[Fis] First Things First (Old Session)

FIS Friends --

I am sorry that I have not been available to participate in the
discussion on definitions. Other projects beckon, but with the
promise of helping with the larger issues of FIS.

However, instead of having participated in the "definitions" thread,
let me reiterate what I said in Paris in the two meetings. I have the
rather strong impression that there is no definition of information
that will be the "one-size-fits-all" that was implied in most of the
discussion.

When you are dealing with a concept this primitive and expressions so
broad, you find that the diversity is there for good reasons. The
diverse notions come from irreconcilable ontologies (a proposition
that seems provable with current theoretical tools, by the way).

What should happen in cases like this, is that you set the formal
ontology from which that definition will be derived by understanding
the context first. Utility of definitions always comes from crispness
of purpose.

So the question is: why do we want a definition? I believe the answer
will trifurcate based on the three interest groups in FIS. One group
believes the purpose of FIS is to host scholarly dialog. Most members
of this group have pet theories the dialog helps refine, or at least
it identifies the weaker arguments. Those in this club seek
definitions simply because it makes the discussion easier. Or rather
it makes it possible in the first place.

A second group believes that information is such a pervasive notion
and its mechanics are so bound up in everything that it deserves a
sort of superdiscipline or pandiscipline. These folks have it harder
because they seek the one true definition. Good luck, I say.

I'm in a third group, which seems to wax and wane depending on what
promising concepts parade across the stage. I believe that we need
something more than a rebundling and synthesis of what we have. I
think we need a (new) science of information and that at least some
elements of it will display new abstractions and mechanisms that
aren't familiar, aren't accidents of history.

This is by far the more difficult challenge and one I would like to
see it more prominently in the FIS agenda. The first question to be
asked is: What is the problem we have with the way things are now?
What problem will go away if we have such a new science?

If we know that, we know a lot, including what shape a successful
definition of information will have. (I will politely suggest the
other groups need to ask a similar question about situation; it is
the only way to address basic ontological mismatches.)

In Paris, I presented such a problem, together with some tentative
mechanics and such. I will be rewriting that presentation as a sort
of manifesto for this agenda, call it the FIS(3) agenda if you wish.
I believe if we are to really have an impact, key statements on this
matter (definitions of the problem and information, solutions) need
to be packagable so that a non-specialist can understand it. You can
read such a popular report of the FIS meeting here:

<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/goranson1>

I think the readership of that is a few million, probably more.

I will not use this message (already long) to outline a manifesto. I
am still struggling myself on how ambitious the agenda would be. I am
negotiating with some possible collaborators in this scoping. I have
promised Wolfgang to submit it, perhaps in parts, to his online
neoFIS journal.

I see three main problems that the new science would help to resolve.
The first is the one I presented in Paris: the vertical flow through
abstraction layers of complex systems. I know something about this
problem.

We cannot escape the second problem, which is that pesky matter of
entropy and encoding. We have to live with mechanisms that work, but
it must be obvious that there is no satisfactory "stretch" of the
thermodynamic notion. Some stretches DO work (forgive the pun), but
in limited domains and with inelegant associations. A new science
would introduce the simple elegance we all suspect must be there. I
myself see a continuity between Einstein's revolution in situating
physical notions, Freud's in situating social ones (though his
mechanics are weak) and what we must do in the general domain whose
"situation" spans physics through societal concepts and fashions.

And there may be a third problem in the scope. I believe it
inevitable that we revisit logic. Many have concluded this as well.
(I've mentioned Barwise before.) Alternative logics already exist in
fields that presently seem remote from science - in fact this is the
point, they seem remote from science precisely because their logics
are so different. I suggest we consider artistic and humanity-centric
"logics" also, as we hunt for tools, and be open to a scope that
includes internal conceptual mechanics: desires, intuitions,
emotions, creativity.

Best, Ted

-- 
__________
Ted Goranson
Sirius-Beta
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