I will use up my second posting for the week with the below, as it is
getting rather long.
Kevin said:
> Take the recent conversation on vagueness with Stan and Loet. My first
>reaction to reading sentences like "I am not as vague as I was when I
was
>a blastodisc…" was to suspect a category mistake: certainly it
is
>expressions (e.g. utterances) that can be vague or not vague, not things
>(e.g. organisms). But my first reaction is an old prejudice, a mindset
>that is less useful, based on this form / substance distinction-- that
>vagueness is something linguistic. But just as the vagueness of an
>utterance is something only meaningful as it emerges into a context, into
>a situation in the world, so too, I wonder: could we take vagueness as
>example of something that hovers on the edge of the logical and the
>material?
>
> This is the crux of it. To take a phrase from Gordana's paper (in Mind
>and Machines 2003), we are dealing with Theory Materialized.
I will here repeat my point that Nature, our model of the World, is a
construct of models and equations based on definitions -- fundametally a
linguistic entity. It has been, for the most part, constructed using
standard two valued logic (hardly even fuzzy logic!), and, indeed. has been
made as fully explicit as possible. One difference between the World and
Nature is that Nature is logical, and, therefore, mechanistic. The World
cannot be inferred to be logical, and certainly is, in the sense of
responding differently to different inquiry about it, not fixed, but,
rather, generative. To be generative it must be vague, in the sense of
indefinite.
So, YES, I would say that vagueness / indefiniteness may well be a
property "on the edge" of the logical and the material.
In regard to the concept of "theory materialized", this I
think can be
found in at least two places. (1) In scientific experiments, with all their
controls, (2) In the mechanized computation of computers.
Replying to Jerry:
>Stan (Digest 486) writes:
>"It is clear that while our models of the world are as fully explicit
as
>possible (thereby modeling the world as mechanistic),the world itself is
>to one degree or other vague."
>JLRC response:
>I do not concur that are models of the world are "as fully explicit
as
>possible." The richness of mathematical explication is simply beyond
>imagination. Indeed, science remains in its infancy, particularly the
>chemical sciences.
SS: I did not mean that science has succeeding in making the most
fully explicit models that might be POSSIBLE. Rather I meant that the ideal
in constructing scientific models is to make them as explicit as possible
given the tools at hand. This presumably serves to enhance the
technological usefulness of scientific discoveries, which goal would not be
served by, e.g., going beyond, say, three decimal places of precision. I
don't believe I have seen a scientific model using fuzzy logic, for example
(other than in systems science).
>Perhaps you read much to much into physical theories? And the
>intractability of continuous dynamics?
>The assertion that:"the world itself is to one degree or other
vague"�is
>gratuitous philosophy and appears to run counter to the history of
>science, particularly the chemical sciences.
SS: Well, let me see: (1) any experimental observations are bounded by
constructed initial and boundary conditions, as well as surrounded by
controls. Change any of these and the results will differ. Where is Nature
here? (2) Where, for example, do we set cutoffs, like when do we decide
that an observed chemical reaction is completed? If we change the
observational scale we will get a different answer to this. (3) And, just
generally, if we observe any phenomenon with a new approach we get new
results. Nature seems boundlessly productive, ready to give us an answer no
matter to what question we can devise. The generativity of natural
situations is a sign of its vagueness. We can never anticipate every
possibility, as we CAN do with a mechanism. (4) Consider an organism -
where is it? As it moves about we cannot locate its exact postion, down to
the flowing of its hairs or the jigging of its flesh. Consider a wave.
Where is it? The positions of these things are cloudlike -- therefore,
vague.
>Stan, if my memory serves me correctly, you were educated as a chemist.
SS: Actually a biologist.
>May I ask you a question? From your philosophical perspective, and from
>the perspective of mathematical philosophy that numbers are abstractions,
>and from the success of the atomic numbers in providing an organization
>framework for chemical calculations, how do you distinguish among the
>concepts of number, matter and identity?
SS: A very deep question. Approaching from what seems the more
general idea first, philosophically MATTER is delayed energy, stickiness
and delay, obstruction to the flow of energy. It was left behind as space
expanded in accelerated fashion in the Big Bang. In contrast, NUMBER
concerns the size of distinct collections of matter -- most primitively,
just: one, some, many. Finally, IDENTITY is based in the uniqueness of
configurations of matter. As to the "succuss of atomic numbers" in
characterizing basic kinds of matter as a guide to chemistry practice, your
implied point is that element definitions are not vague but extremely
precise. I agree that for practical purposes the supposition that elements
are collections of exactly identical particles has been a helpful notion.
But suppose we were to take seriously a switch from integers to real
numbers in describing elements. Ae you willing to assert that an element
would show itself as, e,g.,13.00000000000...000...infinity? Even if you
would opt for that, where IS any individual of this element at this moment?
That question points at quantum mechanics, whose basic notion, the wave
function, is 'exactly' vague.
STAN
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Received on Wed Nov 30 21:43:36 2005
