[Fis] A definition of Information

Dear colleagues,

I don't think that meaning is generated in individual minds, but in
practices and languages among human beings. Meaning is then reflected in
the minds of individuals. The next-order system is constructed
bottom-up, but once in place control is top-down. Individuals may have
some discretionary room for changing meaning at the supra-individual
level (by communicating) and the reflection can be idiosyncratic.

Of course, one can also use the concept of meaning metaphorically in
relation to other systems. When I say, for example, that eating
chocolates is meaningful for my stomach, I am conflating psychological
meaning with a physiological one. Thus, we can derive a concept of
meaning at the level of general systems theory. (Let me recall that
information can be defined one-step more abstract, namely
mathematically.) The notion of meaning at the level of general systems
theory, however, can no longer be identified with psychological meaning.
That would be another conflation.

In summary, meaning is generated at the supra-individual level (in
practices and by languaging). We are able to develop a generalized
notion of meaning. The psychological mind is then one among other
possible systems of reference, but can no longer be considered as having
an epistemological priority.

Philosophically, one could then ask how I can "know" this or "say" this
as a person. My answer would be: because I am grounded in a discourse. I
store meanings which I get from literature and practices. These meanings
can be used reflexively.

With kind regards,

Loet

> -----Original Message-----
> From: fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es
> [mailto:fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of S�ren Brier
> Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2004 11:52 AM
> To: Jesper Hoffmeyer
> Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: [FMG-SPAM] - Re: [Fis] A definition of Information -
> Bayesian Filter detected spam
>
>
> Dear all (especially John and Stan)
>
> My interpretation of Peirce ontological theory of mind is
> also based on this important quote that Jesper points to
> below. But let me add a few others from an article I just
> finished for Axiomathes.
>
> "Far less has any notion of mind been established and
> generally acknowledged which can compare for an instant in
> distinctness to the dynamical conception of matter. Almost
> all the psychologists still tell us that mind is
> consciousness. But …unconscious mind exists. What is meant by
> consciousness is really in itself nothing but feeling. …there
> may be, and probably is, something of the general nature of
> feeling almost everywhere, yet feeling in any ascertainable
> degree is a mere property of protoplasm, perhaps only of
> nerve matter. Now it so happens that biological organisms,
> and especially a nervous system are favorably conditioned for
> exhibiting the phenomena of mind also; and therefore it is
> not surprising that mind and feeling should be confounded.
> …that feeling is nothing but the inward aspect of things,
> while mind on the contrary is essentially an external
> phenomenon."(Peirce, CP: 7.364.)
>
> Thus, the essence of consciousness is feeling and an
> important aspect of Firstness is pure feeling. From a
> Peircian framework with its synechism, you have to admit that
> the universe is permeated with Firstness, but that is not the
> same thing as human awareness (though it is the origin of
> it). Peirce writes. "What the psychologists study is mind,
> not consciousness exclusively. … consciousness is a very
> simple thing. …not…Self-consciousness … consciousness is
> nothing but Feeling, in general, -- not feeling in the German
> sense, but more generally, the immediate element of
> experience generalized to its utmost. Mind, on the contrary
> is a very difficult thing to analyze. I am not speaking of
> Soul, the metaphysical substratum of Mind (if it has any),
> but of Mind phenomenally understood. To get such a conception
> of Mind, or mental phenomena, as the science of Dynamics
> affords of Matter, or material events, is a business which
> can only be accomplished by resolute scientific
> investigation."(Peirce, CP:
> 7.365)
>
> Peirce is not speaking of human self-consciousness but of the
> essence of consciousness as a phenomenon that develops in
> nature to emerge in new and more structured forms in living
> beings, nervous systems and language-based culture. Peirce
> writes about this concept of thought, understood as a
> function of mind and semiosis:
>
> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
> appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the
> purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is
> really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of
> objects are really there. Not only is thought in the organic
> world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a
> General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be
> thought without Signs. We must here give "Sign" a very wide
> sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within our
> definition."(Peirce, CP: 4.551)
>
> Here Peirce is widening the semiosis concept to include
> chemical pattern-creating processes as nature's thinking. I
> would prefer to call these proto- semiotic processes to avoid
> a too broad sense of the concept leading into a pan-semiotic
> metaphysics. But, nevertheless, Perice's metaphysics operates
> with the "inside" of material nature. He
> writes:
>
> "Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there in the same
> proportion feeling exists. In fact, chance is but the outward
> aspect of that which within itself is feeling."(Peirce, CP: 6.265)
>
> Chance, spontaneity and feeling are connected to Firstness
> that forms the basic and vague link between everything.
> However, from a biosemiotic view, it does not develop into
> genuine signs before organized into living cells. To see the
> habits or laws of nature as signs in themselves for the
> Universe, you have to construct the Universe as a subject.
> That would be a subject so abstract that it would be far
> beyond ordinary human comprehension.
>
> The basic philosophical problem is whether in a Peirciean
> framework you can have Thirdness without sign quality. If you
> want to make the universe in itself an interpreter the answer
> is no. But, from a biological perspective, what we call signs
> and semiosis are working within quite different space and
> time frames. It is true that Peirce wrote that "the universe
> is perfused with signs" and that he looks at matter "as
> effete mind" and finally, his Synchistic doctrine connects
> mind with matter and sees mind as continuity and semiosis. He
> further sees "the one original law to be the recognized law
> of mind, the law of association, of which the laws of matter
> are regarded as mere special results" (Peirce, CP: 6.277).
> Peirce writes the following that can be seen as essential to
> his contribution to a theory of mind:
>
> "Hence, it would be a mistake to conceive of the psychical
> and the physical aspects of matter as two aspects absolutely
> distinct. Viewing a thing from the outside, considering its
> relation of action and reaction with other things, it appears
> as matter. Viewing it from the inside, looking at its
> immediate character as feeling, it appears as consciousness.
> …remember that mechanical laws are nothing but acquired
> habits, like all the regularities of mind, including the
> tendency to take habits, itself; …this action of habit is
> nothing but generalization, and generalization is nothing but
> spreading of feelings." (Peirce, CP: 6.268)
>
> If we cannot have Secondness and Thirdness in nature without
> interpretants being established, then every stable entity in
> the universe has to be considered a sign, and there are no
> objects to refer to. Even if dyadic relationships are almost
> always embedded in the triadic mediating force of Thirdness
> and final causation, they must be considered to have
> independent existences. To make sense, in Peirce's
> metaphysics, and to be compatible with the work done in the
> sciences, we must primarily view the laws of nature as
> objects in themselves. I do not want to conceptualize the
> idea of natural laws in any transcendental way. Apart from
> the law of mind, Peirce sees them as immanent. In modern
> scientific language one would say that they emerge out of the
> symmetry breaking that is generated by the cooling of the
> universe.But under the law of mind and habittaking.
>
> This is the view I am challenging Stan on. Do we share this
> and if so what are the consequenses for his thermodynamic
> view and criteria for establising interpretants?
>
> Sorry for the length! Soren
>
>
> Jesper Hoffmeyer wrote:
> >
> > Hi, Stan, S�ren and John
> >
> > Just dumping in on the latest exchanges: As you
> > know I am neither a Peirce scholar or a
> > philosopher, but it seems to me that the
> > following quote from the 1891 paper in the Monist
> > "The Architecture of Theories" points to an
> > ontological interpretation of the law of habit
> > taking as I prefer to call it (because people
> > invariably identifies mind with human mind, which
> > was definitely not what Peirce had in mind):
> >
> > "In the beginning - infinitely remote - there was
> > a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being
> > without connection or regularity would properly
> > be without existence. This feeling, sporting here
> > and there in pure arbitrariness, would have
> > started the germ of a generalising tendency. Its
> > other sportings would be evanescent, but this
> > would have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency
> > to habit would be started; and from this, with
> > the other principles of evolution, all the
> > regularities of the universe would be evolved."
> > (Peirce 1931-35) CP 6.33).
> >
> > Jesper
> >
> > >At 11:26 AM 2004/03/16, S�ren Brier wrote:
> > >>Dear Stan
> > >>
> > >>The problem I am raising is that according to Peirce pure
> feeling as
> > >>Firstness is there from the beginning and as such internally in
> > >>matter and energy - and so is the law of mind. But you
> seem to build
> > >>up the hierarchy in a fairly physicalistic way.
> > >
> > >With all due respect, S�ren, this is a controversial issue
> in Peirce
> > >scholarship. The consensus on Peirce-L is that Firstness
> is a mode of
> > >being, but that it cannot exist on its own, since existence arises
> > >only with Secondness. After that, various people tend to disagree
> > >about the roles of the two. Peirce's few remarks on Hegel,
> with whom
> > >he agrees in some respects, and distances himself in
> others, probably
> > >need to be investigated closely to get any further than two
> > >alternative views that Firstness is both ontologically and
> logically
> > >prior to Secondness, or that it is not ontologically
> prior. Peirce's
> > >texts seem to support both interpretations, according to the
> > >discussions on Peirce-L. As I understand Stan, he would accept the
> > >logical primacy of Firstness, as being required by Secondness, but
> > >not its ontological primacy as being able to exist without
> > >Secondness. The "law of mind", it seems to me to apply to logical
> > >primacy (the possibilities) and not ontological primacy
> (existence).
> > >So I think that Stan's interpretation is consistent with what we
> > >currently know about the interpretation of Peirce. It seems to me
> > >that the coming of mind into existence could occur much later than
> > >the primal being of its possibilities (laws, if you want).
> > >
> > >John
> > >
> > >
> > >John
> > >
> > >I've found the link between apes and civilised men - it's us.
> > > -- Konrad Lorenz
> > >John Collier collierj@ukzn.ac.za
> > >Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
> > >T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031
> > >http://www.kli.ac.at/research.html?personal/collier
> > >http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/index.html
> >
> >--------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >Please find our disclaimer at http://www.disclaimer.nu.ac.za
> >
> >--------------------------------------------------------------------
> > ><<<<gwavasig>>>>
> > >
> > >_______________________________________________
> > >fis mailing list
> > >[email protected] http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
> >
> > --
> > -
> > Jesper Hoffmeyer
> > University of Copenhagen
> > Department of Biological Chemistry
> > S�lvgade 83
> > DK 1307 Copenhagen K
> > Denmark
> > Tel. +45 3532 2032 (+45 4798 2578 at home)
> > Fax +45 3532 2040
> >
> > hoffmeyer@mermaid.molbio.ku.dk
> >
> http://www.molbio.ku.dk/MolBioPages/abk/PersonalPages/>
Jesper/Hoffmeyer
> > .html
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > fis mailing list
> > [email protected] http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
> --
> Venlig hilsen/Best wishes S�ren Brier
>
> Handelsh�jskolen K�benhavn/Copenhagen Business School
> Inst. For Ledelse, Politik og Filosofi/Dept. of Management,
> Politics and Philosophy, Bl�g�rdsgade/Blaagaardsgade 23 B, 3.
> floor, room 326, DK-2200 Copenhagen N. Telephone +45
> 38152208, mail sbr.lpf@cbs.dk .
>
> Old home page with full text papers:
> http://www.flec.kvl.dk/personalprofile.asp?> id=sbr&p=engelsk
>
>
> Ed. of Cybernetics & Human Knowing
> http://www.imprint-academic.com/C&HK
> Subscriptions sandra@imprint.co.uk,
>
> _______________________________________________
> fis mailing list
> [email protected] http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
>

_______________________________________________
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
Received on Wed Mar 17 18:19:19 2004