Dear all,
Can't we just consider ethics as a glue of the society as a system. If to
look for an analogue in non-social domains, then any action from inside or
outside the system disrupting the system is "unethical" from perspective of
that very system. Thus eating proteins is "unethical" from perspective of
proteins, because its an end to their existence :-). Behaviour of cancer
cells might be conisdered unethical from a viewpoint of an entire organism.
In a same way criminal or unethical behavior of members in our societies
lead to social, economical and psychological problems like insecure or
unsafe environment, distrust leading to disintegration of social bonds, etc.
As a system, society has means (analog to immune system) to get rid of an
unethical" elements by isolating or disintegrating them - which may seem
unethical" from a standpoint of those elements... Still, when "unethical"
elements start to prevail, society either changes to some other form of
existence (history, history!..), or disintegrates and then bond again to a
new form/structure of society, because elements may not be able to exist if
they are not parts of something ensuring the quality of their existence...
Best wishes
Viktoras
-------Original Message-------
From: Rafael Capurro
Date: 04/21/06 10:57:42
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Fw: [Fis] The Identity of Ethics
From: Rafael Capurro
To: Jerry LR Chandler (by way of PedroMarijuan <marijuan@unizar.es>)
Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2006 5:58 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] The Identity of Ethics
Dear Jerry and all,
Morality is a (human) fact, not different from, say, the existence of
chemical reactions that follow special 'rules'. We say in German that
Chemistry works" ("die Chemie stimmt") when we spontaneously make
friends/make love (See also Goethe's "Wahlverwandschaften").
Of course, I am not saying that the specifity of moral imperatives can be
deduced from natural phenomena whatsoever. I am just 'justifying' the
existence of a specific form of human reflection called ethics that has to
do explicitly with the moral phenomenon, I.e. With norms and values that
rule human action in a specific community.
These norms and values can be descriptive analyzed (no different in
principle as when you analyze a chemical substance and its reactions with
other ones), what we call "descriptive ethics."
We distinguish it from a "normative ethics" in which we tentatively analize
the form and content of such systems of morals in order to justify/change
them (or not) and so in order to give ourselves reasons for our actions.
That we are able to give ourselves reasons for our actions, I.e. That we do
not just act according to "unchangable" laws of nature but that we are open
to possibilities of action makes the specificity of human action and its
moral" character.
In case these possibilities take place within the context of modern digital
communication (Internet and the like) we speak of "information ethics"
(similarly to "medical ethics" in the case of situations in which the
physician/patient/society are involved regarding health). In other words, we
ask for an ethical foundation of our decisions within a digital
communication environment. But in a broader sense, we can say that
information ethics' deals with norms and values of (human) communication in
different media. In this sense we speak for instance of library ethics,
(mass) media ethics etc. Of course, the ethics of scientific communication
belong to information ethics to, concerning not only, for instance,
plagiarism, but the very idea of sharing our (scientific) ideas with others
(which include some kind of "communism of ideas" that interferes sometimes
with the (moral/legal) rules of, say, copyright regime(S).
The question you state about the genesis of moral (not ethical!) behavior is
a key issue in ethical thinking for centuries (I say: moral behaviour,
because this is the phenomenon we want to study, "ethical behavior" being
the reflection upon it: the question about the genesis of "ethical behavior"
is not (basically) different from the question of any other kind of
scientific behavior": why do we do science? For pragmatical (survival)
purposes? For the seek of truth? ... In the case of ethics as reflection of
morality, we start with this kind of reflection whe we have problems with
moral rules. Ethics is a symptom. But this is a broad field of study that I
cannot deal with now).
So, what is the genesis of moral behavior? Why do we "feel" obliged to do
the good? Is this the right question to start with? (as you see I am asking
now two different kinds a questions, an ethical and a "metaethical"
(linguistic) one). We can start with the "fact" of human will (this is what
Kant and Schopenhauer...) do, by saying that reflection (ethics) is not a
(enough) motivation for moral action (as intellectualists believe). Kant
believed that human reason (seeking vor universal laws) is not only of
theoretical but also of practical kind. Given the fact (!) that we are
capable of doing science (I.e. Of looking for the universal) means, when we
reflect it upon our actions, that we are "compelled" to act also
universallistically" which is what Kant calls, as you know, the categorical
imperative. How does this idea of universality (or of the formality of the
categorical imperative) fits with the "locality" of moral systems/norms and
their evolution? And how do we "apply" the Kantian rule to specific
situations?
Today we are maybe less Kantians as we think because our belief in human
reason and its universality is not so strong as two centuries ago. We have
some good reasons (theoretial and historical ones) for being sceptical about
it.
But not only this, we have in the field of ethics other traditions than
Western one which makes us more "humble" with regards to our foundational
ambitions. In a way, this is less a negative aspect as a positive one
because it shows is the openness of human cultural evolution and the kind of
ethical "indeterminacy" of human reason. But why should our action and its
foundation be less complex than, say, the life of a molecule?
Another (older) (Western) tradition of ethics states that the task of ethics
is not primarily the fundation of morals but the "design" of good life (ars
vitae). What we try to reflect in the information field is the idea (the
ideas) of what this means in the beginning century. This kind of ethical
thinking is less "normative" and more "optional".
cheers
Rafael
Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro
Hochschule der Medien (HdM) University of Applied Sciences, Wolframstr. 32,
70191 Stuttgart, Germany
Private: Redtenbacherstr. 9, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany
E-Mail: rafael@capurro.de; capurro@hdm-stuttgart.de
Voice Stuttgart: + 49 - 711 - 25706 - 182
Voice private: + 49 - 721 - 98 22 9 - 22 (Fax: -21)
Homepage: www.capurro.de
Homepage ICIE: http://icie.zkm.de
Homepage IRIE: http://www.i-r-i-e.net
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Received on Fri Apr 21 12:24:13 2006
