[Fis] Re: What is information?

[Fis] Re: What is information?

From: Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]>
Date: Mon 17 Oct 2005 - 18:33:49 CEST

Dear Koichiro:

Thank you for your response on your conceptualization of information
from the perspective of theoretical physics. It seems that your
views could possibly overlap with Igor in the sense of the physicists
view of biological information - "function as fiction".

Because the order property of this narrative is important, I re-post
the original questions and your response. It is essential to re-re-
read these posts in order to understand my further questions, which
are appended as the last section.

Dear Kochiro:

Your post of September 29, 2005 leaves me in a state of wonder.

I really do not understand the potential relations between the
semantics, which appear to "unconceal" and the syntax, which appears
to "re-conceal," that which was unconcealed. In view of the many
issues that appear to be glued together (with lose of identity) in
your narrative, I will address only the first parts of your post.

Koichiro writes:
On Sep 29, 2005, at 6:00 AM, fis-request@listas.unizar.es wrote:
Folks,
    Apart from the definitional matter, energy and information are
intimately
related to each other.

This is a wonderful sentence. May I assume that the reference is an
abstract meta language of types? For example, a bacterium, a fruit
fly and an elephant are all of he same type, the commonality being
that the names represent living organisms.

My only concern here will be to call some attention
to the issue of information in relation to energy, I would hope.

This suggests that the issue is not of types but of tokens.
Is this issue one of existence? If not of existence, what is the
source of the potential non-definitional relation?

    Energy conceived in the first law of thermodynamics on energy
transformation is informational in precipitating a new type of energy
carrier through cohesive interactions acting among the pre-existing
energy
carriers.

May I presume that an energy carrier is an existent energy?
(And, note that energy of the first law is of a definition type, or
do I misread your intent?)
If so, is the existent energy a generic energy?

Energy transformation is informational in making a new difference.

Is the "new difference" a non-definable variable?

    A principal energy carrier met with in material processes is a
Planck's
energy quantum.

Does the view of an existent energy restrict its manifestation to
energy quantum in the "apart from definitional" matter?

Nonetheless, a Planck's energy quantum does not transform
itself within linear quantum mechanics, though it can yield a
macroscopic
coherence by way of a linear superposition of each microscopic
quantum. If
the relative time interval for the occurrence of nonlinear quantum
coherence
is limited, the likely quantum coherence to occur would be at most of a
linear type allowing only a linear superposition.

Why?

In the absence of definitions, what restricts the domain of
interactions?

In contrast, appearance or
emergence of a new quantum of interest may be expected from nonlinear
quantum coherence of a lasting type.

Quantum or quanta?
Are "lasting type"s of quantum durable? If so, how does one see the
manifestation of the "lasting types?"

Could you post an experimental description of:

"The citric acid cycle running in the presence of temperature
gradients alone
without recourse to enzymes of biological origin is internally
coherent only
nonlinearly, which Atsushi Nemoto and myself observed in my lab."

This experimental result should be of great interest to the
individuals interested in biological information.

Cheers

Jerry LR Chandler

On Oct 7, 2005, at 1:54 AM, fis-request@listas.unizar.es wrote:
>
> From: "Koichiro Matsuno" <CXQ02365@nifty.com>
> Date: October 6, 2005 7:52:19 AM EDT
> To: <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Re: What is information ?
>
>
>
> Dear Jerry,
>
> Your remarks are almost always hard to respond in a proper
> manner. A principal reason for this rests upon me, and not upon
> you. I have been constantly referring to situated logic, instead of
> propositional logic. Classical sciences are a kingdom of
> propositional logic, especially classical one, while quantum
> sciences also have some affinity toward a particular type of
> propositional logic known as quantum logic. In contrast, situated
> logic comes to the fore once the relationship between the context
> and the contextual elements is simultaneously focused upon.
> Identification of the context requires the act of measurement, and
> situated logic is conditioned on the act of measurement. If
> propositional logic is the only rule of the game in town, most of
> what I have said may remain irrelevant. Instead, if there happens
> to be a case for conditional statements to survive, situated logic
> may have some room for its own survival.
>
> Either good or bad, the distinction between types and tokens is
> not crisp in situated logic, depending upon how the context for
> both could be conceived of in the first place. A most defensive
> strategy here must be to make differences in tokens ubiquitous, as
> dismissing a sturdy problem of how different types could emerge, as
> much as possible. For instance, energy of the first law of
> thermodynamics is a name assigned to something which preserves its
> quantity while being subject to its transformation in quality.
> Consequently, a new difference arising from energy transformation
> is a "non-definitional variable", asking a new nametag only after
> the event.
>
> In this regard, occurrence of a Planck's quantum is very
> peculiar in that both the context (the particle-like nature) and
> the contextual elements (the wave-like nature) appear
> simultaneously as bare empirical phenomena, instead of as logic. It
> may correspond to appearance of a new type in the sense that it
> remains robust even in presence of adverse disturbances. It would
> not be required to assign a new nametag for distinction every time
> de novo disturbances are imposed. One unique aspect with a Planck's
> quantum is its coherence linearly superposed.
>
> As following along almost the similar line, one may expect to
> have a nonlinear quantum coherence as pointing to appearance of a
> further new type if it remains robust. This will be a matter of
> totally empirical or experimental issue as much as appearance of a
> Planck's quantum has been so. Once the robustness is empirically
> guaranteed, one may wish to apply to it propositional logic,
> situated logic or whatever else depending upon the situation.
>
> The citric acid cycle which we thought as an example showing an
> operation of a quantum as a heat engine exhibiting a nonlinear
> coherence is exclusively empirical and experimental (Matsuno, K &
> Nemoto, A. 2005, "Quantum as a heat engine: the physics of
> intensities unique to the origins of life" Phys. Life Rev vol 4 now
> online on Elsevier's ScienceDirect) What is informational here is
> to come up with something surprising from the participatory
> perspective.
>
> I may have touched upon some of your concern only cursorily.
>
> Cheers,
> Koichiro
>
>

OK. Now for extensions to the threads of how the concept of
information is related to theoretical physics.

KM:

> Your remarks are almost always hard to respond in a proper
> manner. A principal reason for this rests upon me, and not upon
> you. I have been constantly referring to situated logic, instead of
> propositional logic.

JLRC:

As a biochemist along with the chemical sciences in general, I am
forced to work in a poly-modal logic. It is a very peculiar logic
developed by chemists to explain the natural of numbers, the natural
numbers also called the atomic numbers. As such, I agree that we are
working from different logical bases, but the difference is not
between propositional logic and situational logic, rather between the
logic that accounts for the emergence of life and the logic of
continuity.

Would it be fair to say that Igor and you both presuppose that
"continuity" is essential and intrinsic to physical philosophy and
hence to the universe in general?

Is it a consequence of such a philosophy that the natural numbers,
the atomic numbers, are merely third-class citizens in such a
philosophy, merely trivial markers of metrics that are of no greater
importance than any other transcendental or surreal number?

KM:

>> Classical sciences are a kingdom of propositional logic,
>> especially classical one, while quantum sciences also have some
>> affinity toward a particular type of propositional logic known as
>> quantum logic.

JLRC:

I apologize for contradicting you, but, it is my view that classical
science developed from poly-modal logics intrinsic to natural
language descriptions of identity, matter, space and time as
"abstract objects of concern". The narrative phrase, "Classical
sciences are a kingdom of propositional logic, especially classical
one" is restricted to, constrained to, limited to, of concern to,
related to a tiny fraction of science, the science of motion in space
and time, is it not?

> In contrast, situated logic comes to the fore once the relationship
> between the context and the contextual elements is simultaneously
> focused upon. Identification of the context requires the act of
> measurement, and situated logic is conditioned on the act of
> measurement. If propositional logic is the only rule of the game in
> town, most of what I have said may remain irrelevant. Instead, if
> there happens to be a case for conditional statements to survive,
> situated logic may have some room for its own survival.
>

Again, I apologize for contradicting you, but the narrative you have
constructed is restricted to, constrained to, limited to, of concern
to, related to a tiny fraction of science, the science of dynamic
measurements.

Stative measurements do not require the invention of a dualistic
narratives upon the independent variables of direction and time,
such that the variables are intimately co-mingled (interlaced,
intertwined, interconnected) such that the identities of the
variables become indistinguishable.

  The poly-modal logic of chemistry is grounded in multiple mood
statements. This suggests that the issue is not the nature of the
logic invoked, but the meaning of the concept of variable in
mathematics and physics. Igor seems to concur with your position.

>
> Either good or bad, the distinction between types and tokens is
> not crisp in situated logic, depending upon how the context for
> both could be conceived of in the first place.

I agree with you that it is a question of how the context (the
numerical environment) is conceptualized.

This appears to be a serious flaw in situated logic, does it not?

The natural numbers of the atomic numbers are used as either tokens
or types in the poly-modal language of a cell and in the ordinary
language of everyday communication. The crispness of such usage is
amply demonstrated by the distinction between such logical objects as
gold, lead and silver and as atomic numbers, by the distinction base
pairs in DNA as unique positions, by the distinction between genes as
sources of biological function, by the distinction between cells, by
the distinction between individuals and by boundless numbers of other
denominations.

> A most defensive strategy here must be to make differences in
> tokens ubiquitous, as dismissing a sturdy problem of how different
> types could emerge, as much as possible. For instance, energy of
> the first law of thermodynamics is a name assigned to something
> which preserves its quantity while being subject to its
> transformation in quality. Consequently, a new difference arising
> from energy transformation is a "non-definitional variable", asking
> a new nametag only after the event.

The phrase " a non-definitional variable" is a novel contribution to
the mathematics of physics. I have no idea what you are trying to
communicate. It would be helpful to have other examples of " a non-
definitional variable" in mathematics and science.

Is the issue that is bothering you the necessity to tokenize
continuity? Does this issue emerge from the situational tokens of
"quanta"?

Is this logic enmeshed in Russell's denotational fallacy?

   The poly-modal nature of biological / biochemical logic does not
encounter this challenge to existential identity. Why not? Is it
because the natural numbers allow the construction of consistent
empirical narratives that are consistently tokenized, consistently
named, consistently inferred from?

Does the issue of a "non-definitional variable" pose an existential
threat to a logical conceptualization of quantum types? (I do not
understand why one desires to interchange natural existential
variables for abstract existential variables; what concept am I
missing?)

>
> In this regard, occurrence of a Planck's quantum is very
> peculiar in that both the context (the particle-like nature) and
> the contextual elements (the wave-like nature) appear
> simultaneously as bare empirical phenomena, instead of as logic.

A very curious sentence. Do you wish to imply that such a profound
distinction between a noun (context) and an adjective derived from
the same root (contextual)? I can not rationalize this sentence
in terms of quantum logic, can I? :-) :-) :-)

> It may correspond to appearance of a new type in the sense that it
> remains robust even in presence of adverse disturbances. It would
> not be required to assign a new nametag for distinction every time
> de novo disturbances are imposed. One unique aspect with a Planck's
> quantum is its coherence linearly superposed.
>
> As following along almost the similar line, one may expect to
> have a nonlinear quantum coherence as pointing to appearance of a
> further new type if it remains robust. This will be a matter of
> totally empirical or experimental issue as much as appearance of a
> Planck's quantum has been so. Once the robustness is empirically
> guaranteed, one may wish to apply to it propositional logic,
> situated logic or whatever else depending upon the situation.
>

May I propose a "gedanken experiment"? This experiment is motivated
by the intense intensity of concern with the distinction between
token and type.

Suppose that one wished to create a "physics of mysticism", a magical
world:
where any logic worked, a world
where everyone's thought was logically true, a world
where the concept of information was useless.

  (Please note, I am only imagining a "gedanken experiment", I do not
wish to offend those with a spiritual bent!)

I assert that one could NOT create such a physics from the natural
numbers.

Would it be possible to create a "physics of mysticism" from the
mathematical concept of continuity?

If such a "physics of mysticism" was created from the mathematics of
continuity, could you propose a theory of information that it would
support?

> I may have touched upon some of your concern only cursorily.
>

You have touched on my concerns. Very deeply.

Is it possible that the abstractions are deeper than either you or I
imagine?

Cheers

Jerry LR Chandler

Research Professor
George Mason University
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study

>
> Cheers,
> Koichiro
>
>
Received on Mon Oct 17 18:40:08 2005


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