[Fis] Materialism vs. Idealism

Dear Guy and colleagues,
Thanks for your welcome comments. Metaphysics, if I understand the word,
refers to that branch of philosophy which attempts to understand the
fundamental nature of all reality, whether sensible or insensible. I
believe disciples of metaphysics fall somewhere in between materialists,
or naturalists, who accept only tangible, visible objects, and
idealists, who maintain that there is nothing but ideas, or mind, or
spirit. It sounds like you�re advocating the naturalist view, Guy. I
suppose, though, that even materialists don�t usually reject the
existence of metaphysics itself.
I think the ideas discussed in metaphysics are among the most profound
and interesting in the history of human discourse. And that history goes
back at least as far as Aristotle, and also includes, surely, Plato,
Kant and Descartes. I don�t think you and I could possibly do justice to
the seminal, wonderful dialectic framed by those renowned thinkers
without a great deal of rereading and consideration. These are certainly
not ideas that have been ignored by our forbears.
Still, I do believe, as I�ve argued, Guy, that there is, in fact, a
convergence between thermodynamics and information theory. And that,
indeed, all information is a property of physical objects; including all
the information in our brains. But, this does not, I�m convinced, imply
that everything which exists is observable. It doesn�t necessarily
exclude the existence of an intangible mind or soul, for example, or of
God, or of insensible mathematics. And I wouldn�t label such things
�metaphysical information�.
No doubt, when I�m considering a mathematical theorem, there is
specialized brain activity facilitating my understanding. I suspect that
the philosophers might say that this activity is not, itself, the
mathematics. I think Michel made the important point that we all seem to
have no problem distinguishing a thermodynamic system, say, from our
mathematical model of it. We may process our perceptions and
understanding of the system through brain activity, I suppose, but those
brain responses are not, themselves, the thermodynamic system. And,
likewise, the neurological function associated with mathematical
reasoning, is not, itself, mathematics. (I feel very inadequate making
this argument; I know that the philosophers have offered innumerable,
superior explanations.)
But, I am now convinced that the conclusion of the materialists cannot
follow logically just from the fact that information is a property of a
physical, perceptible object. Even though the observable nature of
information may have led to many carefully crafted, assiduously
researched and annotated, thoughtful arguments. I suspect, without
having done the research, that there is, by now, a hefty accumulation of
contemporary publications assessing Landauer�s dogma of material
information upon the metaphysical discussion.
All these ideas interest me thoroughly, but I can�t say I�m able to
discuss them from a perspective of knowledge of the seminal discourse
provided for us by eminent philosophers. Still, I think it�s a mistake
to assert that �if metaphysics exists, then information theory can only
be a toy model of entropy, at best�. I suspect you mean that if anything
exists which is not observable, then my support for Landauer�s
conclusion that all information is physical, must be invalid. That�s the
implication I find incorrect, Guy, and I understand that to be the point
of our disagreement.
Thanks for your stimulating reply.
Cordially,
Michael Devereux

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Received on Mon May 17 22:57:57 2004