[Fis] Scientific Method

Dear Loet and colleagues,

Thanks for the messages of some days ago. As I see it, Loet, the
writings of Kuhn and Popper, and others, attempt to describe the vital
elements of the methods of science. While you and I haven�t debated the
status of those books, it is pertinent to the important ideas introduced
recently by Rafael. I believe these philosophers of science try to
explain (some better than others), not just which methods scientists
have effectively employed in the past, but also why these methods have
shown themselves to be continually progressive, while other modes of
inquiry are not.

In this context, progressive means, as philosophers of science say, that
those traditional scientific methods must have resulted in theories and
laws which do actually describe our tangible world. They result in
truth, if you will, and that�s why we need not excise scientific laws
when they become old and out of fashion. Rather, we build on the truths
taught by Dalton, and Hook, Darwin and so many others. Using those
truths as a foundation, we may be able, for example, to more accurately
define the scope of their applicability. Or incorporate, say, Hamilton�s
formulation of dynamics into our quantum theory of microscopic phenomena.

I agree, Loet, that the further development of sciences other than
physics is a subject of importance, and of great interest. As I hope
I�ve emphasized in the past, I have a profound respect for the great
truths we�ve learned, over the centuries, from estimable intellects like
Plato, Homer, Kant, Hume and so many others. I think they have taught us
lessons for life that are often of much greater value than any
scientific theory.

But, quite obviously, their methods were not the methods of the
sciences, and, in general, they�re not typically progressive.
Philosophers continue to argue the merits of Plato and Epicuris, for
example, but scientists do not question Newton�s laws, or Boyle�s.

I�m convinced that the fundamental reason we scientists don�t persist in
attempted revisions, or even replacement, of established scientific
laws, is that every one of them can be validated again, here and now, by
each one of us, in repeated laboratory experiments. (And, there�s a
certain kind of visceral consummation in doing that.) If I doubt it, I
can go into the laboratory and try to refute it. And that attempt at
refutation does, indeed, go on continuously in the natural sciences.

So, when you write, Loet, that �in some domains (e.g. human culture) it
may be more difficult to repeat experiments and one has to work with
quasi-experimentation, etc.� , I�m sure these aren�t the methods of
science still taught to natural scientists today, the methods described
by Arab investigators in the middle ages, codified by Roger and Francis
(Bacon, that is), and refined by Popper, Quine and Pierce more recently.

I�ve absolutely no doubt, Loet, that one ought be �allowed to study
society�s secrets with the same rigour and using the mathematical theory
of communication.� And, I�m certain that real integrity and honesty in
pursuit of understanding would allow such methods to produce truthful,
valuable results.

But, if the results can not be validated by repeated, scientific
observations, those conclusions cannot be tested by everyone who is
disposed to dislike the result, or, who may simply choose to be
disagreeable. I think it�s fascinating, that in the natural sciences, we
need not depend on the integrity, or decency, or probity, of other
scientists. We can just refute his results in the laboratory.

Philosophers of science still scrutinize and parse the methods of
science They continue to refine our understanding of just how and why
those methods work so effectively. I�m sure that repeated, empirical
observations are fundamental to the scientific method, and must always
be included as an essential ingredient.

Which does not mean, of course, that those methods employed in
understanding human culture, and which may not always rely on repeated
experimental observation, are invalid or untrue. But, I believe, and
most philosophers of science confirm, that such procedures, are not the
methods which have come to be called scientific.

I�ve cited the works of Rolf Landauer from the nineties. He made what I
understand to be the definitive arguments that all information is
physical. I�ve reread parts of his papers from time to time and still
believe they are convincing, and even more commendable, they�re
enlightening.

My understanding of the word communication would imply that information
is its subject. (I realize that, like science, energy, entropy and so
on, the word isn�t always used with the same meaning by everyone, and I
suspect, Loet, that you interpret it differently than I do.) I would
argue that there is no communication without transfer of information
between separate entities. (People, for example.) And that, therefore,
if it�s communication, physical information (which carries measurable
energy, as, say a molecule does) must be exchanged.

I hope no one will construe my arguments to imply that i�m denigrating
research which doesn�t rely entirely on experimental observation. I know
of some of the extraordinary accomplishments and profound insights
resulting from such work. But, I am emphasizing that such research is
not pure science, and doesn�t follow what does seem to be the accepted
scientific method.

I think we�re all better off for that diversity. But, what worries me,
is a possible diminution of the natural sciences, where sloth, or
unreason, or just selfish interest, may find an excuse in ambiguous use
of the term scientific method, or lack of a determined defense of the
historical efficacy of those methods., for the publication of nonsense
camouflaged with a scientific imprimatur.

Cordially,

Michael Devereux

_______________________________________________
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
Received on Thu Jul 22 07:01:37 2004