Dear Viktoras and all,
Does it mean that those who survive are by definition "ethical"?
The strongest and fittest organisms are those whose behavior sets the
norm of what is good?
Do I read it correctly?
Best wishes,
Gordana
Viktoras Didziulis wrote:
> Dear all,
>
> Can't we just consider ethics as a glue of the society as a system. If to
> look for an analogue in non-social domains, then any action from inside
or
> outside the system disrupting the system is "unethical" from
perspective of
> that very system. Thus eating proteins is "unethical" from
perspective of
> proteins, because its an end to their existence :-). Behaviour of cancer
> cells might be conisdered unethical from a viewpoint of an entire
organism.
> In a same way criminal or unethical behavior of members in our societies
> lead to social, economical and psychological problems like insecure or
> unsafe environment, distrust leading to disintegration of social bonds,
etc.
> As a system, society has means (analog to immune system) to get rid of an
> unethical" elements by isolating or disintegrating them - which may
seem
> unethical" from a standpoint of those elements... Still, when
"unethical"
> elements start to prevail, society either changes to some other form of
> existence (history, history!..), or disintegrates and then bond again to
a
> new form/structure of society, because elements may not be able to exist
if
> they are not parts of something ensuring the quality of their
existence...
>
> Best wishes
> Viktoras
>
> -------Original Message-------
>
> From: Rafael Capurro
> Date: 04/21/06 10:57:42
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: Fw: [Fis] The Identity of Ethics
>
> From: Rafael Capurro
> To: Jerry LR Chandler (by way of PedroMarijuan
<marijuan@unizar.es>)
> Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2006 5:58 PM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] The Identity of Ethics
>
> Dear Jerry and all,
>
> Morality is a (human) fact, not different from, say, the existence of
> chemical reactions that follow special 'rules'. We say in German that
> Chemistry works" ("die Chemie stimmt") when we
spontaneously make
> friends/make love (See also Goethe's "Wahlverwandschaften").
>
> Of course, I am not saying that the specifity of moral imperatives can be
> deduced from natural phenomena whatsoever. I am just 'justifying' the
> existence of a specific form of human reflection called ethics that has
to
> do explicitly with the moral phenomenon, I.e. With norms and values that
> rule human action in a specific community.
>
> These norms and values can be descriptive analyzed (no different in
> principle as when you analyze a chemical substance and its reactions with
> other ones), what we call "descriptive ethics."
>
> We distinguish it from a "normative ethics" in which we
tentatively analize
> the form and content of such systems of morals in order to justify/change
> them (or not) and so in order to give ourselves reasons for our actions.
> That we are able to give ourselves reasons for our actions, I.e. That we
do
> not just act according to "unchangable" laws of nature but that
we are open
> to possibilities of action makes the specificity of human action and its
> moral" character.
>
> In case these possibilities take place within the context of modern
digital
> communication (Internet and the like) we speak of "information
ethics"
> (similarly to "medical ethics" in the case of situations in
which the
> physician/patient/society are involved regarding health). In other words,
we
> ask for an ethical foundation of our decisions within a digital
> communication environment. But in a broader sense, we can say that
> information ethics' deals with norms and values of (human) communication
in
> different media. In this sense we speak for instance of library ethics,
> (mass) media ethics etc. Of course, the ethics of scientific
communication
> belong to information ethics to, concerning not only, for instance,
> plagiarism, but the very idea of sharing our (scientific) ideas with
others
> (which include some kind of "communism of ideas" that
interferes sometimes
> with the (moral/legal) rules of, say, copyright regime(S).
>
> The question you state about the genesis of moral (not ethical!) behavior
is
> a key issue in ethical thinking for centuries (I say: moral behaviour,
> because this is the phenomenon we want to study, "ethical
behavior" being
> the reflection upon it: the question about the genesis of "ethical
behavior"
> is not (basically) different from the question of any other kind of
> scientific behavior": why do we do science? For pragmatical
(survival)
> purposes? For the seek of truth? ... In the case of ethics as reflection
of
> morality, we start with this kind of reflection whe we have problems with
> moral rules. Ethics is a symptom. But this is a broad field of study that
I
> cannot deal with now).
>
> So, what is the genesis of moral behavior? Why do we "feel"
obliged to do
> the good? Is this the right question to start with? (as you see I am
asking
> now two different kinds a questions, an ethical and a
"metaethical"
> (linguistic) one). We can start with the "fact" of human will
(this is what
> Kant and Schopenhauer...) do, by saying that reflection (ethics) is not a
> (enough) motivation for moral action (as intellectualists believe). Kant
> believed that human reason (seeking vor universal laws) is not only of
> theoretical but also of practical kind. Given the fact (!) that we are
> capable of doing science (I.e. Of looking for the universal) means, when
we
> reflect it upon our actions, that we are "compelled" to act
also
> universallistically" which is what Kant calls, as you know, the
categorical
> imperative. How does this idea of universality (or of the formality of
the
> categorical imperative) fits with the "locality" of moral
systems/norms and
> their evolution? And how do we "apply" the Kantian rule to
specific
> situations?
>
> Today we are maybe less Kantians as we think because our belief in human
> reason and its universality is not so strong as two centuries ago. We
have
> some good reasons (theoretial and historical ones) for being sceptical
about
> it.
>
> But not only this, we have in the field of ethics other traditions than
> Western one which makes us more "humble" with regards to our
foundational
> ambitions. In a way, this is less a negative aspect as a positive one
> because it shows is the openness of human cultural evolution and the kind
of
> ethical "indeterminacy" of human reason. But why should our
action and its
> foundation be less complex than, say, the life of a molecule?
>
> Another (older) (Western) tradition of ethics states that the task of
ethics
> is not primarily the fundation of morals but the "design" of
good life (ars
> vitae). What we try to reflect in the information field is the idea (the
> ideas) of what this means in the beginning century. This kind of ethical
> thinking is less "normative" and more "optional".
>
> cheers
>
> Rafael
>
>
> Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro
> Hochschule der Medien (HdM) University of Applied Sciences, Wolframstr.
32,
> 70191 Stuttgart, Germany
> Private: Redtenbacherstr. 9, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany
> E-Mail: rafael@capurro.de; capurro@hdm-stuttgart.de
> Voice Stuttgart: + 49 - 711 - 25706 - 182
> Voice private: + 49 - 721 - 98 22 9 - 22 (Fax: -21)
> Homepage: www.capurro.de
> Homepage ICIE: http://icie.zkm.de
> Homepage IRIE: http://www.i-r-i-e.net
>
>
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Received on Fri Apr 21 13:08:40 2006
