>
> >> >So how does energy, information and
> >> >semiotics fit together in a theory of FIS in your framework.
> >> SS: Information would generally be any restriction or
> >> constraint on
> >> variety or possibilities. Meaning emerges from such restrictions
> >> when a
> >> system of interpretance generates interpretants on the basis of
> such>> restriction. A system of interpretance can be any system
> (abiotic or
> >> biotic) that can modify its form or behavior after encountering a
> >> constraint in its environment. I have elaborated on these
> things in
> >> Semiotica 120:381-394; 127: 481-495, 134:359-380.
> >>
> >> Do you have
> >> >a coherent and internal consistent theory developed?
> >> SS: I would say rather that I am working on it.
> >>
> >> STAN
> >> >
> >> >"Stanley N. Salthe" wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> Replying again to S�ren:
> >> >> First, as a model of the intensional complexity of the
> world, the
> >> >> specification hierarchy; {physical world {material world
> >> {biological world
> >> >> {{{etc.}}} shows that energy is the primary, and primal, stuff
> >> in the
> >> >> world, out of which all else comes. So it is in the most
> >> general category.
> >> >> The material world generates friction and delay = entropy, and
> >> so entropy
> >> >> is not as foundational as energy, as we can see by {energy
> {entropy>> >> {{{etc.}}}. But entropy would be foundational with
> respect to
> >> biology>> because the informational constraints found in genetic
> >> information are
> >> >> historical in origin, and history is just a record of the
> >> results of
> >>> >> friction and delays. So: {energy {entropy {history {etc}}}.
> >> The etc. here
> >> >> could be read as human cultural discourse. This could be
> >> summarized as
> >> >> 'story telling'. Then we would have {energy {entropy {history
> >> {story>> telling}}}}.
> >> >>
> >> >> STAN
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
>

_______________________________________________
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
Received on Mon Mar 1 01:00:24 2004