At 09:59 AM 2006/02/12, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
> > In summary -- testable hypotheses -- testable, testable, testable.
> > Without that, we have at best distinctions with no pragmatic
> > difference. That means no information.
>
>Dear John:
>
>Yes, this is fine with me as long as "testable" does not mean
returning to
>the ontological assumptions about an external "reality" against
which one
>has to test. The "reality" which one assumes in psychological
systems
>(Cogito) or social systems (cogitatum) is not of that nature; it is not
res
>extensa.
Sorry, Loet, but I really don't know what you mean by that. If reality or
nature or whatever is a social construction, then we are testing against
reality or nature or whatever. If it is not, then we are testing against
something else. If external reality is a social construction, then it
exists. I assume that whatever it is that can surprise us in tests is
external reality. Certainly what we construct can surprise us. My
concern is that we don't trivially test against what must be the case.
I honestly don't know how to construct the situation you seem to be
proposing in a consistent way, so I probably haven't responded to
you in a way that you approve of. Basically, the only construction
that I can see that is both coherent and consistent is that there is
no external reality, or internal one either. Their is just reality, which
we are a part of. The problem then is to separate reality into parts
that are epistemologically relevant. There is evidence, and there are
hypotheses. We test hypotheses against evidence. If there are
disagreements about evidence, then we need to test hypotheses
about what we thought was evidence. If we can't test these, then
there is nothing to argue about. The distinction that you are trying
to make seems to me to fall into this last class, and consequently,
on the Pragamtic Maxim, it makes no difference to meaning. if
you want to talk that way, fine with me, but don't fool yourself into
thinking you are saying something substantive. You are just indicating
by a style of discourse that you fit in with a certain manner of thinking
that has a certain history. There is really nothing to that that is
substantive or testable except that you do fit into that style. It is
sort of like being Muslim.
>This does not preclude that we may be able to construct tests, for example,
>for Markov properties of the distribution, etc., but much depends then on
>the operationalization and the theory of measurement. The epistemic
objects
>have to be constructed. Unlike biology, the social sciences cannot proceed
>irreflexively in this respect because they can no longer assume a
"nature"
>out there.
Sorry, again I do not see why. can you give me a clear example that
clearly differs from the non social sciences? Are you saying that there is
no social reality? If so, how could it be the subject of anything, let alone
science? I am unclear what you mean by 'irreflexively'. Aren't we biological
and physical too? We can change our biological and physical parametres,
so that can't be the difference. Of course all measurements depend on
the operationalization and theory of measurement (see Mach, for example
on these topics in physics). I am unclear what you mean by epistemic
objects being constructed. Do you mean that we have to find some way to
decide what to measure? If not, what different (testable) are you proposing?
>"Nature" as a given implies the Leibnizian assumption, as we
agreed in a
>previous exchange. We are no longer considering an order which was given
(in
>the revelation), but an order which is emerging on the basis of
interaction
>and recursion/incursion.
Nature as a given seems to me to have nothing to do with the
current discussion. I don't see why you think it does. Nature
changes constantly, whether we are involved or not. Some things
stay the same though, or else science would be impossible. Or
do you think that what is special about social phenomena is
that there are no interesting things that are relatively constant?
That would be an interesting and testable position.
>For example, in a relatively straightforward study with Nienke Oomes I
>studied the emergence of the European Monetary System during the 1980s and
>the 1990s. We could show when in the early 1990s the Markov property
became
>a better predictor than the assumption of independent development of
>European currencies which co-evolved with the German mark. Thus, one is
>sometimes able to test hypotheses against each other.
>
>Similarly, in a study with Koen Frenken we could show that the DC4
>functioned as the dominant design in aircraft development rather than the
>DC3. These were relatively simple operationalizations. The
>operationalization of a meaning-processing system would be much more
>complex.
Again, I am unclear what your point is. Do you mean that if we did a study
in some other way the DC4 (basically not successful) would not have been
the dominant design in aircraft development rather than the DC3 (hugely
successful, and therefore not much reason to improve on)? Would this
alternative perspective have changed what the engineers did, and what
their reasons were? St Aquinas said that even God couldn't change
history. Are you making social scientists greater than God?
Cheers,
John
Professor John Collier collierj@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031
http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/index.html
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Received on Sun Feb 12 12:35:52 2006
