Re: [Fis] Consilience and Structure

Malcolm

probably the question you are asking has something to do with the
(conceptual/philosophical) problem of defining what are 'relations'. If you
take a look at Heidegger's Being and Time � 17, you will find there a
discussion with Husserl's idea of 'relations' (in German: Beziehungen) as a
formal concept for all kinds of connections between things. Digns and their
'relations' are, following Heidegger, a universal characteric of all kind of
things but we should not follow from this that all relations (Beziehungen)
are necessarily of the kind of relations Heidegger calls 'reference' (in
German: Verweisung).
I quote Heidegger showing the complexity of the concept of sign:
"Among sings there are symptons, warning signals, signs of things that have
hapened lready, signs to mark something, signs by which things are
recognized; these have different ways of indicating, regardless of what may
be serving as such a sing. From such 'signs' we must distinguish traces,
residues, commemorative monuments, documents, testimony, symbols,
expressions, appearances, significations. These phenomena can be easily be
formalized because of their forml relational character; we find it
especially tempting nowadays to take such a 'relation' as a clue for
subjecting every entity to a kind of 'Interpretation' which always 'fits'
because at bottom it says nothing, no more than the facile schema of content
and form."
This sentence was published in 1927, long before semiotics (and
cybersemiotics). It can be considered as a criticism of the universal claim
of semiotics. Heidegger is making the point by making a difference between
the kind of universal kind of relation he calls 'relation' and the kind of
relation he calls 'reference'. This last one is confined to the phenomena
analyzed by Heidegger as being "ready-to-hand" i.e. to phenomena as we deal
in everyday life (also in a scientific/technical set) by using things as
tools and organizing them within a wordly environment.
The difference our retina makes could be interpreted then as a difference of
the retina that 'reacts' at the light in the sense of a 'reference' and not,
as expected, in the sense of an objective frame of reference or as a
'relation'. The reason for this is the retina has an 'internal stance' (or a
'pragmatic' way of doing with 'signs') as Koichiro would say, and that we
have both, an internal and an external stance of sings as 'relation' and as
'reference'. The question concerns them the foundational relationship
between both. Heidegger argues that although relations are universal, this
kind of universality (Koichiro's external stance) is an abstraction with
regard to the 'narrower' or 'pragmatic' view of 'reference'. Signs as
'reference' imply the kind of existential 'pragmatic' envolvement that makes
things understandable by situating them within a (familiar) wholeness of
references (and significances). I wonder if our retina is 'reacting' so to
speak automatically, within such a whole of references, before our
(scientific) mind starts making the universal reflection of sings and what
they 'mean'
cheers
Rafael

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Received on Mon Nov 8 13:15:23 2004