Re: [Fis] Philosophers describe science

From: Stanley N. Salthe <[email protected]>
Date: Sun 04 Jul 2004 - 22:46:49 CEST

Regarding Michael's posting below: testability deriving from observation
(measurement) certainly is the basis of science. However, I think we need
to be somewhat cautious here. The Duhem-Quine thesis has it that testing
is not objective, but is done within the confines of the discourse that
initiated the question, so that one does not "discover" new surprising
things (mostly just ignored if they impose themselves on observations).
(On the jokes list we have the question "How often do you beat your wife? !
) In any case, I have my own, stronger, version of Duhem/Quine, which I
have personally seen in action more than once. In order to test a
hypothesis it is necessary to set up an experimental situation, and this
involves making a number of ancillary assumptions. If the test is a
refutation (of one's favorite theory), one need not refute it at all. One
sees that some ancillary assumption was inappropriate or poorly deployed.
One changes it, modifies the experiment, and ... well, this can go on for a
long time, perhaps an entire career!
     On the definition of science (which has in the past been used to cast
discredit upon one or another social science) I note anthropologist Leslie
White's defininition: "science is sciencing". What is sciencing? It is
just the making orderly, disciplined observations along with good record
keeping.

STAN

>Dear Loet and colleagues,
>
>Thanks for the lucid and thoughtful message, Loet. Im sure youre right
>that the word science is often used for a wide range of meanings. I
>think that broad range can sometimes cause confusion rather than
>enlightenment, and may even include contradictory interpretations. Ive
>used the word to mean the pursuit of understanding by that method
>usually called the scientific method. My meaning would distinguish the
>humanities, including philosophy, art, mathematics and theology, for
>example, from science, and corresponds, roughly, with the separation
>described by C. P. Snow in his notable book, The Two Cultures.
>
>I would only categorize those disciplines as truly scientific which
>strictly adhere to the methodology of science. The renowned philosopher
>of science, Karl Popper, I believe, has described those methods most
>clearly and persuasively. His theory of falsification, refined by Quine
>and others, refurbishes and explicates the tenets of the scientific
>method portrayed first by Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century and
>Francis Bacon in the seventeenth. (And they go well with eggs and toast.)
>
>Popper explained that his falsification, or refutation, principle
>supplanted logical induction as the criterion for a valid scientific
>assertion. That assertion must, in principle, be subject to an
>observation or physical experiment capable of refuting that prediction.
>I believe this is the essence of truly scientific investigation, and is
>the source of its efficacy, its validity and authority, and of the
>progressive nature of genuine science. In my view, we ought label
>something science, and accord it the credence and respect of scientific
>conclusions, only to the extent that it adheres to the scientific method.
>
>Its my understanding, Loet, that the Vienna Circle encompassed
>philosophers of science, Carnap, Feigel, Philip Frank, possibly Quine,
>but few, if any, natural scientists, and that they are credited with an
>analytic philosophy which advocates clear, precise statements, and
>logical rigor and evidence, rather than ambiguity, in argumentation. If
>thats all there is to it, I count myself as such an advocate. In my
>judgment, equivocation and imprecise dilation (though easy to do) is a
>hindrance, and no help, toward understanding scientific arguments, or
>philosophic ones.
>
>Id like to emphasize that the laws of those scientific disciplines
>which strictly depend on observational validation are exclusively
>progressive, historically. There is no need to reconstruct scientific
>laws established observationally, since they are just as true today
>(within the range of their applicability) as when originally deduced.
>Though some religious doctrines, and the dictates of powerful notables,
>may have altered dramatically since Galilleos time, for example, we
>continue to recognize that the earth does not center our universe.
>
>The threat of torture to Galilleo, or just the pressure for compliance
>with our peers, or the craving for personal promotion, cannot alter
>scientific conclusions which are observationally founded. And which
>contrast, so often and so obviously, with self-serving speculation.
>Moreover, it appears that the awesome onslaught of modern technology
>(for good, and bad) flows from that reality which only observation imparts.
>
>I do recognize that many contemporary philosophers of science, including
>Kuhn, point to a different explanation of the historical progression
>which characterizes the observational sciences. But I can make (some
>other time) a powerful and persuasive case, I believe, that it is the
>universality and legitimacy of observation, and not popular acceptance
>by any group, if, even a group of influential scientists, which
>validates the conclusions of natural science.
>
>I appreciate your explanation for the use of a mathematical theory of
>communication to study flow of currency and other tokens of value, Loet.
>I wish I knew more. I find it fascinating and valuable.
>
>Cordially,
>
>Michael Devereux
>
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Received on Sun Jul 4 21:15:38 2004

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