Re: [Fis] The timings of meaning

Ted Goranson wrote:

> Pedro C. Mariju�n wrote on 3/23/04:
>
>> For instance, the conceptualizations on 'grupoids' (Nature 472,
>> 601-604, Ian Stewart 2004) might be a third way in between sets ...
>> ...snip...
>> ... the sciences (and laws of nature) are indeed important --and
>> maybe it is another focused discussion to consider for the future.
>
>
> Friends -
>
> I am sorry to have been absent from the discussion recently. It looks
> like some very impressive ideas have been introduced and massaged a
> bit. But I am a little concerned that we may have strayed a bit from
> what I thought this group was about.
>
> It is my impression that the reason for FIS to exist is to explore the
> relatively new idea that there is a discourse of sorts among chemical
> entities and similarly among physical ones; that the nature of the
> "information" of this discourse needs to be induced (taking out the
> human observer); and further that if some new, non-human based notion
> of information can be distilled then universal mechanics of such
> things as evolution and emergent behavior can be usefully applied
> across many disciplines.

I am a little confused here. You draw a distinction between CHEMICAL
ENTITIES and PHYSICAL ONES - can you clarify the distinction?

>
> The key here is not to discuss what WE think information "is," rather
> what do CHEMICAL ENTITIES "think" it is. I believe nearly all our
> precedents - our giant minds of the past - fail us on this score
> because they entangle the notions of knowledge and insight with
> information.

You appear to be saying that Schr�dinger and Whitehead did not
understand this distinction - and I am quite certain that they did,
despite their entanglement with the unavoidable consideration of the
notions related to what we can know and how we can know it.

>
> Pedro has wisely led us through examination of some candidate
> abstractions and notions. But this most recent one has pitfalls; I
> think perhaps because "meaning" is too fraught with anthropomorphic
> overtones to be very leverageable for the FIS agenda. Therefore we may
> have gone into a rather off-topic albeit interesting discussion.

I share this observation.

>
> This message is in response to Pedro's reintroduction of the question
> whether sets, groups or categories are more fundamental to the
> "conversations" within the chemical and physics domains. Since
> introducing the question, I have struggled with this quite a bit.
>
> I think natural numbers, symmetry and time are probably elements of
> this primitive notion of information, possibly in that order. I think
> we should be thinking of transformation or process rather than
> identity and therefore functions instead of operations. Identity in
> this context is a question of history; I believe time is always
> retrospective and never conditional. Causality is an imputed notion.

It is not clear to me that the case for natural numbers is so clear cut
in fact - since the universe is not consistently, or ever, truly
periodic. It seems to me that real numbers are, in fact, fundamental
and that "natural numbers" are a distinction of human convention.
Natural numbers are a convenience of trade, information in the universe
is not so constrained.

>
> This - I'm simplifying here - has led me to prefer groups rather than
> sets in thinking about the mathematics. It allows for both geometric
> and algebraic operations, provides for simple abstraction mechanisms,
> and can be structured to be sparse and purely symmetry-based.
> "History" of the kind that seems appropriate is accommodated and the
> mechanics are natural to those frequently employed by physicists and
> chemists.
>
> I am attracted to Leyton's work because it is a workable instance of
> something close to what we need. To make it applicable we've got to
> retool the cognitive mechanics, something that will give Michael fits
> I suspect. I plan on meeting with him after Easter to see about this
> and will report back.
>
> I'm talking here about the notions native to the primitives involved.
> In order for us to REASON about this (another matter entirely) I see
> no way out of a categorical logic. That's the new science part. As I
> have said before, I'm very impressed by Barwise's work toward a new
> information theory as a candidate for this.

This observation makes a limiting assumption. You assume that such a
analysis is not only possible but ultimate - that is, you assume it
considers all the aspects relevant to information and its propagation (I
hesitate to use the word "complete"). This is a fundamentally flawed
assumption - it is the trap into which twentieth century science fell.

>
> Away with sets, I say! Peirce is marvelous, but inapplicable, as with
> Shannon and the overly encumbered regime of entropy. I think this
> upcoming session will be another attempt to stretch a rabbit skin over
> a horse.

Peirce is marvelous and inapplicable - but I would not take anything
said in this forum about Peirce to be at all representative of him.
Peirce is broadly misunderstood and abused in the literature.

>
> We need to be very clear about this: there are two vocabularies
> involved: that which the species uses to organize and affect others
> and that which we use to reason about (create science about) those
> effects and systems. Groups and categories are likely not what we
> need, but they seem to get us closer to what Jerry calls an "organic"
> mechanics of information.

Perhaps, but unlikely IMHO - the effective distance between set theory
and category theory is insignificant.

Further, while I agree in principle about the two vocabularies you
identify, one has to recognize that they necessarily coexist and that
they are unified in the vehicle of communication. These vocabularies do
not exist independent of the conscious entity that manipulates them.

Whereas, the vocabulary that I understood this group here to be
concerned with is the abstract vocabulary of information in nature.
IOW, how information works.

With respect,
Steven

>
> Best, Ted
>

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Received on Sat Mar 27 21:33:46 2004