[Fis] The Methods of Scientists

From: Michael Devereux <[email protected]>
Date: Tue 06 Jul 2004 - 02:08:56 CEST

Dear Loet, Rafael, Stan and colleagues,

I know I�m treading in troubled waters when I argue for the strict
distinction between the methods of science and those of other
disciplines. My understanding is that a majority of philosophers of
science today would disagree with me. I suspect, from what I read, that
most such philosophers would favor, generally, Kuhn�s view, to Popper�s.
Interestingly, I find that most physicists would hold that the work they
do is continually authenticated and validated by observation. I think
most physicists are mistaken about that, however.

I�m merely arguing from experience. Most of what I read these days in
reputable, refereed physics journals, and it�s mostly in the narrow
field of quantum measurement theory, is not very valuable. Much of it, I
find, is nonsense, not well supported by either logic or observation.
There seems to be a proliferation of supposition and speculation, even
obfuscation sometimes, which I�m sure, does not follow from a genuine
search for nature�s secrets, and cannot result from the rigorous methods
of science. I think, and regret, that much of what professional
physicists produce, these days, is not very good science.

It wasn�t always so. Reading articles in physics journals from fifty or
more years ago is almost always useful. Such an article may be arcane
and limited, even by physics standards, but is almost always good
science, and accurate, I�ve found. I attribute some of that distinction
over time to the excuse afforded by some philosophers of science for
self-serving speculation and political influence, rather than
controlled, careful observation and logic, as the essential regimen of
the scientific process. You know, if science is really just a political
process of advocacy of personally advantageous conjecture, with the
appropriate appearance of real science in publication, I�d be foolish
not to do the same for myself.

My very careful reading of Kuhn�s book indicates that his essential
argument is based on a history of the behavior of many acknowledged
scientists. Specifically, that if a lot of scientists acted in self
interest, rather than genuine and regimented pursuit of nature�s truths,
then the scientific method must be, of course, just whatever those
scientists were doing. As you may suspect, I find such a conclusion
unsubstantial.

I recognize there is more in Kuhn�s book than only this. He argues for a
culturally-derived paradigm shift in the actual perceptions of
observation. I�m sure he�s mistaken about that, also. And, I believe I
can support that conclusion persuasively. (I�ll do it some time.)

As I�ve made the distinction between philosophy and science, Rafael,
I�ve maintained that the methods of those disciplines are separate.
Obviously, we don�t attempt to refute the estimable works of Plato, or
Kant, or Aquinas, say, by controlled experiments. Those philosophic
teachings are subjected to much different standards of validation.

But, it is because of the continued agreement of Newton�s Laws, and
Einstein�s, with persistent observations on stars, planets. elementary
particles and such, that we recognize these scientific theories as
valid. They do, indeed, describe our physical world. None have ever been
refuted by careful, repeatable experiments (within the bounds of their
applicability). I take this, Rafael, not to be a matter of �faith� but
of observable fact. (I do recognize that some philosophers, like Kuhn,
have questioned the universality of human observations.)

I, too, have seen it happen, Stan, that an experimenter fails to
investigate any situation which could refute his hypothesis. Or, as you
say, to reconfigure any problematic ancillary assumptions. And to only
observe carefully, and to emphasize, phenomena that are confirmatory.
Sad to say, I�ve found it to be usual, in fact.

Which is why repeated and varied experiments by different investigators
are necessary. And why real integrity, and respect for truth, is so
essential to authentic science. As I see it, the problem is not with the
scientific method, but with the methods of some scientists.

Rafael, you write that statements of what is, or what is not, the
scientific methodology, Popper�s falsifiability theory, for example,
�are of course, not 'falsifable'. That means, that the foundation of
science cannot be, itself, scientific. Popperianism has be itself
'falsified' not just by Kuhn. The problem with some Popperians is that
they never accepted to be refuted and thus got into contradiction with
their own dogmata.�

Yes, I certainly agree that Popper�s theory of the foundational
principles of science is not, itself, subject to observational
refutation. That is just the point I�ve been asserting. The philosophic
foundations of science cannot, as you say, be scientific. Because
they�re not science, they�re philosophy, and we judge them by
philosophy�s standards, not those of science. As Plato�s, or Hume�s
philosophy, is not observationally falsifiable, so also for Popper�s. I
see no contradiction there.

Thanks for all the stimulating comments.

Cordially,

Michael Devereux

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Received on Tue Jul 6 02:10:54 2004

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