Re: [Fis] The timings of meaning

From: Ted Goranson <[email protected]>
Date: Tue 30 Mar 2004 - 01:12:22 CEST

Steven Ericsson Zenith wrote on 3/27/04:
>I am a little confused here. You draw a
>distinction between CHEMICAL ENTITIES and
>PHYSICAL ONES - can you clarify the distinction?

Previously, we have discussed the fact of layers.
There seem to be some species who form systems
that result in new systems. So for instance
elementary particles would form systems that
result in a new layer of primitives, say
molecules. The comment was intended to note the
two layers. But I am not at all sure what the
elements _really_ are. Probably, the ones we use
(elementary particles and molecules) are
artifacts of abstraction techniques of ours, not
theirs.

>You appear to be saying that Schr�dinger and
>Whitehead did not understand this distinction -
>and I am quite certain that they did, despite
>their entanglement with the unavoidable
>consideration of the notions related to what we
>can know and how we can know it.

Yes, those and many others (I just attended
Jerry's memorial symposium on Prigogine). These
are certainly finer minds than mine. But even
these heaviweights haven't hit home runs. The
reason, I believe is that they hadn't stumbled
upon the right set of abstractions.

>>I'm talking here about the notions native to
>>the primitives involved. In order for us to
>>REASON about this (another matter entirely) I
>>see no way out of a categorical logic. That's
>>the new science part. As I have said before,
>>I'm very impressed by Barwise's work toward a
>>new information theory as a candidate for this.
>
>This observation makes a limiting assumption.
>You assume that such a analysis is not only
>possible but ultimate - that is, you assume it
>considers all the aspects relevant to
>information and its propagation

I don't think I said that and surely didn't mean
to. Barwise specifically situates his notions in
a sea of unknowables.

>Perhaps, but unlikely IMHO - the effective
>distance between set theory and category theory
>is insignificant.
>Further, while I agree in principle about the
>two vocabularies you identify, one has to
>recognize that they necessarily coexist and that
>they are unified in the vehicle of
>communication. These vocabularies do not exist
>independent of the conscious entity that
>manipulates them.
>Whereas, the vocabulary that I understood this
>group here to be concerned with is the abstract
>vocabulary of information in nature. IOW, how
>information works.

I must have really been clumsy in my words. I
thought I clearly made the differentiation
between abstractions that, say, cells use and
those that we use in reasoning about what they
use.

I may be mistaken (I often am) but I understand
FOL, indeed all the common logics of science to
be set-based. Category logics are something else
altogether. There can be mappings, but these are
incomplete in interesting details. Categories are
the abstractions of the process of abstracting
and superficially seem apt for reflexive logic of
the type that would deal with the abstractions we
need.

Or did I misunderstand you?

Best, Ted

-- 
Ted Goranson
Advanced Enterprise Research Office
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Received on Tue Mar 30 01:22:48 2004

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