Steven, in the posting below, said:
> Logic has wrestled with the problem for a long time and failed (e.g.,
>Peirce, Carnap et al.), but perhaps it is in the Foundations of Logic that
>new ground can be broken.
I agree with ths statement, and have been plugging the idea that one
way to go, following a suggestion of Peirce's is to work on constructiong a
'logic of vagueness'. It is clear that while our models of the world are
as fully explicit as possible (thereby modeling the world as mechanistic),
the world itself is to one degree or other vague.
STAN
> Dear Pedro,
>
> If living organisms are molecular machines according to principles we
>currently understand then there is no explanation of experience according
>to current "science of the artificial."
>
> As Goranson says, "Most scientists assume that the basics of science
are
>known." The sciences of the artificial essentially adhere to the view
>that our physical models are complete and that, where there lies
>difficulty, explanations with the same essential properties as existent
>theories will be available.
>
> Roger Penrose has been pointing out the inadequacy of this position for a
>decade and a half. As recently as January, in the journal Nature, he says
>"... I perhaps have enough of the physicist's arrogance about me to
>believe that a physical 'theory of everything' should at least contain the
>seeds of an explanation of the phenomenon of consciousness. It seems to me
>that this phenomenon is such a fundamental one that it cannot be simply an
>accidental concomitant of the complexity of brain action. ..." (full
text:
>http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/TOE.htm).
I agree.
>
> I have only recently entered the fray. In my discussions across
>disciplines I encounter three positions that violate the clear principles
>of good science.
>
> 1. Experience is not a phenomenon of the world and therefore
>requires no explanation.
> 2. Experience is an emergent phenomenon of the world that require no
>further explanation.
> 3. Experience is a phenomenon of the world that simply cannot be
>explained.
>
> None of these positions can be formalized since none can be quantified,
>none can be verified and certainly none can be falsified. It is not
>simply that the explanation is missing from physics and needs to be
>included in physical theories - the explanation must also find its way
>into the Foundations of Information Science and the Foundations of
>Mathematics.
>
> Logic has wrestled with the problem for a long time and failed (e.g.,
>Peirce, Carnap et al.), but perhaps it is in the Foundations of Logic that
>new ground can be broken.
>
> The reason that these positions remain and are widely accepted comes from
>a deeply rooted conservatism and a misguided belief that we are at the
>pinnacle of our scientific achievement - it seems to me that any such
>belief is, inevitably, the pinnacle of our ignorance.
>
> The motivations for these violations in the USA are especially
>unfortunate and I have discovered over the past two years that one of the
>unspoken reasons they persist here is that many scientists and
>mathematicians seek to "leave room for God."
>
> In raising research funding I have to be careful not to offend
>individuals with sincere beliefs in the traditional mysteries - and I
>sincerely mean no offense - but there really can be no room in science for
>such an allowance. We must follow science wherever it may lead and allow
>it to inform faith, defining any notion we may have of God accordingly.
>
> For these reasons, progress may be impossible in the USA - even in my
>beloved California.
>
> With respect,
> Steven
>
> --
> Dr. Steven Ericsson Zenith
> SEMEIOSIS RESEARCH
> Silicon Valley, California
> http://www.semeiosis.com
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Pedro Marijuan wrote:
>
>Dear colleagues,
>
> Trying to sum up the themes of my yesterday message (in this my second
>post of the week), the emphasis might be put in the insufficient
>theoretical distinction, real conflation, between:
>
> INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS
>
> PROCESSUAL LIFE CYCLES
>
> As a matter of fact, the latter have been caught under the wings of the
>former as one of the core ideas of the "sciences of the
artificial" (eg,
>in whole disciplines such as artificial intel., cognitive psych.,
>artificial life, molecular computing...). Ideas and philosophies of
>information have been imported and circulated into the "sciences of
the
>natural" without much trouble --aren't living organisms but
"molecular
>machines"? Even more, most of the rhetorics under the banner of
>information society, knowledge engineering, entrepreneurial information,
>etc., is also built around deliberate confusion between the two realms
>--aren't we but info processing systems?, why couldn't computers be
>conscious?
>
> Clarifying the relationships along the above informational blurred
>boundary may be important ---perhaps by theorizing along the processual
>characteristics of life cycles we could advance response to some of the
>fundamental questions proposed by Ted about the fis agenda (his report at
><http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/goranson1>
deserves very
>careful reading).
>
> greetings,
>
> Pedro
>
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>
>
>
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Received on Sat Nov 26 22:23:45 2005
