Dear Pedro and all,
what does it mean "aren't we but..." (or is this or that "but"...)? Some
weeks ago I suggested a similarity between two different levels (the social
and the molecular). Loets answer was that "we can make an analogy among
almost every system. This may serve us a heuristics." Of course, the
formulation "something is nothing but..." is reductionistic and as such it
aims at deleting any kind (?) of analogical heuristics that starts by
acknowledging different levels of discourse according to different level of
the phenomena at stake.
I am not defending any method based on "analogies" just because analogies
do not themselves pay attention to the phenomena as such. This is, I think,
what Pedro is saying, when he speaks about the "deliberate confusion
between the two realms" (the social and the molecular). Sometimes it is
better to forget the formulation "nothing but" Otherwise we could say that
this group is, for instance, "nothing but" an energetic exchange between
our computers of whatever...
One main aspect of a science of information or, as I prefer to say, of a
message theory, is to make ourselves clear that messages as "causes" have
implications (or "effects") that go beyond the nature of the sender. This
is the "basic law" of such a new science "new" with regard to the
conception "causa aequat effectum" as analized by Peter Fleissner some
years ago. What we do not have is, I agree with Ted Goranson, a theory that
explains how (and what kind) messages interact also according to different
time schedules. But it is, at least, an advace if we are aware that we need
such a theory (or a cluster of theories) and that the concept of message is
at the core of such a theory. It is already at the core of Shannon's theory.
kind regards
Rafael
Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro
Hochschule der Medien (HdM) University of Applied Sciences, Wolframstr. 32,
70191 Stuttgart, Germany
Private: Redtenbacherstr. 9, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany
E-Mail: rafael@capurro.de; capurro@hdm-stuttgart.de
Voice Stuttgart: + 49 - 711 - 25706 - 182
Voice private: + 49 - 721 - 98 22 9 - 22 (Fax: -21)
Homepage: www.capurro.de
Homepage ICIE: http://icie.zkm.de
Homepage IRIE: http://www.i-r-i-e.net
----- Original Message ----- From: "Pedro Marijuan" <marijuan@unizar.es>
To: <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Sent: Friday, November 25, 2005 11:32 AM
Subject: [Fis] Molecular-Experimental sciences (II)
>Dear colleagues,
>
>Trying to sum up the themes of my yesterday message (in this my second
>post of the week), the emphasis might be put in the insufficient
>theoretical distinction, real conflation, between:
>
>INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS
>
>PROCESSUAL LIFE CYCLES
>
>As a matter of fact, the latter have been caught under the wings of the
>former as one of the core ideas of the "sciences of the
artificial" (eg,
>in whole disciplines such as artificial intel., cognitive psych.,
>artificial life, molecular computing...). Ideas and philosophies of
>information have been imported and circulated into the "sciences of
the
>natural" without much trouble --aren't living organisms but
"molecular
>machines"? Even more, most of the rhetorics under the banner of
>information society, knowledge engineering, entrepreneurial information,
>etc., is also built around deliberate confusion between the two realms
>--aren't we but info processing systems?, why couldn't computers be
conscious?
>
>Clarifying the relationships along the above informational blurred
>boundary may be important ---perhaps by theorizing along the processual
>characteristics of life cycles we could advance response to some of the
>fundamental questions proposed by Ted about the fis agenda (his report at
><http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/goranson1>
deserves very
>careful reading).
>
>greetings,
>
>Pedro
>
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Received on Mon Nov 28 11:06:05 2005
