A number of misconceptions crept into Stan's interpretation of my
posting that I'd like to correct.
Stan is right to point out that falsification is an essential component
of any scientific theory. Unfortunately I have found myself repeatedly
reminding good scientists of this fact in recent times. I know that it
should go without saying - but it seems necessary in currently.
Newtons theory of attracting forces is falsified by Einsteins GR.
Falsification occurs because GR makes predictions that account for
phenomenon not accounted for by Newtonian gravity; in the precession of
the perihelion orbit of Mercury. That Newton's equations remain
pragmatically useful on Earth is beside the point.
The primitive I propose is not equivalent to anything in Peircian
semeiotics - though Peirce does on occasion talk in monotheist terms
that might sound similar. In fact all panpsychic theories sound similar
- they are not, in fact. Indeed, it is not at all clear that my
hypothesis qualifies as panpsychic (but I humor people that think that
it does).
The primitive is not equivalent to the common notion of observation in
quantum or classical terms - though it is the primitive by which
observation assembles in senses.
Laszlo makes the category error I observed in my earlier posting. He
does not define information in physical terms.
See an outline review of my work at http://www.what-it-all-means.com
Here is a copy of a recent abstract:
Engineering Sentience: Life, the Evolution of Senses and the
Familiar Mind
By Steven Ericsson Zenith revised at August 22, 2005 10:46 PM.
We present an explanation of experience in nature, a theory of
sentience, that describes the initiation of life, the evolution of
senses, and the construction of the familiar mind.
We view the physical construction of senses as an engineering by natural
selection against a previously unconsidered universal primitive. By
analogy, we describe the primitive as inert and primitive in the same
manner that gravity is inert and primitive. By its presence alone, it is
responsible for the introduction of complexity into the universe.
The primitive can be quantified as the value experience gives to the
survival of organisms. Physiology initiates and assembles by virtue of
the presence of this primitive alone; the nature of experience as sense
is characterized by the physiological assembly. In our model of
sentience, this primitive-of-experience is the fundamental element of
familiar high-order experiences.
In essence, we observe that it is only necessary to introduce the
presence of this primitive for a working model of life, the evolution of
senses, and the construction of the familiar mind to be constructed.
This novel view changes how we look at the phenomenal evidence and, in
particular, sees all biochemistry as the mechanics of the hypothesized
engineering of sentient structures.
The hypothesis is fully reductive and provides falsifiable predictions
that illustrate the engineering we propose.
With respect,
Steven
Stanley N. Salthe wrote:
>Commenting on Steven's posting:
>He said:
>
>
>
>>The shift between the complex and the non-complex systems of
information
>>comes from our underlying theories of nature that allow us to
interpret
>>difference. Gravity is my favorite example here where we see a clear
>>progression of interpretation from Galileo through Newton to Einstein
-
>>all founded essentially on the same observable differences.
>>
>>Falsification plays a central role in moving us from one
interpretation
>>to another - and it is because Newton's theories are falsifiable that
we
>>can readily accept Einstein. Einstein's theories explain more of the
>>observable differences - IOW "they have greater consistency with
the
>>available information."
>>
>>
> SS: One should note that all scientific theories must be falsifiable.
>If a theory is not, is not really a scientifc theory.
>
>
>
>>The theory of Evolution is informed by observable differences at a
level
>>of greater complexity - and it can be seen that science makes the same
>>mistakes as it did between Newton and Einstein. It is the underlying
>>premise that alters the interpretation of apprehended information.
>>
>>
> SS: You speak as if Newton's theory was falsified. This is not so --
>in the realm in which it is appropriate. Einstein's view is just more
>general. In a classical situation we get just as much 'information' from
>either perspective!
>
>Steven continues:
>
> > The formal metaphysical question then becomes how we analyze and
>express our apprehension and interpretation - and this is no longer a
>question of the definition of information but now one of analysis,
>communication and convention, by which we build consensus in formal
>deliberation.
>
>
>>It is in this context that my proposed quantification of and role for
a
>>primitive of experience apply - we simply cannot correctly interpret
the
>>available information without it. This premise and the formal operator
>>"experience-of" essentially add the basis of complexity to
current
>>convention and moves us toward a place for experience in our formal
models.
>>
>>
> SS: In scientific models there is usually place for a variable that
>would represent an observable, and it is here that experience inputs into
>such models. What else do you mean?
>
>
>
>>I meant rather that it is necessary to include my proposed primitive
in
>>our understanding of how complex physical structure arises in nature.
It
>>is an addition to our models that enables a new interpretation of
>>observable difference - just as, by analogy, the notion of the
curvature
>>of space time is an addition to the models of gravitation.
>>
>>
> SS: So here Steven seems to refer to the idea that observation itself
>will change the system being observed, which is often (?commonly) the
case.
>In other words he seems to be asking for a format to include observation
as
>a generative force. This is somewhat available in Peircean semiotics,
>where a triadic understanding (object - sign - interpetant, with
>interpretant connecting again to object, giving a triangle) is required.
>Here a system of interpretance co-constructs the sign (along with
>indications from the object), and, as well, constructs the interpretant.
>So, here the sign is not so much 'discovered' empirically, as constructed
>with help from observation.
>
>This view connects to Laszlo's:
>
>
>
>>I suppose the kind of question "What is information?"
requires first of
>>all an ontological consideration, moreover a "definition" of
its "quality".
>>
>>In this respect I would propose a "hermeneutic" ontology, in
which we
>>have an at least "two levels" world consists of the sign and
its context.
>>
>>In this world the information is an interpreted sign.
>>
>>
>-snip-
>
>
>>The crucial point is the interpretation. Interpretations partly
preserve
>>the sign in itself, as an individual being, but partly, at the same
time
>>consider it as the "sign of something else". Information is
the product
>>of this "double seeing" practice.
>>
>>
>-snip-
>
>
>>I suppose that this definition harmonizes with many others. The
meaning
>>(and measurement) of quantity of information depends on the
>>characterization of signs, context and interpretation.
>>
>>
>
>STAN
>
>
>
>
>
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Received on Sun Sep 18 22:36:37 2005
