Re: [Fis] A definition of Information

Hi, Stan, S�ren and John

Just dumping in on the latest exchanges: As you
know I am neither a Peirce scholar or a
philosopher, but it seems to me that the
following quote from the 1891 paper in the Monist
"The Architecture of Theories" points to an
ontological interpretation of the law of habit
taking as I prefer to call it (because people
invariably identifies mind with human mind, which
was definitely not what Peirce had in mind):

"In the beginning - infinitely remote - there was
a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being
without connection or regularity would properly
be without existence. This feeling, sporting here
and there in pure arbitrariness, would have
started the germ of a generalising tendency. Its
other sportings would be evanescent, but this
would have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency
to habit would be started; and from this, with
the other principles of evolution, all the
regularities of the universe would be evolved."
(Peirce 1931-35) CP 6.33).

Jesper

>At 11:26 AM 2004/03/16, S�ren Brier wrote:
>>Dear Stan
>>
>>The problem I am raising is that according to Peirce pure feeling as
>>Firstness is there from the beginning and as such internally in matter
>>and energy - and so is the law of mind. But you seem to build up the
>>hierarchy in a fairly physicalistic way.
>
>With all due respect, S�ren, this is a controversial issue in Peirce
>scholarship. The consensus on Peirce-L is that Firstness is a mode
>of being, but that it cannot exist on its own, since existence arises
>only with Secondness. After that, various people tend to disagree
>about the roles of the two. Peirce's few remarks on Hegel, with whom
>he agrees in some respects, and distances himself in others, probably
>need to be investigated closely to get any further than two alternative
>views that Firstness is both ontologically and logically prior to Secondness,
>or that it is not ontologically prior. Peirce's texts seem to support both
>interpretations, according to the discussions on Peirce-L. As I understand
>Stan, he would accept the logical primacy of Firstness, as being required
>by Secondness, but not its ontological primacy as being able to exist
>without Secondness. The "law of mind", it seems to me to apply to logical
>primacy (the possibilities) and not ontological
>primacy (existence). So I think
>that Stan's interpretation is consistent with what we currently know about the
>interpretation of Peirce. It seems to me that
>the coming of mind into existence
>could occur much later than the primal being of its possibilities (laws, if
>you want).
>
>John
>
>
>John
>
>I've found the link between apes and civilised men - it's us.
> -- Konrad Lorenz
>John Collier collierj@ukzn.ac.za
>Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
>T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031
>http://www.kli.ac.at/research.html?personal/collier
>http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/index.html
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-- 
-
Jesper Hoffmeyer
University of Copenhagen
Department of Biological Chemistry
S�lvgade 83
DK 1307 Copenhagen K
Denmark
Tel. +45 3532 2032  (+45 4798 2578 at home)
Fax +45 3532 2040
hoffmeyer@mermaid.molbio.ku.dk
http://www.molbio.ku.dk/MolBioPages/abk/PersonalPages/Jesper/Hoffmeyer.html
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